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THE INTERCONNECTION OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL NORMS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF FATWA-GIVING 
A STUDY BASED ON FIELDWORK AT DĀR AL-IFTĀʾ  
NAJAH NADI ABDULFATTAH AHMAD 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the dynamic interplay of the shared legal, personal, and 
societal commitments of mustaftīs, (petitioners), and muftis at Cairo’s Dār al-Iftāʾ, the 
official fatwa council, where I observed 140 fatwa sessions mostly concerning marital 
disputes. It focuses on the role and impact of fatwas in preserving social and gender 
relations in a society with increased religious tendencies and dispositions, such as the 
Egyptian society. The thesis demonstrates that the study of iftāʾ within its 
institutionalized and interactive channels could effectively enhance our understanding of 
the process of legal interpretation in general, and the power dynamics of social/gender 
relations in particular. Therefore, the thesis attempts to develop a model for the study of 
fatwas that gives consideration to petitioners, as agencies of the law; muftis, as social and 
religious interpreters; and the structures of the society of which fatwas are issued, as an 
influential, yet influenced element. 
The thesis demonstrates that Dār al-Iftāʾ provides Egyptians with an alternative to 
courts for religious, marital, and social counseling. It further demonstrates how Dār al-
Iftāʾ aims at preserving marriages, and, by extension, the societal and gender norms. 
During the society preservation attempts, muftis adapted to the social patriarchal 
assumptions that give each married partner privileges in correspondence to their gender 
 iv 
position in the society. Hence, I pay closer attention to women’s involvement in male-
dominated spaces such as religious institutions to negotiate their marital relations and to 
challenge the hegemonic structures of their society. 
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Note on Translation and Transliteration 
Whenever possible, I have used the familiar English forms of Arabic words and names; 
otherwise, I have followed the International Journal of Middle East Studies system of 
transliteration. All quotes from Arabic sources are translated by me, unless stated 
otherwise. 
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Introduction 
Knowing the legal ruling related to every action a Muslim engages in is both 
religiously demanded and socially encouraged in Muslim societies. It is the task of 
religious interpreters—ranging from jurists and muftis to preachers (imams) and judges—
to identify, produce, develop, and deliver Islamic legal rulings. Judges and muftis have 
the most important roles in the interpretive process because of their direct connection to 
the practice of their societies; fatwas are responses to questions posed to muftis by 
petitioners and judgments are verdicts to cases raised in courts by litigants. There are 
several similarities and differences between judgments, issued by judges, and fatwas, 
issued by muftis. The most notable similarity is that both are based on the interpretation 
of the major Islamic religious texts; the Qur’an, and the Prophetic reports—coupled with 
an extensive heritage of Islamic jurisprudence in the case of fatwas, and the national laws 
and codes in the case of judgments. The most notable difference is that judgments are 
legally binding, while fatwas are not. While the application of fatwas is voluntary legally, 
they are, however, religiously authoritative. 
Researchers in Islamic studies and Muslim societies have devoted a great amount 
of academic works to the study of court judgments and, to a lesser extent, of fatwa 
collections. The bulk of these studies is based on written documents from pre-modern 
archives and modern court records and fatwas. Amongst the few studies that investigate 
fatwas, fewer still attempted to study fatwas within the interactive process between 
muftis and mustaftīs, petitioners. The element of mufti- mustaftī interaction adds more to 
the understanding of the interpretive process, and the dynamics of authority in fatwa-
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giving. This thesis thus attempts to analyze the interactive element of fatwa-giving and 
fatwa-seeking, through analysis of fatwa sessions between muftis and mustaftīs at the Dār 
al-Iftāʾ, the Egyptian Fatwa Council. It focuses on the role and impact of fatwas on 
gender relations among Egyptian families and shows how, by comparing Egyptian 
courts’ use of a codified version of Islamic legal rulings and Dār al-Iftāʾ’s lenient use of 
various schools of law, both institutions exercise religious and legal authorities to satisfy 
desired goals that harmonize social relations, but also enforce patriarchal structures. 
Since Egyptian courts under the nation-state system are often inaccessible and 
bureaucratic, the current Dār al-Iftāʾ in its institutionalized form has filled the need by 
providing an accessible and affordable alternative to courts. People resort to Dār al-Iftāʾ 
for the sake of seeking legal advice, negotiating marital disputes, and for the most part to 
fulfill their faith demands and religious needs as Muslims. Corresponding to the people’s 
needs and goals, the muftis of Dār al-Iftāʾ, supported by their legal expertise and social 
legitimacy (as well as the religious authority of their fatwas) provide the society with 
religious preaching, legal advice and social mediation. 
The main contribution of this thesis is to show that, through the dynamic interplay 
of the shared legal, personal, and societal commitments of muftis and mustaftīs, fatwas 
are constructed via the contributions of both parties’ respective powers over the fatwa 
process. Such fatwas, in affecting the mustaftī and by extension society in general, serve 
both personal and societal aims. Creating an alternative space for religious, marital, and 
social counseling, Dār al-Iftāʾ aims at preserving marriages, and, by extension, societal 
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and gender norms. In some cases, this alternative space provides women with greater 
agency and power than the courts; in others, it does not. 
The research consisted of both theory and fieldwork components. For the 
fieldwork, I attended 140 fatwa sessions, and communicated with muftis and employees 
at Dār al-Iftāʾ. For the theoretical component, I engaged with both primary and secondary 
literature on fatwas, court codes, and traditional jurisprudential texts. I also utilized to 
official government websites for personal law codes and administrative procedures.  
I divided my research into three main chapters. In chapter one, I aim to show the 
legacy and significance of fatwas as authoritative religious opinions paying a close 
attention to its contextual nature, as well as to show the increased legitimacy of the Dār 
al-Iftāʾ among Egyptians. I first explain basic notions and assumptions about the issuing 
of fatwas—its relation to both, religious texts and contexts of its receiver— followed by a 
basic introduction on the required legal qualifications for muftis who issue fatwas. 
Second, I give a brief history and development of the Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾ followed by 
profiles of its appointed muftis and main departments in order to contextualize my 
research. 
In chapter two, I aim to demonstrate that muftis use creative dynamics to engage 
in and challenge the traditional Islamic schools of law aiming to remain faithful to the 
traditions while adjusting to modern contexts. Comparing the descriptive analysis of the 
divorce fatwa cases with the Egyptian Shariʿah court codes, I show how muftis, 
concerned about the stability of society, use various strategies to preserve marriages via 
the use of distinct legal discourse against the frequency of divorces in the Egyptian 
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society. I pay special attention to the implication of these pro-marriage and social-
stability stances on women resorting to Dār al-Iftāʾ to investigate their husbands’ divorce 
pronouncements and obtain marital rights. I show that women were granted the support 
of religious fatwas only when their requests are in line with the socially accepted 
religious positions adopted by Dār al-Iftāʾ’ muftis. The overall message I hope to convey 
is that Dār al-Iftāʾ and its muftis created a maverick iftāʾ paradigm to deal with the 
complexity of petitioners’ contexts while retaining a threefold nature of their role as 
muftis in the society; this threefold nature consists of the legal, social, and religious 
aspects of their iftāʾ.  
In chapter three, I further explain this threefold nature of iftāʾ as reflected in the 
negotiation spaces embedded in the iftāʾ and istiftāʾ processes. In particular, muftis and 
petitioners negotiate the social and religious practices as much as they negotiate the 
various legal solutions. The social and legal structure of marriage and the relationship 
between the married couple will be highlighted in this chapter to clarify the scope and 
limits of these negotiations. The basic structure of marriage, as encountered through my 
research, consists of reciprocal rights and duties; the husband owns the obedience right 
over his wife and owes her financial support; the wife owns the financial support right 
over her husband and owes a full obedience to his orders. The recognition of this 
structure by muftis of Dār al-Iftāʾ influenced their fatwas—they issued fatwas in 
correspondence to these marital rights and duties—as well as their social advices and 
religious preaching—they consistently insisted that the adherence to these socially 
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accepted religion-based rights and duties maintains both successful and stable marriages 
and by extension a stable society.  
Overall, it will become evident that the social dimension is strongly present in the 
legal and religious dimensions in the practice of fatwa-giving and fatwa-seeking, which 
proves that understanding societal norms is vital in understanding the process of legal 
formation in this society. With this in mind, this thesis then offers an important reading of 
the legal and social dynamics of the iftāʾ practice in Egypt. First, it aims at identifying 
and analyzing the modified legal model on which Dār al-Iftāʾ depends, and what this 
model entails in terms of Dār al-Iftāʾ’s institutionalized structure and scholarship; second, 
the social practices of divorce, and Dār al-Iftāʾ’s role in preserving and modifying these 
practices; and finally, it aims to look into and beyond the cases presented in the fatwa 
sessions to identify and analyze the use of the religious authoritative institution of Dār al-
Iftāʾ as a means to negotiating marital disputes by Egyptians who seek consultations at 
the Oral Fatwa Department in Dār al-Iftāʾ.  
Focusing on the fatwas issued by means of actual interaction between muftis and 
petitioners in the fatwa sessions at the Oral Fatwa Department at Dār al-Iftāʾ— as 
opposed to other forms of issued fatwas such as written and electronic ones—I aim to 
demonstrate that Dār al-Iftāʾ provides an avenue for Egyptian Muslims to fulfill their 
religious desires, negotiate their social relations in the context of ending marital disputes, 
and participate in the formation of religious authority through their engagement in the 
process of legitimizing religious institutions. As said, I will pay close attention to 
women’s participation in the Dār al-Iftāʾ fatwa sessions, aiming to elucidate how women, 
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as agents of the law, engage in the formation of religious authority by their visits to Dār 
al-Iftāʾ in an attempt to improve their social status as marital partners.  
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Chapter One: Iftāʾ and Dār al-Iftāʾ In Context 
1. Fatwa-Giving: Methods and Structures 
Iftāʾ, the craft of issuing legal opinions, has a well-known contemporary rule that is 
strongly rooted in tradition, which states, “fatwa changes with the changes in times, 
places, cases and persons.1” Iftāʾ then comprises, besides its legal sources of 
interpretation, an active involvement in human affairs including their social norms, 
personal experiences, and situated contexts of each case seeking a fatwa. Due to iftāʾ’s 
complex structure, competence for muftis, who perform it, requires not only the 
knowledge of legal rules, but also the knowledge of these contexts. 
Traditionally, there are several types of muftis based on their legal qualifications, 
and also different types of Ijtihād—the processes of reasoning that jurists employ to 
arrive at a decision that best fits the law pertaining to a particular case2, based on its 
scope and independence in scholarship. These categorizations, as well as a detailed 
description of the whole process of legal interpretation, are intensively discussed in the 
science of ʾUṣūl Al-Fiqh, principles of jurisprudence. They are also discussed with 
specific focus on guidelines to the muftis’ responsibilities and qualifications as well as 
their piety requirements, in Adab Al-Muftī, the etiquette of the mufti, literature3. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Assayūti, Jalalu Ad-Din. Al-Rad ʿala man Akhlada ʾla Alʾard. Unpublished manuscript. P, 181. 
2 Hallaq, Wael. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. P, 27, 
2 Hallaq, Wael. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. P, 27, 
3 Frequently used references on Adab al-Mufti literature: 
a) Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā b. Sharaf. Adab al-Fatwá wa-l-Muftī wa-l-Mustaftī. Damascus: Dār 
al-Fikr, 1988. 
b) Al-Timūrtāshī, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh. Muʿīn al-Muftī ʿalá Jawāb al-Mustafatī. Beirut: Dār al-
Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah, 2009. 
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practice of iftāʾ, however, is not always as clear, direct, or structured as it seems in these 
theoretical writings. These writings usually try to draw a picture of “an institution that is 
fully mature, timeless, and highly ideal in character, paying little attention to historical 
developments or to actual circumstances to muftis in specific local settings.”4 
 I attempt to draw a contextually situated picture of the practice of iftāʾ, one that 
closely considers the interaction between legal and social norms. I investigate the legal 
interpretive methods employed in fatwa-giving sessions. These interpretive methods 
consist of the use of legal expertise, shared social contexts between muftis and 
petitioners, and a negotiation process muftis and petitioners use in order to harmonize 
fatwas with the social practices in their societies. More specifically, I wish to synthesize 
the following: (A) a basic theoretical tʾaṣīl, authenticated rooting, of the Islamic family 
laws and fatwa-giving principles in the foundational texts of jurisprudence and iftāʾ 
manuals; (B) a contextualized fieldwork of family law fatwa sessions conducted at the 
Dār al-Iftāʾ of Egypt; (C) an anthropological analysis of gender relations in the Egyptian 
society as it appears in both the questions asked and the fatwas given. By means of this 
synthesis, I hope to investigate firstly, the role Dār al-Iftāʾ of Egypt, as an authoritative 
religious institution plays in the preservation of the social relations in Egyptian society, 
and what it specifically entails in terms of marital disputes. Secondly, I hope to show that 
iftāʾ, through its distinct relationship with societal norms, has been actively influential in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
c) Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Assayyed Muhammad Amīn. Sharh Manzūmat ʿUqūd rasm al-muftī. (Unpublished 
manuscript. 
d) Al-Shawkānī, Muhammad b. ʿAli. Commentary, Badrī, Abī Mūsʿb. Al-Qawl al-Mufīd fi Adillat al-
Ijtīhād wa Al-Taqlīd (Beirut, Dār al-Kitāb: 1992). 
4 Muhammad Khalid Masʿud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers (eds.), Islamic Legal Interpretation: 
Muftīs and Their Fatwas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. P, 15. 
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Egyptian society particularly in the past few years due to advancements in media and 
technology, thus enhancing Dār al-Iftāʾ’s accessibility and authority. Lastly, I base on the 
above two points, a discussion of women’s use and position in Dār al-Iftāʾ—what they 
want to achieve from resorting to Dār al-Iftāʾ and what benefits, if any, Dār al-Iftāʾ is 
able to offer to them.  
The following example illustrates the dynamic interplay of Islamic legal doctrine, 
Iftāʾ, and Egyptian social practices and circumstances; Sheikh ʿAli Jomʿa, a prominent 
Azhari Sheikh, Professor, and Egypt’s appointed Grand Mufti since 2003, issued a fatwa 
on the permissibility to bury more than one body in the same grave given that Egypt, 
particularly Cairo, has very limited burial plots. 
In the fatwa, Sheikh Jomʿa explained that generally, it is impermissible to bury 
more than one individual in a single grave. He continues to explain, however, that it is 
permissible to do so in Egypt due to limited burial plots. Sheikh Jomʿa analogized this to 
the case of burying martyrs of the battle of Uḥud (fought in 625) where the people had to 
bury more than one in the same grave because there were too many dead bodies and not 
enough space. He also suggested that in the Egyptian case, they might construct multiple 
levels inside the same grave. Alternatively, people would need to construct an arch made 
of bricks or stones over the body previously buried without touching the bodies since it is 
forbidden. Then they would heap earth over the arch and bury a new corpse over it5. Of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I have attended this particular fatwa session of which Sheikh ʿAli Jomʿa between 2006-2007, for 
references to the same fatwa written online: 
English: Jomʿa,ʿAli. “Fatwas: Customs and Modern Issues.” Web. <http://www.ali-
gomaa.com/?page=fatwas&fatwa_details=449>. 
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course this fatwa can be applied to other places that have the same circumstances, but the 
issuing of this particular fatwa in this particular time in the 20th century is significant. The 
fatwa could have alternatively followed the preponderant rule of impermissibility, and 
suggested that people should bury the dead outside the city in other spacious areas such 
as the empty desert. However, there were other contextual considerations that prevented 
Sheikh Jomʿa from making such suggestions. For example, the economic situation makes 
it nearly impossible for most Egyptians to afford buying these available lands, and the 
government does not provide any assistance in this regard. In addition, there is a long-
standing Egyptian tradition that people visit the graves of their relatives regularly, and it 
would cause many difficulties for them to travel for such visits if they bury the dead far 
away. Just as the questioner mentioned, it is also a practice of Egyptian families to keep 
all family members in the same graveyard. These considerations altogether made it very 
clear that the fatwa here is not depending solely on the legal rulings, but also the 
practices, norms, and traditions of the particular context of which it is given. 
Muftis must understand the specific situation of each petitioner to determine the 
most relevant opinion among the available legal opinions; the more they succeed in 
understating the elements surrounding the istiftāʾ, request for a fatwa, and story, the more 
they are able to provide an answer that is in the best interest of their questioner. This 
concern of providing the most appropriate answer to each question explains the flexibility 
in fatwa-giving and the different fatwas given to different people with different 
circumstances on the same question. An example to illustrate the particularity of a given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Arabic: Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣryyah, the Egyptian Fatwa Council. “Fatawa Sheikh ʿAli Jomʿa.” Web. 
<http://www.Dār-alifta.org/ViewFatwa.aspx?ID=439>. 
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fatwa to its mustafī, petitioner, is one that I encountered in one of Sheikh Jomʿa’s fatwa 
sessions as well as in my recent fieldwork at Dār al-Iftāʾ.  
In his book Fatwas of Muslim Women, (Fatāwa al-Marʾa al-Muslimā,) which is 
based on his fatwa sessions, Sheikh Jomʿa discusses a fatwa regarding a man who 
engaged in illicit sex with his mother-in-law before and after the consumption of his 
marriage to her daughter. The question was submitted to Sheikh Jomʿa in a fatwa session 
by a man who claims to have been asked this question by the husband in question 
regarding the validity of this husband’s marriage and whether his illicit sex with the 
mother-in-law invalidated his marriage. Sheikh Jomʿa, after seeking God’s refuge from 
such sins, immediately answered the question by stating that the man’s wife is certainly 
forbidden on him and that he must immediately separate from the entire family. He 
explained that the man’s simultaneous sexual relationship with the mother and daughter 
is absolutely forbidden, and although some jurists claim that “what is forbidden does not 
forbid what is permissible,” denoting that the forbidden sex with the mother-in-law does 
not forbid the permissible marriage to the daughter, the man in question’s repeated 
forbidden act with his mother-in-law does indeed forbid and invalidate his marriage to 
her daughter even if both are honestly repentant, based on the established jurisprudential 
rule of “blocking the means”6 to an illegal act. Explaining the various possibilities that 
may affect the giving of a fatwa, Sheikh Jomʿa added that he was asked the same 
question by another man who also engaged in illicit sex with his mother-in-law, but since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Jomʿa, ʿAli. Fatawa al-Marʾah al-Muslima, Fatwas for Muslim Women. Egypt: Nahdet Maṣr, 2010. P, 
138. 
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she had died by the time the question was asked to Sheikh Jomʿa, he permitted the 
husband to continue his marriage and seek repentance7. 
Hence, it is clear that the difference in circumstances in these two cases have 
rendered a different answer to the same question. In the first case, Mufti Jomʿa looked at 
two main elements of the question: the repetition of the forbidden act, and the possibility 
of continuing it since both parties are alive. In the second case, however, the repetition of 
the illicit sex is neither mentioned in the question, even if it could be true, nor is it 
available anymore with the death of the mother-in-law. Therefore, the Mufti looked at the 
current marriage and its stability, and thus gave a fatwa, also based on available texts, 
more interestingly, the same above mentioned text, “what is forbidden does not forbid 
what is permissible,” explaining that the “blocking the means” rule is stronger than the 
former rule and hence, it played a greater role in the first case but did not have the same 
effect in the second. 
In case 14 in my fieldwork, a man in his forties who works in a mechanical shop 
in Munshaʾat Nāṣer, a very poor street in Cairo, came with his elderly mother. The 
mother began the session (and actually requested that I leave the room, but the mufti told 
her I am a researcher and that it is important for me to observe) by saying that her son has 
a serious problem for which she hopes the mufti will find a solution. She proceeded to 
explain that her son “committed adultery with his mother-in-law and has greatly regretted 
it and wants to repent to God, but what about his marriage, his wife, and his kids?” The 
mufti directed his words to the silent husband and said, “What brought you here? Why 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Jomʿa, p, 139. 
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now?” The husband responded: “I was at work and I heard the Qur’anic chapter of Sūrat 
an-Nisāʾ, and since then I’m so afraid of God and will never go back to this sin.” The 
mufti then gave the man the following fatwa: “Your wife is still your wife, but if you ever 
go back to this forbidden relationship with her mother, your wife will be forbidden for 
you now that you know.” The mufti turned to the mother and said, “and he [the husband] 
shall never even see this mother-in-law again; he has to cut all ties to her completely.” 
Back to the husband, the mufti continued: “And never tell your wife about your 
relationship with her mother for the sake of their mother-daughter relationship.” 
Here, the mufti issued the fatwa that Sheikh Jomʿa gave in the second case 
mentioned earlier though the mother-in-law is still alive in this case. The ruling in this 
case considered other factors such as; the fact that the presence of the man’s mother, an 
authoritative figure over the son, showed his seriousness in repentance. Another factor 
considered was the man’s residential locality; Munshaʾat Nāṣer is a notoriously 
dangerous slum area, especially for parentless children who become homeless. Therefore, 
in an effort to safeguard the man’s children the mufti was keen to preserve the marriage. 
Finally and seemingly to me, the man is very poor, and if the mufti invalidated his 
marriage he probably would not have been able to afford to remarried, which may in fact 
become a cause of having illicit sex with other women including his mother-in-law. 
These examples, as well as similar cases I plan to discuss, demonstrate that when it 
comes to the practice of iftāʾ, muftis are not only interested in the precise legal issues, but 
also, and even more so, in resolving the situations they encounter in a way that preserves 
and harmonizes social relationships. It might seem to people who do not pay attention to 
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such essential features of the practice of fatwa-giving as a contradiction in legal rulings, 
but in fact as the above examples reveal, it is not. Giving different fatwas to different 
people is the natural result of the rule I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, “fatwa 
changes with the changes in times, places, cases and persons.” Fatwa is then a step after 
the legal ruling, al-ḥukm ash-sharʿī; the legal ruling is primarily a product of the legal 
scholarship in reading religious legal texts through the understanding and context of its 
producer, the jurist. The fatwa, however, is constituted through a mutual interaction 
between the mufti’s scholarship and the petitioner’s particular case. Jurists perform 
Ijtihād to produce different legal rulings to human actions whereas muftis perform iftāʾ to 
choose the most appropriate one of these legal rulings to the question posed to them. Of 
course, muftis can also be mujtahid jurists and perform both procedures, but it is not a 
condition for their eligibility to practice iftāʾ.  
It is worth noting here that it is stated in the (Iftāʾ methodology) section of the Dār 
al- Iftāʾ’s “the etiquette of giving a fatwa” manual that the Dār al-Iftāʾ use and transmit 
“the four well-known Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Mālikī, Hanafī, Shafiʿī and 
Hanbalī) while also acknowledging and take into consideration the other schools of 
jurisprudence that Muslims follow in different parts of the world, which are “Jaʿfarī, 
Zaydī, ʾIbādī and Dhahirī”8. This methodology is a major factor in the flexibility Dār al-
Iftāʾ enjoys in terms of following multiple madhhabs, schools of law, instead of 
specified-madhhab based iftāʾ, which in fact was the most common type of iftāʾ before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣryyah, the Egyptian Fatwa Council. “The Establishment of Dār al-Iftāʾ: History and 
Development.” Web. < http://www.dar-alifta.org/Module.aspx?Name=aboutdar>. 
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the institutionalization of iftāʾ through fatwa councils9. In fact, this is one of the features 
that al-Azhar, as the oldest and most authoritative Islamic studies institutions, is proud of. 
Ahmad At-Tayyeb, the Great Sheikh of Al-Azhar, has emphasized in several occasions 
that the preservation of the four traditional Sunni schools of law is a main goal for Al-
Azhar as it is believed preserving these schools of law is the safeguard to Shariʿah’s 
pluralism. 
Next, I am going to briefly explain important iftāʾ principles that are most relevant 
to this work followed by a profile of the Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾ that will help us understand 
in more detail its position in the Egyptian society.  
It is important to mention here that it is not my concern to give a literature overview 
of the Adab Al-Fatwa, although I do intend to engage with its materials throughout my 
paper, but rather to pave the road to the next chapters on this thesis. The first iftāʾ 
principles I will be discussing deals with the relationship between the question and the 
fatwa issued as an answer to it. The second deals with the exact legal procedures of 
which muftis need in order to perform iftāʾ and that also define the limited scope of 
Ijtihād they are entitled to. These iftāʾ principles will help us understand the essential 
elements of muftis’ work, their actions, as well as what is to be expected of them as 
muftis in the fatwa sessions.  
i. Iftāʾ as an Interpretive Process: Questions-Answers Correspondence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Muhammad Khalid Masʿud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers. P, 22. 
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As determined in adab al-fatwa manuals10, constructing a fatwa should correspond 
to the question asked to the muftis. Thus, Fatwa is constructively connected to the act of 
asking questions. Imam Yaḥyā b. Sharaf An-Nawawī (d. 1300), for instance, insists that 
the mufti should answer questions only on the basis of the facts stated in the istiftāʾ’, the 
question seeking the fatwa,11 and that the fatwa applies only to the one who requests it. 
Fatwas are not to be generally applied by others unless they encounter the exact same 
situation, which, according to some, should be determined by muftis as well. This 
emphasis on the adherence to the question being asked and the limitation in application to 
the fatwa issued makes it clear that the Iftāʾ’s interpretive process starts by the asking of 
the question, the istiftāʾ. In this regard, it is the petitioner’s responsibility to draw a 
concrete picture of the fatwa case, and accordingly, the mufti begins to conceptualize the 
case presented in order to place it under a legal category that would allow him to explore 
the legal options related to the case at hand. Questions are of great significance; the 
premises and facts given by the petitioner(s) are crucial elements and influential factors 
in the issuing of a fatwa since they formulate the comprehension of the fatwa case for the 
mufti. 
Having said that, and because individual practitioners have their own commitments, 
stories, and, we encounter, both historically and in modern times, that carefully, and 
sometimes selectively, structured questions posed by petitioners and litigants aiming to 
reach certain results and favorable answers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Al-Nawawī, p, 26, Ibn ʿĀbidīn, p, 30-39. 
11 Al-Nawawī, 46. 
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Indeed, petitioners, who are mostly laypeople, will not always be successful in 
putting together facts that are legally influential, i.e. facts that can be recognized by 
jurists as bases and grounds of legal rulings, aḥkam. In other words, petitioners may not 
recognize what sort of information are relevant to the making of legal rulings—so that 
they would highlight in their questions—instead, they highlight their concerns and 
experiences, and since muftis are required to deal with the facts included in the questions, 
these petitioners’ inputs then become essential to the formulation of the legal rulings.. 
Hence, petitioners use, in order to achieve their goal of influencing the mufti’s answers, 
the social norms they share with the muftis of their societies as part of the istiftāʾ 
procedure. Muftis, who aim to preserve the society’s relations and values as previously 
stated, take into consideration these social norms raised by petitioners. 
Hence, by emphasizing facts that are not relevant to the legal arguments, but are 
socially, religiously, and sometimes, psychologically influential in the istiftāʾ, petitioners 
attempted to influence the mufti's perception to the cases in order to reach favorable 
answers. Individuals attempt to use the religious authority embedded in the Dār al-Iftāʾ to 
claim rights over other individuals and to negotiate duties. Examples of petitioners’ 
attempts to influence muftis by socially recognized concerns appeared in many different 
forms in the fatwa sessions I attended. For instance, a husband kept complaining about 
his wife’s dress code, which is not related to his legal question, in a divorce incident to 
place the blame on her for causing the divorce pronouncement. The husband then 
attempted, on the basis of his blame to the wife, to dispute post-marriage financial rights 
on the basis that the wife’s behavior is a main cause to their marriage dissolution. In 
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another case, a divorced woman complained about her ex-husband’s shortcomings in 
paying child support and other expenditures, while her legal question was about the 
permissibility of preventing him from seeing their daughter—whom she has full custody 
over—until she gets a full payment of the child support. A third case showed a father-in-
law telling a story of his son’s marriage and the amount of social, economic, and moral 
losses the daughter-in-law caused his son, while the question was whether his son is 
permitted to divorce her without having to fully pay any post-marriage rights to her 
because of her behaviors. All of these cases indicate fatwa-seekers’ ignorance of what is 
relevant in legal questions, but at the same time shows how they bring their social 
concerns—that were not in all times agreed upon by both spouses, i.e. a spouse may bring 
a societal norm that s/he adhere to while the other is not, such as the dress code in the 
previous example that the wife thought was completely appropriate and the husband 
thought it was not—to the legal procedure. The awareness of the crucial role of social and 
moral norms that influence muftis’ opinions, then, is a must in the study of fatwas and 
their relation to the contexts of their receivers. 
In his article, “The Significance of Istiftāʾ in the Fatwā Discourse,” Khalid Masʿud 
explains the strong connection between fatwa, istiftāʾ, and social norms by saying: “The 
scope of a particular fatwa is defined by the istiftāʾ. Istiftāʾ is a medium, which is used 
frequently to raise questions about new social practices whether they could be assimilated 
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into the Islamic tradition, and about how conflicts between social and legal norms should 
be reconciled”12. 
One may conclude out of this question-answer correspondence that whoever gets to 
present their case for a fatwa, whether there’s more than petitioner, guarantees him or 
herself a higher chance of getting his or her desired fatwa. In other words, the more the 
petitioner is able to state the facts from their own point of view, the more they are likely 
to influence the mufti’s answer to these facts. Thus, there is an inseparable relationship 
between istiftāʾ and iftāʾ in both their constituting of a fatwa, and their influencing by the 
social context. 
This interconnection of istiftāʾ and iftāʾ thus forces the mufti to understand the 
social norms in order to be qualified to give a fatwa. The question then focuses on if all 
petitioners in the fatwa sessions attended at Dār al-Iftaāʾ were equally given the chance to 
speak. Which one of the petitioners, if any, was granted the priority of being heard or the 
right to tell the story? Although it is traditionally established that it is not the mufti’s 
responsibility to investigate the presented facts, were there any techniques by which 
muftis were able to justly take into consideration all aspects of the fatwa case? 
The answer to these questions, which will be further clarified throughout this thesis, 
depends in the context under consideration on the type of the fatwa. In divorce cases for 
instance, the priority of speaking, without a doubt, is granted to petitioning husbands and 
not to their wives. Wives, however, were consulted in cases when husbands claimed they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Masʿud, Khalid. “The Significance of Istiftāʾ in the Fatwa Discourse.” The Islamic Research Institute: 
The International Islamic University, Islamabad Vol. 48, No 3, Autumn 2009. P, 348 
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forgot or were not sure of the exact circumstances of the divorce incident. Otherwise, it 
was the husband who was asked to tell the entire story. However, wives were able to 
speak after their husbands about problems, concerns, and complaints regarding the 
marital relationship in general. Muftis’ justification of this position is that the divorce 
pronouncement and other related-legal issues, such as intention, are in the husband’s 
hand for he is the one who has the right to initiate it in the first place; this matter will be 
discussed in further detail. Therefore, wives may only be consulted as a second source 
when needed. As for non-divorce questions, muftis equally hear all petitioners or at least 
the ones who asked to tell or re-tell the story in question. 
 Thus, the narrative and the art of asking questions is an essential part of the 
formulation of the fatwa; it is where the experiences of ordinary Muslims’ and practical 
applications come in the front of the legal process to steer its interpretation and to 
emphasize individuals’ share in the iftāʾ authority. In other words, muftis and their 
knowledge of the legal norms coupled with petitioners and their experiences/social norms 
share the authority and power of the religious fatwas because they both take part of its 
formation. This shared interpretive process places a great value on the human element in 
the production of fatwas. Muftis, as Kevin Reinhart explains, “are not merely legal 
scientists reporting the transcendent facts. They respond also to their knowledge of the 
petitioner and his circumstances as well.13” This last point on the shared authority 
between muftis and their petitioners will be further developed in the third chapter of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Reinhart A, Kevin. “Transcendence and Social Practice: Muftīs and Qādīs as Religious Interpreters.” 
(Annales Islamologiques, 27: 1993) p. 5-28, p13. 
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thesis. It is important to place the increased authority and legitimacy to the non-binding 
legal opinions, fatwas, in its larger scale of the increased religious demands that is a 
result to the “significant changes in how Islamic authority is legitimized through the 
acquisition and demonstration of knowledge14,” and through obtaining fatwas in our 
context. Thus, Muslims’ demands for religious instructions and religious answers to their 
questions and concerns have led to an expansion in the production of fatwas in their 
societies. 
ii. Muftis and Their Legal Qualifications: Ijtihād al-Manāṭ 
Turning from explaining the complex nature of the iftāʾ procedure and the relation 
between it and istiftāʾ, the most relevant Uṣulī, foundational, principle to the practice of 
fatwa-giving, is Ijtihād al-Manāṭ. Singling out Ijtihād al-Manāṭ among all other Uṣulī 
principles for discussion does not imply that it is the only necessary legal procedure in 
the fatwa-giving, but rather it is to emphasize the importance of the contextual linkages 
of the fatwa question through explaining the legal procedure that precedes the issuing of 
the fatwa; it relies primarily on these contextual linkages after already investigating the 
legal texts and the available legal rulings for the question asked.  
As mentioned before, understanding the essence of the muftis’ work helps explain 
the method they follow in the fatwa sessions as well as the limits of their legal authority. 
The legal authority is determined through the level of their Ijtihād, which is through their 
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Leiden: Brill, 2012. P, 6-7. 
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ability to produce suitable fatwas to the questions posed to them using the religious legal 
texts directly or choose from established legal rulings.   
The particular type of Ijtihād muftis deal with is called Ijtihād Al-Manat, also 
known as al-Ijtihād fil ‘illa, the independent reasoning of the basis of the legal rulings. It 
is the jurist’s duty in this Ijtihād to identify the basis behind each given legal ruling 
whether already established, i.e. in religious texts or previous Ijtihāds of early jurists, or 
newly established. For this reason, Ijtihād Al-Manāṭ is the most essential method in 
deducing laws from religious texts according to the Islamic science of Ūṣūl al-Fiqh; it 
functions through the investigation of the ʿilla, cause— the tool with which jurists can 
continually produce substantive laws through, for example, the use of qiās, analog, which 
is mainly based on the common ʿilla between an aṣl, established law, and a farʿ, new 
branch.  
This type of Ijtihād is divided into three categories: the first is takhrīj al-manāṭ, the 
deduction of the basis of a ruling, and it deals with legal rulings that are established in the 
religious texts with no specification of their basis or attributes that can be suitable ʿilla 
for them. Jurists investigate the Shariʿah’s principles and rulings in order to find the most 
appropriate basis for such rulings and accordingly apply them, or give them as fatwas, to 
the cases of which carry the same basis. Al-Ghazālī gives an example for this case using 
texts that forbid alcohol where drinking alcoholic drinks is made forbidden with no 
mention of the basis for its forbiddance. Ghazālī states “So, we [jurists] deduce the basis 
of the ruling bilrʿi wal nazar, by reason and speculative reasoning, so we say: “He 
forbids it [alcohol] for that it is intoxicant, therefore, it [intoxication] is its [forbiddance] 
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ʿilla,’ and thus, we make analogy on wine [based on that they share the ʿilla of 
intoxication], and this is Ijtihād al-qyās, the analogical rational reasoning.”15 Another 
example that is more relevant to this work is the established legal ruling that allows for 
each marriage three divorces based on the Qur’anic text (2:229) “A divorce is only 
permissible twice: after that, the parties should either hold together on equitable terms, or 
separate with kindness,” and the prophetic Hadith narratives that explained the third, 
when companions thought the Qur’anic verse allow divorce only twice, by saying that 
“separate with kindness” which presupposed a return after the second divorce, and thus 
making a third divorce allowable. Jurists who considered the basis of the permissibility of 
the three divorces ruling is literally, i.e. three divorce utterances or declarations, counted 
the thrice divorce as an execution of the allowed divorce number. Jurists who considered 
the basis of the permissibility of the three divorces ruling is conceptual, i.e. they are three 
chances in marriage that constitute three marriages, which presupposes divorcing and 
remarrying twice counted the ‘thrice divorce’ as only execution of one out of the three 
divorces. 
The second type of Ijtihād al-manāt is tanqīh al-manāt, the refinement of the basis 
of a ruling. Similar to the first category, there is no specified ‘illa for the mentioned legal 
ruling. However, in tanqīḥ al-manāt and as Wa’il Hallaq defines it, there are attributes 
that accompany the rulings and can possibly be its ‘illa, which makes it easier for jurists 
to either examine each until they specify the most appropriate one or just agree that any 
one of them is possible, and determine their suitability for the specific cases. Hallaq 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Al- Ghāzālī, Abī Hamīd. Al-Mūṣtaṣfā Min ʿilm al-Uṣūl. Cairo: Al-Halabī: Unknown year of publication. 
P, 233. 
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states: “tanqīḥ al-manāṭ is the identification of the ratio legis [ʿilla] insofar as it is 
isolated from attributes that are conjoined within the texts.16” In this case, jurists perform 
Ijtihād to specify one of them as the ruling’s ʿilla. It is clear how these two categories 
result in major differences in the jurists’ opinions. An example of this type of Ijtihād 
that is relevant to this thesis is the standard divorce fatwa that Dār al-Iftāʾ issues to the 
standard Egyptian divorce pronouncement where they consider a specific attribute as the 
basis of the divorce legal ruling as will be discussed in the second chapter. 
As for the third category, taḥqīq al-manāt and the application and verification of 
the basis of the legal ruling, it is of utmost importance in the craft of acquiring the legal 
rulings, the issuing of fatwas, and in the application of these rulings in human practices in 
a specific context. Much to what I have encountered, the muftis of Dār al-Iftāʾ do not deal 
with the first two categories as much as they do with the third since the legal rulings’ 
basis for the fatwas that I attended, for example, are mostly known or established by the 
Grand Mufti and the senior muftis. Fatwa trustees then follow these established fatwas in 
their fatwa sessions, but these bases’ existence or non-existence in a specific case is what 
muftis need to know. It is the mufti’s job here to determine through the examination of 
the context provisions if a ruling is applicable in a specific case or not. For instance, the 
known ruling regarding the requirement of a witness is that s/he is ʿadl, just; “But to 
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determine the characteristics and qualifications on the basis of which a witness can be 
typically described as ʿadl is the function of mujtahid”17.  
Another example that clarifies this method and is evident in the fatwa sessions that I 
attended is related to nafaqa, expenditure. Ghāzālī explains how muftis use taḥqīq al-
manāt to give a fatwa regarding expenditure by explaining, “The basis of the legal ruling 
in expenditure of dependents is ‘sufficiency’, and it is known by naṣ, known-text, but the 
fact that a pound is sufficient for this specific person or not is acquired by Ijtihād and 
speculation”18. This method is also clearly found in giving a fatwa regarding divorce 
since that the base of the divorce rulings are known by text or by the above two types of 
Ijtihād. However, the determination of the establishment of one of these bases, such as 
the intention in the kināya divorce, in a specific case is acquired, as will be explained in 
detail, through the performance of the Ijtihād of taḥqīq al-manāṭ. 
Thus, in this process two essential parts are being dealt with: the first is the 
knowledge of the basis of the legal rulings, and the second is the knowledge of the 
contextual factors by which we are able to determine and connect the legal rulings to the 
petitioners’ cases in a specific society. Successful muftis should be able to manage the 
use of these three categories while giving a fatwa in each specific case. As mentioned 
previously, the last category, taḥqīq al-manāt, is the most essential element in fatwa 
giving due to its direct connection to the application of the legal rulings in particular 
cases. It is worth noting that because Dār al-Iftāʾ is an institution, it attempts to be 	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309. 
18 Ghāzālī, p, 230. 
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consistent in the fatwas issued by all of its muftis, and therefore, it agrees—by its fatwa 
committee led by the Grand Mufti—on standard legal rulings to be followed by their 
muftis and fatwa trustees in the fatwa sessions. Accordingly, the job of these muftis and 
fatwa trustees is to investigate the existence of these legal rulings already established by 
the committee in the presented cases. An example to this is Dār al-Iftāʾ’s standard fatwa 
in the common Egyptian divorce cases, which will be discussed in the second chapter. 
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2. Dār al-Iftāʾ of Egypt: History and Development (1895-Present) 
i. The Establishment of the Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾas an institution 
Iftāʾ began with the beginning of Islam itself. The prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and 
his companions after him are said to be the first to practice iftāʾ19. In the early Islamic 
history, iftāʾ remained a private independent practice that serves the continuation of 
living according to the Islamic laws through connecting these laws to its practice until it 
took a public institutionalized form when Muftis first started to work as consultants for 
the official Qādīs, judges, since the ʾUmayyāds (661-720).20 In Egypt, iftāʾ was also 
associated with the courts while retaining an independent practice outside the courts 
simultaneously. By the late nineteenth century, iftāʾ took an official institutionalized form 
independent from the court system known as the Dār al-Iftāʾ. 
  As an overview of the establishment of the Mufti position and the institution of 
Iftāʾ, the position of the Mufti was well known to Egypt since the Mamlūk era [Egypt 
1250-1517]. Mufti Effendi Miṣr was the position title given by Muḥammad ʿAli to Sheikh 
Muḥammad Elmahdy as the first state appointed Mufti of Egypt in 184821. However, 
according to the official records of the Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾ, its establishment as the 
official council of fatwa wasn’t until 1895. Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen suggests in his 
book “Defining Islam for the Egyptian State: Muftis and Fatwas of the Dār Al-Iftā” that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Muhammad Khalid Masʿud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers, p, 5. 
20 Muhammad Khalid Masʿud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers, p, 5. 
21 Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣryyah, the Egyptian Fatwa Council. “The Establishment of Dār al-Iftāʾ: History and 
Development.” Web. < http://www.dar-alifta.org/Module.aspx?Name=aboutdar>. 
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1895 is probably when the fatwa records, sijillāt, began to be carefully registered22. The 
first Muftī ad-Dyār al-Miṣrīyah, the Grand Muftī of Egyptian lands, was Sheikh Hassūna 
an-Nawāwī (d.1929), who was the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar at the same time23.The 
position of the Mufti in Egypt was generally connected to the courts system, yet the 
appointment of a singular grand mufti was not established until after the official Dār al-
Iftāʾ was founded. Rather, there were multiple muftis for the multiple Sharīʿa courts that 
employed muftis of the four Sunni madhhabs, schools of law, who worked as consultants 
in each court24. 
   In addition to the court muftis, there were also multiple madhhab specific muftis 
for each Egyptian district, mudurīyah, and state, wilayah (city), as well as a mufti for the 
ministry of justice, and another for the ministry of endowments. Above all these muftis, 
there was the Great Hanafī mufti of Egypt, who was also called Muftī ad-Dyār al-
Miṣrīyah and the title was transformed to the Dār al-Iftāʾ’s Grand Mufti25. After Sheikh 
Muḥammad ʿAli’s appointment as the Muftī ad-Dyār al-Miṣrīyah in 1899, the position 
consolidated with that of the ministry of justice; the muftī ad-Dyār al-Miṣrīyah since that 
time is both the Grand mufti of the Dār al-Iftāʾ and the ministry of justice26.  
  Until 1931, the Dār al-Iftāʾ muftis were also consultants in the Shariʿah court, but 
after the Shariʿah Court Ordinance of 1931, muftis could “no longer hold any office of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣryyah, the Egyptian Fatwa Council. “Al-Mishwar, the Journey: The Most Important 
Achievements of Dār al-Iftāʾ 2003-2013: A Ten Years Report.” In print. P, 103 
23 Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣryyah, the Egyptian Fatwa Council. “The Establishment of Dār al-Iftāʾ: History and 
Development.” Web. < http://www.dar-alifta.org/Module.aspx?Name=aboutdar>. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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authority within the Shariʿa court system27. Subsequently, Dār al-Iftāʾ’s fatwas, as 
Skovgaard-Petersen states, “had lost all binding authority and were from then on merely 
of an advisory character28.” In this sense, fatwas of Dār al-Iftāʾ lost its state authority and 
binding source that they used to get from their affiliation with a binding authoritative 
institution of courts. Throughout this thesis I argue that Dār al-Iftāʾ has developed 
another source of authority that relies on the social legitimacy though its involvement in 
the Egyptian society. In fact, the Dār al-Iftāʾ’s detachment of the state courts, in addition 
to eventually gaining their independence from the Ministry of Justice, has helped them to 
earn the trust of the people of Egypt, and consequently develop a society-based authority. 
Such authority and involvement in the social affairs placed Dār al-Iftāʾ in a competed 
position over authorities with courts since both deal with marital disputes within the 
Egyptian societies.  
  Thus, the gradual establishment of the Dār al-Iftāʾ as an independent institution 
from the bureaucratic state courts was an advantage for Dār al-Iftāʾ. The independence 
from the court opened the possibility for Dār al-Iftāʾ to become, similar to Shariʿah 
courts, authoritative as a religious institution, and yet, unlike the court, accessible to the 
members of the society because it is not bureaucratic. Another source of independence 
was their financial independency; Dār al-Iftāʾ’s financial administration was under the 
Ministry of Justice from 1899 until 2007 when Dār al-Iftāʾ, for the first time, became a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Jakob, Skovgaard-Peterse. Defining Islam for the Egyptian State: Muftis and Fatwas of the Dār Al-Iftā. 
Leiden: Brill, 1997. P, 105. 
28 Jakob Skovgaard-Peterse, p, 105. 
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financially independent official institution. The implications of this independency will be 
discussed in further detail.   
  It is worth noting here that contrary to common belief, Dār al-Iftāʾ is independent 
from al-Azhar as an institution, although all of its muftis are by definition Azharis either 
by their affiliation to Azhari education, both at the grade school and university level, or 
by their traditional Azhari training. The classical methods of Azhari learning are based on 
ijāzā, license and certification to teach, and sanad, continued transmission granted by a 
Sheikh to a student that qualifies her/him to transmit their knowledge to others by means 
of the same transmission. The fact that muftis of Dār al-Iftāʾ are Azharis is yet another 
factor of their religious authority since al-Azhar, with its history as the oldest Islamic 
institution in Egypt, is already authoritative for the common Egyptians. 
ii. A Transformative Social Media Outreaching: Sheikh ʿAli Jomʿa and the 
Reform of Dār al-Iftāʾ 
  In the past ten years, coinciding with Sheikh ʿAli Jomʿa’s appointment as the 
Egyptian Grand Mufti in 2003, Dār al-Iftāʾ’s history witnessed a great transformation of 
its social media that significantly increased its presence and authority in the Egyptian 
society. Sheikh ʿAli Jomʿa came with a vision about the importance of ʿulama’s 
engagement in the society, and the emphasis on the collective institutionalized structure 
of the religious sectors such as Dār al-Iftāʾ. Therefore, immediately after appointed. 
Sheikh Ali, who was supported by his already established fame and credibility in both the 
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academic Azhari circles for being one of the top legal scholars at al-Azhar29, and by the 
Egyptian society for being one of the leading religious media programs figures, started 
the reconstruction of Dār al-Iftāʾ’s infrastructure. 
  In these ten years, Dār al-Iftāʾ created multiple different Fatwa councils and 
departments to respond to the complexity of the new vision of Dār al-Iftāʾ, which 
necessitated the appointment of new committee members and administrators. As 
mentioned in their tenth annual report, the total number of the Dār al-Iftāʾ employees 
before 2003 was only forty, and currently it is more three hundred. Dār al-Iftāʾ has also, 
through their Research Center, worked on the careful documentations of the fatwas they 
issue which become resources for muftis under training. All these efforts aim to enhance 
the local and global presence of the Dār al-Iftāʾ. As a result a tremendous number of 
agreements, programs, and other corporations were arranged between Dār al-Iftāʾ and 
other fatwa councils/religious institutions all over the world30.  
  Most important developments within these ten years, that are most relevant to my 
argument of the society-based authority that Dār al-Iftāʾ has developed after its 
independence from the authority of courts, are those helped placing Dār al-Iftāʾ to a 
nationally and internationally recognized religious institution through connecting it and 
its sources to the global social media links. For example, a multi-languages website was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Another key factor of Sheikh ʿAli Jomʿa’s credibility and reputation is that in 1998 Sheikh Jomʿa was 
able to take a permission from the Ministry of Endowments to re-establish the traditional Islamic study 
circles at al-Azhar Mosque after years of being shut down by the Egyptian state. Not only that he stated 
teaching there but also invited the leading Azhari traditional Sheikhs, who preserved this traditional study 
circles outside al-Azhar to teach. 
30 Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣryyah, the Egyptian Fatwa Council. “Al-Mishwar, the Journey: The Most Important 
Achievements of Dār al-Iftāʾ 2003-2013: A Ten Years Report.” In print. P, 54-59. 
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launched for Dār al-Iftāʾ for the first time to publish, receive, and answer fatwas and 
conduct iftāʾ research in nine languages31. A few years after, a free call center was also 
launched to facilitate the process of istiftāʾ, requesting a fatwa, for those who do not wish 
to visit Dār al-Iftāʾ in person32. Other forms of social media outreach for Dār al-Iftāʾ 
included Facebook, Twitter, YouTube channels as well as T.V. programs hosting muftis 
to respond to questions posed to them by the audience.  
  A pivotal point to raise here is that these latter social media links, receive simple 
legal and religious issues that deal with information regarding Islamic knowledge such as 
rituals and its legal rulings and not marital or transactional disputes, specially if more 
than one petitioner involved—It is so often that muftis refuse to answer such questions 
unless petitioners present their case at the Dār al-Iftāʾ. Indeed, this last point is a major 
evidence to what I have discussed regarding the Iftāʾ- Istiftāʾ relationship since the 
presence of the petitioners will help muftis to gain more knowledge about their specific 
contexts and/or cases. All in all, these social media transformations of Dār al-Iftāʾ has 
enhanced its accessibility to the people of Egypt, which indeed is another strong reason, 
besides its detachment from the bureaucratic courts system, behind the increased social 
authority held by the Dār al-Iftāʾ.  
  A significant evidence of the development in Dār al-Iftāʾ’s presence and 
involvement in the Egyptian society appears in the huge transformation of the number of 
issued fatwas in the past few years in comparison to the fatwa production since the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid. P, 25. 
32 Ibid. P, 29. 
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establishment of Dār al-Iftāʾ in the nineteenth century. According to the sijilāt, records, 
of Dār al-Iftāʾ, the estimated total number of fatwas issuing per year has increased from 
three thousand fatwas to half a million or a million. This huge industry of fatwas is a 
consequence of the social demands and petitioner’s trust increased by the social media 
outreach efforts. The unusual new presence of Dār al-Iftāʾ attracted more people to 
benefit from its sources as newspaper coverage also started following the new 
developments of Dār al-Iftāʾ. An example to such attention given to Dār al-Iftāʾ is the 
below article in one of the official Egyptian newspaper, al-Ahram, that provides a 
statistic, based on the Dār al-Iftāʾ’s annual report, of the total number of fatwas issued in 
201233. The title of the article is “Half a Million Fatwas in the Year of 2012,” 
Interestingly, after giving details about the different forms of the fatwas issued in 2012, in 
person, online and through phone calls, the article quotes Professor Yusri ʿAbdulmoḥsen, 
a professor in psychology sciences in Cairo University, in his analysis of the increasing 
number of fatwas issued in recent years. ʿAbdulmoḥsen claims that the interest in the 
religious opinions regarding daily life events and the media spotlight of muftis and 
Sheikhs created a “social infection” where members of the society became keen to find a 
religious support to every action they take. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Al-Ahram, the pyramids, Official Egyptian Newspaper. “Half a Million Fatwas in the Year of 2012.” 
Web. <http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=1141927&eid=794> 
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  To correspond to the society’s needs and demands, Dār al-Iftāʾ multiplied its 
buildings and opened other Dār al-Iftāʾ branches in several Egyptian cities. All the above 
transformations in Dār al-Iftāʾ’s legacy and authority in the Egyptian society makes it of 
utmost importance to understanding their legal scholarship as well as their role in the 
preservation of the society’s relations and stability.  
  To begin with, I will briefly describe the structure of Dār al-Iftāʾ’s departments 
and focus on the department in which I conducted the fieldwork. 
The basic structure of the current Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾ 
  Dār al-Iftāʾ is comprised of several departments and offices. Here, I focus on the 
department in which I conducted my fieldwork and will only briefly describe the other 
departments. 
  There are four major departments in Dār al-Iftāʾ which are: The Fatwa Council; 
The Research Department, which is further divided into several research-specialized 
sections; The Training Department, which is mainly responsible for the Egyptian and 
international muftis’ preparations; and The Support Services Department, which is 
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responsible for the media outreach through websites and broadcasts, the Dār al-Iftāʾ 
journals, reports and documentations of fatwas, etc34. 
The Fatwa Council: A committee of top muftis and legal scholars under a direct 
supervision of the Grand Mufti, Sheikh ʿAli Jomʿa. The main job of this committee is to 
issue and produce fatwas to the questions asked by petitioners. Under these muftis there 
are a group of umanāʾ al-Fatwa, fatwa trustees, who are still in training to be muftis, as 
well as a group of researchers from the Research Department.  
  The questions posed to the Fatwa Council are to be first presented to the fatwa 
trustees, and if they are not able to address them, then, they go to junior muftis. And as a 
final stage, they go to senior muftis, the main Fatwa Council Committee, and finally, they 
are to be presented to the Grand Mufti, mostly in either new issues that they have not 
encountered before or complicated cases that need Ijtihād. 
  The Fatwa Council is divided into four sub-departments: Oral Fatwa Department, 
Written Fatwa Department, Telephone Fatwa Service (the same members of the oral 
fatwa department are the ones who talk to petitioners on the phone), and E-mail Fatwa 
Service. In general, and as explained by the Grand Mufti’s advisor who was responsible 
for my fieldwork, most of the family law cases go to the Oral Fatwa Department— Dār 
al-Iftāʾ does not provide written fatwas to family law cases and divorce cases in 
particular. Most of the transactional cases, including inheritance and alms giving as well 
as all types of business contracts, go to the Written Fatwa Department. E-mail and phone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid. P, 23-25. 
36 
 
services are not specified but mostly about rituals as well as family laws. As previously 
mentioned, muftis insist on the presence of petitioners in questions related to disputed 
issues in both marital and transactional consultations, and even more strictly in marital 
disputes since they involve greater space for mediation and negotiation as I shall later 
explain. Therefore, muftis who answer phone calls and emails request that petitioners 
come in person to Dār al-Iftāʾ to obtain a fatwa regarding their issues.  
iii. The fieldwork: July 7th – July 14th 2012 
  In the summer of 2012, I submitted a request to the Grand Mufti of Dār al-Iftāʾ to 
conduct fieldwork at the Oral Fatwa Department by attending fatwa sessions and 
interviewing petitioners. After a week long processing of my request, I was informed that 
interviewing petitioners is against the Dār al-Iftāʾ polices regarding petitioner privacy, 
and was only permitted to attend fatwa sessions. I attended one hundred and forty fatwa 
sessions in seven days with four different muftis/fatwa trustees. The following are short 
profiles of each of the muftis I observed during their fatwa sessions. 
a. Muftis and Their Iftāʾ Training 
  S E, the head of the Oral Fatwa Department: Sheikh E is an Azhari graduate who 
has been working on research in the Islamic legal system for over twenty years. I had 
previous knowledge of him and his study circle in a suburb of Cairo, where he teaches 
Islamic law to other Islamic law students. Sheikh E is the oldest and the most experienced 
mufti at the Oral Fatwa Department, however, there are other fatwa committees above 
him to which he directs complicated cases. He is one of the first muftis to graduate from 
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the intensive three-year mufti-training program held at Dār al-Iftāʾ.  I attended eighty 
sessions with him and the most notable characteristics I found in his sessions was the 
ease with which he issued his fatwas, his familiarity with similar historical cases and his 
comfort level asking deeper, more personal questions even those unrelated to the question 
asked to further understand the petitioners social situation.  
  The other three were Fatwa Trustees. All were Azhari graduates in their early 
thirties or late twenties. Usually in English we put lower age first: late twenties or early 
thirties. All had received five to seven years of training at Dār al-Iftāʾ. One of them was 
an Imam, the other an Azhari doctoral student, and the third a researcher at the 
Department of Research at Dār al-Iftāʾ. They are working under the supervision of the 
head of the Oral Department, Sheikh S E, and transfer only the most difficult cases up 
into him. I witnessed very few daily cases transferred to Sheikh S E from the other Fatwa 
Trustees as well as few cases transferred from Sheikh S E to the group fatwa committee 
above him, which shows the collective and hierarchal system I previously mentioned.  
  The differentiation between muftis and fatwa trustees at Dār al-Iftāʾ is in large 
based on what is traditionally known in Adab Al-Fatwa as the distinction between al-
fatwa wa ḥikayat al-fatwa, giving a fatwa and narrating a fatwa. While the former is 
related to producing the fatwa and is done by mujtahid muftis, muftis who perform 
Ijtihād in any of its levels35, the second is merely a muqallid, follower, mufti’s report of 
the same fatwa, issued by a mujtahid mufti, to others while being able to also report the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For a description to on the different level of Ijtihad and Mujtahids, please refer to, Hallaq, An 
Introduction to Islamic Law. 
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authentication of the fatwa. In other words, a mujtahid mufti produces the fatwa and 
authenticates it in the legal sources; a muqallid mufti may then transfer it to others with 
the same circumstances. To connect this difference to the three types of jtihad al-Manāṭ 
discussed previously, a mutahid mufti is capable of performing the tanqīḥ, takhrīj—both 
based on textual investigation—as well as taḥqīq, which is based on the investigation of 
the case’ contextual provisions in order to ensure the fatwa’s suitability to the specific 
case. A muqalid mufti, however, is only capable of performing this last procedure, taḥqīq 
al-manāṭ to ensure delivering the most appropriate (already established) fatwa to the case 
presented in the fatwa session. For this reason, scholars of Adab Al-Fatwa, in fact, 
disputed whether to give the title “mufti” to the ones who merely perform ḥikayat al-
fatwa. Abu ʿAmr Ibn Aṣ-ṣalaḥ (d.1245) for instance, articulates that calling this person a 
muqallid mufti is metaphorical since s/he is not in essence a mufti36; but since fatwa 
trustees—who are the equivalents to the muqallid muftis—have the knowledge of the 
fatwas already issued by Dār al-Iftāʾ muftis and able, after receiving the relevant training, 
to investigate the exact case presented to them, they are set as muftis in these fatwa-
issues. 
   The training each fatwa trustee receives varies in length and type based on the 
qualifications they already hold upon entering Dār al-Iftāʾ. There are two main types of 
training each fatwa trustee/mufti receives. The first is the official mufti preparation 
course, an intensive nine months of training, established in 2005 and held yearly at Dār 
al-Iftāʾ. This training consists of, not exclusively though, research methodology, adab al-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Al-Nawawi, citing Abu ʿAmr Ibn Aṣ-ṣalaḥ, p, 13. 
39 
 
fatwa, the etiquette of fatwa-giving, history, social sciences, socio-politics, and 
interpersonal skills such as presentation and speaking skills. 
  The second type of training is divided into two parts, the first is an ongoing 
training that focuses on learning Islamic sciences, through reading classical texts with 
sheikhs inside or outside Dār al-Iftāʾ. Muftis and fatwa trustees are not obliged to attend 
these classes but highly encouraged. The second part of the ongoing training is rather 
individual, i.e. one-to-one training. Because Dār al-Iftāʾ is based, in methodology, on the 
Azhari methods of studying the Islamic sciences, a fatwa trustee must receive, in order to 
practice fatwa giving, an ijāzā, a traditional permission to practice or teach given to him 
by sheikhs who already received it from others who also received it from sheiks before 
etc. Thus, each fatwa trustee, after receiving the required training, sits in on other 
muftis/fatwa trustees fatwa sessions to observe their practices for two or three years, then 
goes to the second phase of practical training and starts giving fatwas to petitioners under 
observation of his teacher until he receives the ijāzā to practice 
b. Iftāʾ and Masculinity 
My usage of the masculine pronoun in the last paragraph was to call to attention 
to the fact that all muftis, fatwa trustees, and iftāʾ trainees at the Dār al-Iftāʾ of Egypt are 
solely men, despite a consensus among scholars of Adab Al-Fatwa that masculinity is not 
by any means a condition for practicing iftāʾ37, in the history of the “institutionalized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 A prominent example to those scholars is Imam Al-Nawawī, he writes, “the conditions for a mufti is 
being a legally competent Muslim, honest, trust… be free or slave, man or woman [and even] blind or 
mute—if able to write or their language signs is understood.” For more of muftis’ conditions, please refer 
to, Al-Shawkānī, Al-Nawawī, and Ibn ʿĀbidīn. 
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iftāʾ,” in Egypt, there is not a single female muftiyah officially appointed at the Dār al-
Iftāʾ or given an iftāʾ ijāza through its training programs. In fact, and seemingly to me, 
there are two major factors behind this strange phenomenon. First, the 
“institutionalization of iftāʾ”, which bestowed a different type of authority upon iftāʾ that 
did not exist in the past practice of the free independent volunteered image of iftāʾ. This 
idea can be further confirmed when compared to the dispute among Adab Al-Fatwa 
scholars over the competency of women as judges; because Qadāʾ, judicial judgment, 
already enjoys this type of authority, scholars hesitated to grant its competency to 
women—who are seen as ineligible religious authorities by some of these scholars. 
The second factor behind the absence of female muftiyah at the institution of Dār 
al-Iftāʾ is that Egyptian society, which bestows authority and legitimacy upon muftis, 
holds a patriarchal image of what can be accepted and legitimatized as religiously 
authoritative. This notion, clearly, emerged from a wider scale of the society’s patriarchal 
image of gender as a whole. Thus, women are not perceived as legitimate religious 
authorities and hence cannot act as muftis, who are legal, religious, and social authorities. 
The question then, is not merely who has the authority to interpret religious 
texts— since jurists and muftis both carry this task and there is not a single restriction 
upon the permissibility of women to perform such tasks—but rather who has the 
authority to give binding and authoritative opinions to be recognized and practiced in the 
society. Understanding the issue of women on iftāʾ from this angle shall help us 
understand the question of authority in Islam in general. 
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c. Petitioners and Istiftāʾ Registration 
  The petitioners’ registration for submitting cases is highly streamlined at the Oral 
Fatwa Department; one simply needs to show up during the department’s working hours 
(9 a.m. to 5 p.m.), present photo identification, and register their name at the front desk. 
Then wait for their turn to be called. Cases are randomly distributed to the muftis of the 
department. The fatwa sessions are held in the office of the mufti which is basic in 
design; a desk, few chairs, bookshelves, and a small bathroom inside or beside the office. 
Each fatwa session lasts for ten minutes to half an hour in most cases, but sometimes they 
last longer. The mufti carefully registers the petitioner’s name, job and neighborhood, 
which helps the mufti define their social class which is essential in positioning their case 
based on the petitioner’s specified social norms, and in relation to the negotiation of the 
fatwa he/she receives.  
  I noticed from the petitioners’ answers to the job and neighborhood questions that 
the majority of the cases were brought forth by middle and lower class citizens. Only a 
few petitioners were counted as upperclass, perhaps because the majority of cases 
presented were marital disputes hinged on the extreme socioeconomic pressures felt by 
the middle and lower class families. Other explanations may be that the upperclasses 
have other accessible resources for their marital disputes such as courts, since they can 
afford its bureaucratic and financial demands, as well as the ability to reach famous 
Sheikhs. It may be that the upperclasses tend to be less religious than middle and lower 
classes. Above all these assumptions is the fact that the negotiation of marital disputes 
between married couples that both contribute to the economic status of their household, 
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such as is the case in upperclass families, may be provided by the economic authority, as 
an alternative to the religious authority provided at Dār al-Iftāʾ.  
The institutionalization of iftāʾ—its relation to the government and/or state—has 
indeed affected its independency, as well as its religious and binding authority. Through 
the affiliation with courts, muftis have found an arena to render a binding nature to their 
fatwas, that were originally non-binding38. The bureaucracy and inaccessibility of courts, 
however, have been major obstacles for muftis’ outreach in their societies. Although 
some muftis were simultaneously practicing iftāʾ outside and inside courts, it is still a 
challenge for petitioners to find the appropriate mufti to consult outside this 
institutionalized form, especially if they are, as most petitioners, not only interested in 
receiving a piece of information about their religious matters, but also in using a 
recognized religious authority in their daily disputes with others, and most importantly in 
their marital relations. Therefore, an institutionalized yet accessible form of iftāʾ solves 
this dilemma. For the above reasons, members of the Egyptian society resort to the Dār 
al-Iftāʾ as an alternative religious authority in hopes of finding legal answers to their 
issues including, and as this thesis is concerned, their marital issues. As a result of A) the 
resorting and anticipation from the people of Egypt to the Dār al-Iftāʾ’s authority and 
mediation, B) the Dār al-Iftāʾ’s stated interest in becoming the legitimate religious 
authority in the society, and C) the extensive social media efforts by Dār al-Iftāʾ to 
establish their legitimacy and to reach their target audience, Egyptians, the Dār al-Iftāʾ of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Agrama, Ali Hussein. “Ethics, Tradition, Authority: Toward an anthropology of the Fatwa.” The 
American Anthropological Association: Vol. 37, No.1, pp. 2-18. 
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Egypt has become a key player in the lives of ordinary Egyptian Muslims through their 
mediation in the latter’s affairs and particularly, marital disputes. Herein lies the 
importance of the study of the iftāʾ and istiftāʾ practices as a means to understanding the 
role of religious authorities in the social relations, and particularly gender relations, of 
Egyptian society.  
Lastly, a key point to understanding the roles of Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾ is, as stated 
by the Grand Mufti, ʿAli Jomʿa, in the ten-year report of Dār al- Iftāʾ, that it maintains 
two major goals in its issued fatwas: the suitability of fatwas to the society and the ending 
of disputes outside courts. Both muftis and employees make the utmost necessary efforts 
to support these goals. These goals will be expounded upon in most of the cases I will 
present in this thesis. The ultimate goal of mufti mediation and negotiation attempts is to 
end disputes, and maintain a stabilized society through the preservation of family units 
(marriages), as well as through the preservation of gender specified roles and 
responsibilities.
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Chapter Two: Divorce, ṭalāq, and Divorce Fatwas 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As we have learned from the introductory chapter, the practice of fatwa-giving is a 
complex compound of religious legal doctrines and social mediations. Muftis, as legal 
and social consultants, play an integral role in the preservation of the society’s relations 
and traditions. They provide petitioners, who also bring their stories and expectations to 
the forefront of legal discussions, with legal solutions that best suit their roles as 
members of the society and practitioners of the Islamic laws. The question-answer 
correspondence sheds light on the given fatwa’s particularity to the receiving petitioner.  
Due to the tremendous mass outreach efforts by Dār al-Iftāʾ to the mass in the 
Egyptian society, thousands of Egyptian women and men seek fatwas either in person by 
visiting the oral fatwa departments at Dār al-Iftāʾ or by other means of media 
communication. It is not surprising, after what we have learned about the socio-legal 
nature of the iftāʾ in Egypt; the majority of these fatwa-seekers are married couples who 
attempt to solve their marital disputes through a religious authoritative and accessible 
channel found at Dār al-Iftāʾ. What surprised to me was that the bulk of this majority was 
divorce cases; out of the 140 fatwa sessions I attended, one hundred and fifteenth were 
divorce cases. This is interestingly significant in a current Egyptian society where the 
social and economic instability have led to increased marital disputes regarding financial 
duties and properties. The male dominant structure of the society created a socialized 
form of “divorce practices” aiming to enforce male social control over women rather than 
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simple marriage dissolution. This is clearly seen in the fatwa sessions attended at Dār al-
Iftāʾ where the divorce cases arise not just because men are trying to dissolve their 
marriages but also because they are trying to threaten their wives through divorce 
statements. Consequently, the frequency of divorce cases rendered the majority of the 
fatwa questions to be related to this matter of which petitioners submit to Dār al-Iftāʾ. In 
turn, Dār al-Iftāʾ corresponded to this phenomenon of frequent divorce cases by creating 
a maverick scholarship, based on their legal expertise and social experiences as well as 
their mediation skills, to deal with such phenomenon in a way that would fulfill their role 
in the society, harmonize the societal relations, including the gender relations, as well as 
preserving marriages, that is believed to be the building block of the Muslim society as 
will be further discussed. 
Here, I would like to present a fatwa story told by Sheikh Ali Jomʿa, the Grand 
Mufti of Egypt, to explain the complexity of giving a divorce fatwa in general, and in the 
Egyptian society in particular. The story begins by a question posed to Sheikh Jomʿa 
from an Egyptian man about a divorce incident while he was accompanying Sheikh Ali in 
a gathering. In the beginning, Sheikh Ali asked the man “What did you say?” The man 
replied,  “ You are ṭaliʾ, divorca” and continued another conversation. After a while, 
Sheikh Jomʿa asked the man again,  “Tell me, what did you say?” The man responded, “I 
think I said, ‘divorce is on me if you do such and such’”. Again, Sheikh Jomʿa engaged 
the man in a different conversation, and after a while he asked him once again about what 
exactly he pronounced. This time, the man said, “I said, ‘if you do not listen, then you are 
divorced.’” As presented, the man thoughtlessly claimed to have declared three different 
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types of divorce, which I will explain shortly, in the same incident only because he does 
not recognize the different legal rulings that belong to each of them.  
By giving this example, Sheikh Jomʿa wanted to demonstrate that the people of 
Egypt, because of the dominant social practices, do not necessarily understand or use 
divorce the way jurists understand it. For these people, divorce is more than a means to 
end marriages as it is for the jurists. They pronounce different divorce formulas for 
different social purposes, which result in the frequency of the divorce cases we 
encounter. Therefore, muftis need to assess these purposes using their knowledge and 
understanding of the social practices in their specific context, as well as the various legal 
scholarships that suit this context. Some of these divorce practices do not actually hold 
the purpose of ‘ending marriages’, which is the only legally recognized purpose for 
divorce according to Islamic Family Law, but rather they fulfill other purposes such as 
controlling one’s actions by the use of a threat to divorce—whether the conditioned of the 
oath divorces—, which is particularly practiced over women as will be demonstrated 
later.  
It is important to note that in this example, Sheikh Jomʿa is primarily speaking 
about the kināya, allusive, divorce, which requires, as a condition for its efficacy, a 
declaration of the divorce intention. The intention then is the basis of the legal ruling of 
the kināya divorce, accordingly; if the intention of ending the marriage is not present, the 
divorce is not present as well. As opposed to the ṣarīh, explicit, divorce, which is done 
through predetermined and clear act of divorcing, and therefore, does not necessitate an 
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intention for its efficacy or establishment. I shall explain in detail the different rulings 
each divorce type is subject to shortly. 
In his study, Marriage, Money, and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, Youssef 
Rapoport provides a unique representation of the study of the intersection between the 
legal and social norms in pre-modern Muslim societies through an investigation of 
divorce practices and causes in the Mamlūk era [Egypt 1250-1517]. He shows how the 
social, economic, and legal sects of the Mamlūk era greatly influenced these divorce 
practices. For instance, he claims that the Mamlūk rulers as well as the common people 
used the oath-taking divorce to emphasize the binding power of their oaths. He presents 
some of the places where he found that the oath-taking divorce is significantly used for 
this purpose, such as for financial obligations, in the marketplaces, gift-giving etc.39. 
Through the study of the socioeconomic and legal aspects that resulted in the frequency 
of the divorce in the Mamlūk era, Rapoport answers the bigger question of “How did 
Islamic family law translate into the reality of medieval marriage.” In addition, Rapoport 
helps us, throughout his book, to rethink the gender relations in medieval societies and 
their implication on women’s status and independency. 
Although the period of which Rapoport is investigating, the Mamlūk period, is 
hundreds of years before the contemporary context of which I’m investigating, most of 
the above mentioned ideas are significantly present in the current Egyptian society. 
Understanding the divorce practices sheds light on the socioeconomic, and even political, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Rapoport, Yossef. Marriage, Money, and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.P, 85-87. 
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status of Egyptian citizens, as well as the gender relations in this complex dilemma. The 
following examples from the fatwa sessions show the frequency of initiating the divorce 
oath in similar events (all these cases are presented by male petitioners): 
Case number (98): I have sworn a divorce oath to quit smoking, and I did not. 
Answer: Divorce is not valid and you need to pay oath kaffārā, atonement. 
Case number (42): I said to my daughter, “divorce is on me if you won’t do such 
and such,” then she did what I swore on and said, “Ok, [indicating that she doesn’t care] 
divorce her [his wife].” 
Answer: Divorce is not established and you need to pay oath kaffārā, atonement. 
Case number (91): I work as a merchant and because of the bargaining nature of my 
work; I swore to divorce my wife so frequently. Does this count as a divorce?   
Answer: This is not a divorce. Pay an atonement you can afford, and stop using 
divorce promises in your daily work. 
In these cases, husbands were aware of the fact that they are risking their marriages 
by pronouncing the oath-divorce or the conditioned divorce. Other cases, however, show 
husbands coming to Dār al-Iftāʾ to investigate, in a post-facto manner, a great number of 
oath and conditioned divorce pronouncements they declared, but never thought it might 
possibly affect their marriages since using such pronouncements is widely spread 
practice. These husbands were mostly advised by religious friends or in some cases by 
their wives to take care of the religious-bond of their marriages, stop the use of these 
pronouncements, and seek a fatwa at Dār al-Iftāʾ regarding their marriages. These 
practices show that the absolute right to divorce that husbands enjoy using have not been 
wisely used in the current Egyptian society, or in, as Rapoport describes, previous 
societies as well. The question is why would Egyptian husbands risk divorcing their 
wives to make a better sale, to get someone to believe they are right, or even to get 
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someone to do what they want them to do? The answer to this question is not, as some 
people may claim, “Because they can”, but it is, however, a part of a larger scale of 
problematic gender relations and social tension between married partners that is also 
intertwined with economic factors. 
The frequency of divorce and its social, economic, and moral consequences in the 
Egyptian society forced muftis to use whatever means they have to constructively 
reconcile two disputing marital partners using their legal scholarship and their role as 
social mediators to stabilize their society through the preservation of marriages because 
marriage is considered “the key to social harmony40” according to Muslim jurists; muftis 
make the necessary efforts to preserve marriages that are threatened by these divorce 
practices. It is because of this complex social dilemma, Sheikh  Jomʿa’s advice to muftis 
of the Dār al-Iftāʾ was to only consider the pronouncements that were made for the 
purpose of ending the marriage in a divorce, and disregard pronouncements that are made 
for other purposes. In order to successfully conduct such an assessment of practice, 
muftis need to be aware of the social nature and cultural backgrounds of these practices 
as a whole, and not to uproot the fatwa case from its social practices. 
To go back to the story told by Sheikh  Jomʿa and its relation to this chapter, it is 
important to again emphasize that the case contained a kināya divorce and not ṣariḥ; this 
is very significant and relevant to our purpose, of identifying the special legal discourse 
Dār al-Iftāʾ provides to dealing with the frequency of divorce, for the fact that in order to 
preserve the Egyptian marriages, the Dār al-Iftāʾ of Egypt categorizes most of the oral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Tucker E, Judith. In The House of The Law. California: University of California Press, 1998. P, 40. 
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divorce formulas Egyptian husbands pronounce as kināya. They use available legal 
interpretations that consider the changing of any of the proper ṣariḥ formulas’ letters 
transforming it into a kināya formula, and thus, limits its efficacy to the intention of the 
one pronouncing it, namely, Egyptian husbands. By doing so, muftis of the Dār al-Iftāʾ 
are aiming to decrease the amount of divorces as much as possible so that they would 
preserve, as mentioned above, the pro-marriage position that they, as religious scholars, 
hold. 
 On the basis of this story and what it reveals, there are two major questions we 
need to address to understand the underpinnings of the practice of divorce in Egyptian 
society as well as the practice of Iftāʾ at the Dār al-Iftāʾ. First, what types of divorce 
pronouncements are established in the Islamic family schools of law? Which of them do 
Egyptian husbands use the most, and for what purposes do they use them? 
The second major question is, what are the means and implications of the discourse 
taken by the Dār al-Iftāʾ in dealing with family law issues in terms of their legal 
scholarship, and in terms of their purpose of preserving the social relations? 
In this chapter, I attempt to answer these two questions. I will start by briefly 
exploring the Islamic scholarships on the divorce legal system with a close focus on its 
formulas and efficacy conditions, followed by the Dār al-Iftāʾ’s specific account 
regarding the category of kināya divorce. Next, I will summarize the Egyptians courts 
Personal Law codes for obtaining judicial divorces in order to compare and contrast the 
methods and means followed and provided by both courts and Dār al-Iftāʾ to the 
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members of the Egyptian society, which steer these members’ choice to restore to either 
one of these two institutions. Throughout the chapter, I will present cases from my 
fieldwork at Dār al-Iftāʾ illustrate the divorce practices in the Egyptian society, muftis’ 
discourse to deal with them, and their impact on the status of women. I aim to 
demonstrate that Dār al-Iftāʾ’s interference in the marital disputes among Egyptian 
married couples provides them with an avenue to obtain not only legal advice, but also 
religious mediation device to deal with their social, moral, and economic problems while 
addressing these disputes. This will also emphasize the conjugal social authority muftis 
enjoy alongside with their religious authority.  
While the main focus in this chapter is drawing a practical image of the Iftāʾ’s 
complex structure through understanding Dār al-Iftāʾ’s discourse to divorce laws and 
practices, it will become evident that, first, preserving marriage is a major concern of 
muftis when dealing with divorce cases; second, petitioners’ engagement in the fatwa 
sessions is shaped by their social positions in the society, and that they attempt to 
influence muftis’ fatwas through emphasizing shared social enforcements that are in their 
most interest; third, the particular engagement of women in the fatwa sessions provided 
them with accessible space to obtain their marital rights, and also not however rendered 
their chance to obtain divorce without having to get their husbands’ consent or go 
through the bureaucratic channels (courts); and finally, Dār al-Iftāʾ obtained its religious 
authority both from their religious legal expertise as well as the way they are conceived 
in the society. 
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2. Divorce, ṭalāq, in the Islamic Family Law System 
Within the Islamic legal system, there are three major categories of divorce. The 
first is ṭalāq, repudiation (I will be referring to this type as “divorce” throughout the 
paper since it is the primary form of divorce); the second is taṭliq, juridical divorce; and 
the third is khulʿ, divorce for compensation. Each of these categories is recognized 
through different formulas, and is subject to a different set of rulings. I will briefly 
explain each category’s basic jurisprudential rulings, and how it is practiced and/or 
obtained in modern Egyptian society. 
Divorce in the Islamic legal system is divided, in terms of the clarity of its formula, 
into explicit or direct, and allusive or indirect. Jurists refer to the first as ṣarīh, and to the 
second as kinayā. 
i. The ṣarīh Divorce: Definition, Formulas, and Rulings 
The ṣarīh divorce is defined in Fiqh texts as “ma la yaḥtamilu ghayra aṭṭalaq,41 
what does not carry meanings but divorce.”  Traditionally, jurists recognized three main 
formulas as explicit: “anti ṭaliq, you are divorced”; “ṭallaqtuki, I divorced you”; and 
“muṭallaqa, divorced”. The pronouncement of any of these ṣarīh formulas requires only 
two conditions for its efficacy: ikhtiār, choice, and taklīf, legal competency42. It is worth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Bājūrī, Ibrahīm. Hāshyāt Al-Bājūrī ʿala Fatḥ al-Qarīb. Egypt: Mustafa Al-ḥalabī, 1343 A.C. Vol. 2. P, 
144. 42	  The characteristics and conditions necessary to define who is the legal competent to execute certain laws 
may include: Islam, freedom, sanity, puberty, gender, purity, physical ability, and financial capacities. 
These characteristics and conditions differ from one fiqhi section/chapter to another. A most noticeable 
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noting that by legal competency in divorce, jurists basically mean the following: A sane 
major married Muslim man, or woman of whom the right to divorce has been specifically 
granted to her in the marriage contract. Without this specific condition, women are not 
legally competent to declare any of the divorce formulas, either ṣarīh or kināya. This is 
one of the reasons why women are the ‘object’ figures in divorce while men are always 
the ‘subject’ as mentioned above. I will further discuss women’s right to divorce in the 
next section. 
Particularly at Dār al-Iftāʾ under consideration, there are two other forms of divorce 
recognized by muftis as ṣarīḥ: divorce issued by a court judgment, and divorce 
documented by a state official marriage-divorce notary, a maʾzūn. Muftis take it for 
granted that these two forms of divorce are final, valid, and accordingly effective43 even 
if a husband claims not to have pronounced divorce. The reason told by muftis for this 
consideration is that the first, issued by court councils, is binding by the judge’s 
authority44, and the second is treated as īqrār45, testimony or admittance of divorce, which 
is a considerable legal evidential method when neither documents nor witnesses are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
division in the use of different set of characteristics for the legal competency is seen clearly between rituals 
ʿibadāt and transactions muʿāmalaāt (goods and commodities). The former deals with God’s claims ḥuqūq 
Ellāh and the latter deals, mostly with private claims ḥuqūq al-ʿibaād. Accordingly, a person can either be 
eligible for the execution of the law, ahlyyat al ʾadaʾ, or be eligible as a seat for obligation and laws, 
ahlyyat al wujūb. Each of these two types of eligibility is divided into full and partial and differs from one 
law to the other.	  
43 In Fiqh terms: efficacy is the consequence of validity; ex: the selling contract is valid, as a consequence 
the buyer owns the goods and the seller owns the price. As for divorce, if divorce is validated, all its post 
rulings is effective such as the waiting period, the expenditure etc. 
44 Traditional jurists held the same position regarding the Qādī’s authoritative judgments but mostly in 
either annulment faskh or khulʿ, divorce for compensation. 
45 Iqrār’s definition: “Ikhbār ʿan ḥaq sābiq ʿala al mukhbir, reporting a previously established 
right/commitment upon the reporter” or basically ʾishhad ʿala al nafs, a testimony over the self.  
For reference: Ar-Ramly, Shihāb Ad-Dīn. Nihaāyat Al-Muḥtāj ʿala Sharḥ Al-Menhāj. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 
1984. P, 65. 
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present. In this case, a husband goes to the maʾzūn, with no documents and witnesses, 
and admits that he has divorced his wife. Another example for this type of evidential 
method would be if someone admitted they have borrowed money from someone else 
where there are neither documents nor witnesses, and so consequently, they will need to 
give the money back to this person since they are the witnesses over themselves. 
Although the ṣarīḥ divorce, in Fiqh writings, is the common or basic type of 
divorce, it was not a main theme in the site under consideration for two reasons: ṣarīḥ 
divorce is a straightforward evidential-based divorce, which decreases the possibility of 
disputing regarding its validity. Those who determinedly decide to divorce go directly to 
either the court or maʾzūn offices, and thus, they need no fatwas to establish their 
divorce. Second, as I will discuss in detail, according to Dār al-Iftāʾʾ, the common slang 
divorce formulas pronounced by Egyptian husbands are not explicit divorce. Therefore, it 
is worth noting that muftis typically refuse to hear any case that was already determined 
at a court or admitted at a maʾzūn office. However, there were some explicit divorce 
cases that I encountered in the fatwa sessions that did not question the validity of the 
divorces, but dealt with post divorce settlements. 
ii. Kināya Divorce: Definition, Formulas, and Rulings 
The kināya divorce is defined as “ma aḥtamala aṭṭalaq wa ghayreh, formulas that 
comprise the meaning of divorce as well as other meanings”. Jurists discussed so many 
possible kināya utterances such as “you are free,” “I leave you,” “I abandon you,” or “we 
are separated.” They then concluded that kināya does not have specific or limited 
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utterances; if a husband pronounced any of these statements or other ones and claimed he 
meant to divorce his wife, she would be divorced, and if he claimed not to have intended 
to divorce her then she is not divorced. Therefore, the efficacy of the kināya divorce 
requires, besides the choice and taklīf requirements, a declaration of a divorce intention at 
the time of pronouncing the divorce phrase. Jurists state that the husband has is believed 
in his consent of ether the absence or presence of the divorce intention because he is the 
only witness to it.46 Women’s intention as well as the testimony of anyone who is present 
in the divorce incident is then not relevant in the kināya pronouncements. It is the 
husband who can only declare the required intention to end the marriage. 
In a useful summary of the role of intention in divorce pronouncements, Paul 
Powers, quoted in Kecia Ali’s book Marriage and Slavery, states, “In terms of basic 
sincerity and effectiveness, explicit statements are valid and binding regardless of intent, 
allusive statements are valid and binding if so intended, and some statements are too 
ambiguous to count regardless of intent.47” 
iii. Oath-taking and Conditioned Divorce 
A long-standing practice in Muslim societies created, besides the aforementioned 
forms of ṭalāq, divorce, two other forms: ṭalāq muʿallaq, conditioned divorce, and yamin 
ṭalāq, oath to divorce. A husband, in both the conditioned and the oath divorces, does not 
declare a straightforward divorce statement, but rather suspends his statement on 
something else. More specifically in the conditioned divorce, the husband issues a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Bājuúrī, Vol, 2. P, 145 
47 Ali, Kecia. Marriage And Slavery In Early Islam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010. P, 136. 
56 
 
divorce from his wife if an event did or did not take place. His statement would basically 
be framed as “if…, then…”. The conditioned divorce can either be ṣarīḥ or kināya based 
on the formulas pronounced. For instance, “law faʿalti fa antī ṭaliq, if you do such and 
such, you are divorced48” is a ṣarīḥ conditioned divorce because it comprises two 
phrases: the first is the condition phrase, of which the divorce is suspended to, and the 
second, the effect phrase “you are divorced” is a ṣarīḥ formula. Changing the effect 
phrase to a kināya formula such as “… then, you are free” will create a kināya-
conditioned divorce. 
 As for the oath-taking divorce, it is worth noting that fiqh texts do not include a 
section (faṣl) in the divorce chapter to discuss oaths to divorce, although they do mention 
it in the body of the divorce book in general. Rather, these texts give larger space to 
discuss divorce oaths under al ayman wal nuzūr, oaths and vows49. Therefore, some 
jurists consider it an oath to divorce and not a type of divorce, i.e. it follows, according to 
these Fiqh opinions the legal rulings for oath-taking which allows, if one so chooses, to, 
renege it and pay the kaffārā, atonement, instead50, as we will see in the fatwa sessions. 
Other jurists, however, insist that the oath-taking divorce is a type of a conditioned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Bājūrī, Vol, 2. P, 147 
49 Examples for fiqh texts that discuss divorce oaths under the book of oaths and not the book of divorce: 
Abu Al-Maʿalī, Al-Juwaīnī. Nihāyat al-maṭlab fi derāyat al-madhhab. Bājūrī and Sherbini 
50 Taqī Ad-Dīn Ahmad Ibn Taimyyah is the most famous jurist who argued against considering the oath-
taking divorce as conditional, but rather he considers it as the oath by God, and accordingly the violation of 
the oath-taking divorce are subject to all legal rulings that apply to the violation to oath by God.  
For a detailed account of Ibn Taymyyah’s argument, see:  
Primary source: Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqī Ad-Dīn.  Al-Ijtimāʿ Wal-Iftirāq Fi Alḥilf Bil-ṭalāq, ed. Muhammad 
ʿAbd al-Razzaq Hamza. Cairo: Maktabat Ansa, 1347 A.C./1927-28. 
Secondary source: Rapoport, Yossef. Marriage, Money, and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. P, 96-10. 
57 
 
divorce because it compromises a conditioned formula; the husband would for instance 
say, “Divorce is on me if I speak to you,” or “I swear of my wife’s divorce, you won’t 
leave.” The Dār al-Iftāʾ of Egypt considers the oath-taking divorce as an oath and not a 
conditioned divorce.  
Thus, the ṣarīḥ and kināya divorces are the main categories of divorce in the 
Islamic legal system—the efficacy of the former depends on the choice and the legal 
competency of the pronouncer. The efficacy of the latter, however,  depends on the 
declaration of an intention accompanying its allusive pronouncements, besides, the 
conditions of the choice and legal competency. Each of these categories, ṣarīḥ and 
kināya, may be conditioned upon an action/event. In this case, the establishment of the 
divorce, in addition to the fulfillment of the previously mentioned efficacy conditions, 
will depend on the occurrence of the condition clause. This exact feature of the 
conditioned divorce is what enables husbands to use it as means of controlling their wives 
actions. Knowing that engaging in a specific action—of which the divorce is hinged 
upon—might result in their marriage dissolution, wives find themselves in a situation 
where they must balance between a specific action and their marriage and thus think 
twice before they engage in such actions. Some wives, however, might find this situation 
as an opportunity to obtain divorce by easily engage in such actions as explained by 
Judith Tucker below. 
Any divorce of any of the aforementioned types and forms may become 
irrevocable, in which husbands cannot return their wives to their marital bonds without 
contracting a new marriage as such in two main cases: a) after a divorce is fully effective 
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once or twice, i.e. by the end of the waiting period of a wife who is divorced a valid 
revocable divorce; and b) after the establishment of a third valid divorce, and in this case, 
the divorce is irrevocable immediately without the need to wait until the end of the ʿidda, 
waiting period. Of course these two cases are in addition to the judicial divorce and the 
divorce for compensation that are irrevocable from the moment they are issued, as will be 
presented. Otherwise, husbands are free to return their wives to their marital bonds 
without their wives’ consent, and even without their knowledge. 
Having set that up, it is important to also mention other issues related to the ṭalāq 
system in Islamic law. As seen, a married couple has up to two divorces to revoke; the 
third divorce will result in an ultimate separation between them unless the wife marries 
another man, consummates the marriage, divorce him, then decides to remarry her 
previous husband.51 Thus, there are three possible divorces for one marriage, but is it 
possible to declare the three divorces at once? And what is required for returning to the 
state of marriage after the first or the second divorce? 
The Thrice Divorce 
If a husband pronounces three divorces at the same time, either by repeating the 
divorce formula three times, such as to say “you are divorced, you are divorced, you are 
divorced,” or by adding a numeric adjective to his formula, such as to say “you are 
divorced thrice,” jurists disputed whether or not to consider his pronouncement as only 
one divorce or three, which will accordingly make the divorce immediately irrevocable. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For more on this issue, please see: Ali, Marriage And Slavery In Early Islam. 
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Dār al-Iftāʾ, under consideration, follows that the pronouncement of thrice divorce to be 
considered only one divorce and not thrice. According to them, unless the three divorces 
have been officially documented in court or at a maʾzūn office52, the divorce is not 
irrevocable. In this former case, muftis affirm the documents’ validity for the reasons 
previously discussed. Although considering the thrice divorce was a minority opinion 
among early jurists, there is a greater agreement among later jurists to count the thrice 
divorce pronounced at the same time as only one divorce because of the following 
reasons: 
a) One reason is by the textual evidences that provide a legal base to this 
jurisprudential opinion, such as considering the thrice divorce forbidden for its violation 
or defiance to the Quraʾnic texts (2:229 and 65:1-2 for) that determine divorce as three 
separate divorces, one after another, and not three divorces combined altogether. Another 
textual evidence for the invalidity of the thrice divorce is the Hadith narrated by Maḥmūd 
ibn Labīd in the Nasaʾī Hadith collection about Rukan ibn ʿAdb Yāzīd, who divorced his 
wife thrice and the prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said to him while very angry, “[how 
dare you] violate the book of Allah and I’m among you!” The story continues in another 
narration by Ibn ʿAbbas in Musnad ibn ḥanbal where the prophet’s statement is as the 
following: “[how dare you] violate the book of Allah and I’m among you, they are once, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Note: the Egyptian juridical codes also considers the pronouncement of a thrice divorce as only one 
divorce. The article 3 under the divorce section in the Personal Law states of 2000 states: “divorce 
combined by number in utterance or in signal is considered only one divorce.” 
For reference: The Egyptian Government Website. “The New Personal Law, Third Chapter: Masaʾil 
AlWilaya ʿala AlNafs, Issues Related to Self-Guardian.” Web. 
<http://www.egypt.gov.eg/arabic/laws/personal/chp_three/part_one.aspx> 
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take her back if you wish. 53” By telling the man he has an option to take back his wife, 
the prophet already implied that the divorce is not a thrice-irrevocable divorce, but rather 
only one divorce. 
b) The second reason why later jurists chose to follow the opinion that says three 
divorces pronounced once is only considered one is the frequency of divorce among 
married couples in Muslim societies, which threatens the stability of family system, 
which is not merely a marital system, but a socioeconomic one as well in these societies. 
Therefore, jurists developed a pro-marriage position to preserve the social family 
relations in their societies. Such concern of instability led jurists to consider minor 
opinions and even legal stratagems for the sake of harmonizing social practices and to 
bringing ease and stability to the members of these societies. This issue will be further 
clarified throughout this paper. 
Rajʿa, Taking the Wife Back 
As for the resumption of marital relations, rajʿa, a husband may take back his 
divorced wife in a revocable divorce by means of explicit verbal declaration that he has 
taken her back to his marital bonds with or without witnesses or by means of any sexual 
interactions not excluded to intercourse; a kiss with the intention of resuming the marital 
relations with his wife is sufficient.54 At Dār al-Iftāʾ, muftis take into consideration the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 There are also other linguistic and methodological approaches to prove the invalidity of the thrice 
divorce. For a detail discussion of these evidences, please refer to: 
Shakir, Aḥmad. The Divorce System in Islam, Nizam Aṭṭalāq Fil Islām. Sunna library, 1998. 
P, 26-39 
54 For further clarification on the jurisprudential dispute in this matter, please see: ʿAli, p.140 
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verbal and the sexual interactions as valid rajʿa. However, they prefer the verbal 
statement, and therefore, ask the husband to initiate it in the fatwa session. The most 
common statement they asked the husband to pronounce was “ʾarjaʿtu zawjati ʾilā 
ʿiṣmati, I took back my wife to my marital-bond.” 
3. Women’s Divorce: Taṭliq, Judicial Divorce, and Khulʿ Divorce for Compensation 
 The judicial divorce primary refers to a divorce issued by the court in response to 
a wife’s inquiry to obtain a divorce from her husband under certain conditions such as 
non-payment of maintenance. As for khulʿ, it is “a divorce desired by the wife in return 
for compensation paid to her husband.55” It is worth noting that according to Fiqh texts, 
although khulʿ is not necessarily restricted to the judge’s involvement in modern times 
particularly in Egypt, it is only done through the court for the fact that documented court 
judgments are nearly the only method of which women can prove they have obtained the 
khulʿ without being subject to any appeals from their husbands or the sate. Both khulʿ and 
taṭliq is, in principle, agreed upon among the majority of jurists of all the Sunni schools 
of law.  
In her book, Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law, Judith Tucker concludes, 
after exploring the different types of divorce depending mostly on the Hanafī School of 
Law, that “Divorce was thus conceived as a man’s divorce,” however, she notes a wife 
may obtain the right to divorce if her husband delegated it to her.56 It is true that this 
delegation of agency gives the wife the right to divorce, but in fact, the husband may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Tucker E, Judith. Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008. P, 95. 
56 Tucker, Women, p. 91. 
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choose to break such delegation at any time. Besides delegation, women might add the 
right to divorce as a condition in the marriage contract, and this way, the right of divorce 
would be legally binding as any other contractual conditions and husbands may not 
cancel these conditions. Otherwise, women will need to obtain either khulʿ or taṭlīq.  
Kecia ʿAli summarizes the issue of women’s right to divorce in her book Marriage and 
Slavery in Early Islam: 
The wife, bound by the marriage tie, did not share the power of 
unilateral divorce. Instead, her opportunities to dissolve the 
marriage were limited to judicial divorce for cause, grounds for 
which varied greatly depending on the school; delegated divorce, if 
authorized by her husband; and khulʿ, divorce for compensation, 
the main form of female-initiated divorce.57  
In order to be more specific to the context under consideration, the Egyptian Dār al-
Iftāʾ, and because under the Egyptian law codes khulʿ, as well as judicial divorce, may 
only be obtained through courts, I will next  the Egyptian juridical codes governing khulʿ 
and taṭlīq. 
ii. Taṭliq and Khulʿ in the Egyptian Court Codes 
The juridical administration in Egypt since 1875 is a mix between Islamic laws and 
other civil laws, particularly the French codes. The personal law, however, is primarily 
based on the Shariʿah laws in principle, as stated in the Egyptian constitution, but 
depends in the general administration laws in its process. Shariʿah courts are under the 
administration of the civil court, and thus, it is subject to all of its bureaucratic legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ali, p. 146. 
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proceedings. The judges who investigate the cases presented to Shariʿah courts are 
“trained in Sharʿah presiding over family law cases within the National Courts.”58  
According to the Civil Code (no.131/1948) drafted by ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī, 
which is based on the Hanafi School of law, the wife may obtain an irrevocable divorce 
on the following grounds: serious or incurable defect of the husband; harm making 
cohabitation as husband and wife impossible; material or moral harm if the husband 
marries polygynously [if making cohabitation as husband and wife impossible]; non-
payment of maintenance; the husband’s imprisonment for three years or more… A 
woman can also seek a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.59 
These grounds remained, in principle, the major grounds to grant wives judicial 
divorces, but as such the criteria of which wives may prove them or the criteria of which 
the court estimates their reasonability is up to the judges to decide case by case. Even 
after the reforms and modifications followed the previous juridical codes. In this regard, 
Beth Baron in his research “Marital Bonds in Egypt,” which is part of Women in Middle 
Easter History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender book, talks about the new 
legislations in the Egyptian Personal Law of 1920-1929, that were a result of reform calls 
aimed to grant women wider grounds for divorce, and to guarantee that ending their 
marriages did not merely hinge on their husbands’ approval. He states: “A 1920 law that 
was supplemented in 1929 recognized four new conditions for juridical relief: if the 
husband had a chronic or incurable disease, failed to provide maintenance, deserted his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Naʿīm, Abd Allāh Aḥmad (ed.). Islamic Family Law in A Changing World: A Global Resource Book. St. 
Martin’s press: 2002. P, 169. 
59 Naʿīm, p.172 
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wife or maltreated her, she could apply to a court dissolution of the marriage. … These 
articles sought to terminate unions that did not conform to the emerging ideal of 
companionate marriage. Yet effort to limit men’s arbitrary ability to divorce their wives 
at will outside the court proved less successful60. 
The 1929 law was further modified by the 1985 law that added more details about 
what is the “harm” that is considered valid ground for juridical divorce, including 
obliging husbands to state in the marriage contract any other current marriages other than 
the one being contracted. The most interesting addition, besides the laws that further 
defined the judicial divorce ground and the means to prove its existence, is the arbiters 
coded. In the article six of the Personal Law, the judge is required to appoint two 
arbiters61: one from the husband’s family, and the other from the wife’s family. The job 
of these two arbiters is to reconcile between the married couples. Article 10 of the same 
law states that if the two arbiters’ reconciliation attempts failed, they should then suggest 
an irrevocable divorce to the judge. The arbiters are also requested to come to a suitable 
judgment regarding to the post-divorce financial settlements on the basis of the 
following: 
1. If the harm is totally from the husband’s side, the wife gets her full financial 
rights. 
2. If the harm is totally from the wife’s side, she shall pay a suitable divorce 
allowance. 
3. If the harm is seen as mutual, the divorce is with no allowance, or the husband 
pays a suitable allowance. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Baron. Beth, “Marital bonds in Egypt.” Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex 
and Gender. New Heaven: Yale University: 1991. 289-309. P, 285 
61 This law is based on the Qura’nic verse (4:35) “If ye fear a breach between them twain, appoint (two) 
arbiters, one from his family, and the other from hers; if they wish for peace, Allah will cause their 
reconciliation: For Allah hath full knowledge, and is acquainted with all things”. 
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4. If the arbiters failed to decide from which side is the harm, the divorce is with no 
allowance. 
In the current Egyptian Personal Law of the year of 2000, which remarkably added 
the khulʿ as a means to women’s dissolution of marriage, a modified description for the 
arbiters job was added in the article 19 to include that “if the arbiters failed to come to a 
conclusion, it is then up to the court to decide on both the divorce and the settlements.”62 
In addition to the required reconciliation attempts by arbiters, the article 18 further 
developed the role of the court itself in the reconciliation attempts between the married 
couple. It states that the court is not to issue a divorce before attempting to reconcile 
between the husband and his wife [usually done through majālis ṣulḥ, reconciliation 
sessions,], and if they do have kids, the court is obliged to make two reconciliation 
attempts instead if one, and to separate between the two attempts by a period of time that 
is not less than 30 days, but not more than 60 days.63 
As for the articles that deal with khulʿ in the Egyptian Personal Law, article 20 of 
2000 states that it is up to the married couple to agree on the khulʿ and its compensation, 
but if they fail to agree, the wife may be granted the khulʿ if she waives all of her post-
divorce financial rights as well as giving the husband the dower stated in the marriage 
contract back. In the same article, the court is obliged not to pronounce the khulʿ 
statement unless it attempts to reconcile between the married couple, and appoint two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The Egyptian Government Website. “The New Personal Law, Third Chapter: Masaʾil AlWilaya ʿala 
AlNafs, Issues Related to Self-Guardian.” Web. 
<http://www.egypt.gov.eg/arabic/laws/personal/chp_three/part_one.aspx>. 
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arbiters for another reconciliation attempt in a period that does not exceed three months.64 
It also states that khulʿ is counted as one irrevocable divorce, and that it is not subject to 
any appeals once established. 
Based on these articles and what they construct, one may conclude the following 
important points in regard to presenting divorce cases by women in courts. 
First, the Egyptian Personal Law indicates the complications that shall face any 
wife who desires to obtain a divorce without the need of her husband’s agreement. 
Although these laws seem to draw a straightforward process of obtaining both judicial 
divorce and divorce for compensation, however, obtaining a judicial divorce for women 
requires more than going through the aforementioned process. There are many other 
factors that stand behind granting women their divorce. Such factors of the court include 
the court laws established, but most importantly, women need to be able to afford the 
court’s bureaucratic system’s demands of presenting a court case, which includes 
financial demands as well as public accessibility. Moreover, the ability to deal with the 
social pressure that face women wanting to obtain divorce from their husbands, which I 
shall point out in the study of the iftāʾ cases. Most importantly, obtaining a judicial 
divorce also requires proving the existence of one of the aforementioned juridical divorce 
grounds; the type and nature of proofs required in courts, as Ziba Mir-Hosseini points 
out, “vary from one case to another; they might involve a combination of the husband’s 
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abandonment of marital life, non-support and maltreatment”65 the establishment of these 
grounds, she proceeds, “becomes more complex and difficult when the husband is present 
and is contesting the divorce.”66 All these factors significantly decrease the chances 
women have to obtain divorces by means through the court in Egypt. 
The second important issue to understand regarding presenting a divorce case in the 
court system is that similar to seeking a fatwa at Dār al-Iftāʾ, presenting a case in court 
has a bargaining nature in its process and purposes. Mir-Hosseini also points out about 
this fact that courts are sometimes used as a means to achieve ends other than obtaining a 
juridical decision, namely negotiating rights and duties: “… the court system is used in 
different ways and for different purposes by men and women… women resort to court to 
improve their bargaining position viś a viś their husbands. Men come to court to offset – 
or preempt—their wives’ actions.”67 It is then another mediation space of which judges, 
by means of their religious and legal authority, provide a means to those who wish to 
pressure the other partner through a negotiation mechanism to speed the process of 
gaining their most desired answers. It is, in this regard, important to mention that Mir-
Hosseini is studying a different context than the one I’m looking for; her study is based 
mainly on the Iranian and Moroccan court cases from the 1990s, and that their laws and 
codes are different than the Egyptian ones, although it is also a combination of the 
Islamic legal system and the state law. Despite all these facts, the use of the court by 
married couples in her study’s context are greatly similar to the uses of the Egyptian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. Marriage on Trial: A study of Islamic Family Law. London: I.B. Tauris, 2000. P, 
107. 
66 Mir-Hosseini, p.112. 
67 Mir-Hosseini, p. 50. 
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courts as well as Dār al-Iftāʾ, which significantly validates my argument of the dual 
nature of the job of muftis, as well as judges, in their respected societies—there are 
inseparable relations between the legal norms and the social contexts they deal with. This 
point will become more evident by the end of the chapter. 
The third issue is that courts, particularly the Personal Law courts that are based on 
Shariʿah laws, are clearly, as a religious institution, taking a pro-marriage position. This 
position appears in the laws regarding arbiters and ṣulḥ, reconciliation, sessions as well. 
The court codes, too, hold a particular interest in preserving the stability of “families” in 
their societies as it is clearly indicated, for instance, from article 18 of the 2000 code that 
obligates the court to double the efforts of reconciliation if the married couple have kids. 
Lastly, the inaccessible nature of modern courts, particularly the Egyptian courts, 
raised the demands on alternative accessible institutions that enjoy the same sort of 
“religious authority” and “negotiation spaces” such as Dār al-Iftāʾ. Petitioners who seek 
consultations on their marital disputes, including women, increasingly consider Dār al-
Iftāʾ as a more accessible option than the through court in hopes of easing the process of 
their desired goals in both obtaining legal answers or, as I pointed out in my introduction, 
negotiating rights and duties. The recent reforms and developments of Dār al-Iftāʾ further 
encourage Egyptians to resort to it regarding their marital disputes among other issues of 
their daily life. 
 
  
69 
 
4. Talāq, Divorce at Dār al-Iftāʾ of Egypt 
As indicated from the previous sections, Dār al-Iftāʾ neither deals with taṭliq, 
juridical divorce, nor khulʿ, divorce for compensation. It only receives divorce cases, and 
more specifically, kināya divorces. The reasons why they only deal with kināya divorces 
may be summarized as the following: a) they consider the common divorce 
pronouncements in Egypt as kināya and not ṣarīḥ; b) the ṣarīḥ cases are mostly those 
issued by the court or state official notary (maʾzūn); c) petitioners who come to Dār al-
Iftāʾ for divorce cases are mostly coming to investigate the validity of their divorces and 
not to establish or initiate a divorce with the exception of a few number of women who 
wished to obtain a divorce outside the court system and attempt to do so by proving that 
their husband did declare an oral pronouncement of a divorce formula. These women 
actually failed to obtain such a divorce, as far as I have encountered in the fatwa sessions, 
because although they proved their husbands did indeed pronounce a divorce formula, 
muftis declare it as kināya, and thus it is up to the husband’s intention whether they 
meant to divorce or not. 
If the husband or the married couple consensually wants a divorce, they would 
directly go to the court or a maʾzūn for its establishment and post settlements. While the 
latter choice is clearly accessible to husbands with no restrictions, for wives it is limited 
to the grounds and conditions I explained earlier. Thus, it is important to keep in mind 
that particularly for women, their reliance on Dār al-Iftāʾ as an alternative arena for 
obtaining a divorce is greater because of their limited access to the court; they attempt, as 
I have encountered in the attended cases, to use the accessible spaces provided in Dār al-
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Iftāʾ to achieve their desired solutions in marital disputes in general, and in obtaining 
divorce-related goals in particular. Although Dār al-Iftāʾ, unlike the court, is legally 
nonbinding, it is religiously authoritative, and therefore, it is able to provide this sort of 
space for petitioners in general and for women in particular, but also with limitations of 
their own. In other words, Dār al-Iftāʾ, with its clear position toward preserving social 
harmony and relations, is able to take the women’s side in both their legal and social 
rights that correspond to their perceived social status. Examples of the wives’ legal rights 
that came into question in the fatwa session are marital maintenance and equal treatment 
of multiple wives. Examples for women’ social rights that also came out in the fatwa 
sessions are the rights to work and the right to communicate and engage in family and 
community activities. Dār al-Iftāʾ, however, failed to support women who desired divorce 
basically because these women’ desire opposed the marriage preservation stance muftis 
uphold. Thus, when comes a case where the mufti aims to preserve the marriage while 
the wife wants to obtain divorce, muftis in fact did not provide these women with an 
alternative avenue to obtain their divorce, because they would have to disconnect from 
their own stance, so, they preferred to support their perception of the social stability 
instead of disconnecting from it. With that in mind, I will next discuss in detail in the 
methods and strategies of giving a fatwa in marital disputes at Dār al-Iftāʾ. 
i. Dār al-Iftāʾ’s Account in ṭalāq Statements 
As we discussed, ṭalāq can either be ṣarīḥ or kināya. Jurists defined each of their 
formulas and efficacy conditions as well as the rulings they are subject to. Dār al-Iftāʾ, 
under consideration, holds a distinct discourse in defining what makes a divorce 
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statement kināya and what makes a divorce ṣarīḥ. The key point in their discourse lies in 
the definition of the kināya divorce. We mentioned that jurists defined kināya as “ma 
aḥtamala atṭalāq wa ghayreh, formulas that comprise the meaning of divorce as well as 
other meanings”. Dār al-Iftāʾ considers the changing of the proper pronunciation of any 
of the ṣarīḥ formulas transforms it into a kināya formula, and accordingly requires a 
declaration of a divorce intention for its efficacy. Based on this definition of kināya, 
which is strongly rooted in late Shafiʿī jurisprudence68, muftis at Dār al-Iftāʾ consider the 
slang Egyptian pronunciation of the ṣarīḥ divorce formula, such as “anti ṭaliq, you are 
divorced” as “enti taliʾ, y divorca” as kināya divorce and not ṣarīḥ divorce. This of 
course includes conditioned divorce since the second phrase of a conditioned divorce 
formula—the effect—may also be pronounced as kināya, as mentioned previously. On 
the other hand, the Azhar Department of Research and Language, which also has a sub-
department for iftāʾ, holds that the slang Egyptian pronunciation of a ṣarīḥ formula does 
not transform it into a kināya divorce for that it is merely an accented pronunciation of 
the same formula and not a different one. This position is also held by some of the 
Sheikhs at Dār al-Iftāʾ who explicitly say that even if we disagree with the method of 
defining kināya in the Dār al-Iftāʾ fatwas, yet, as muftis affiliated with the official fatwa 
institution, they follow the Dār al-Iftāʾ’s method when giving a fatwa in divorce cases at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 An example to these late Shafii texts:  
Ash-Shirbīnī, Shams Ad-Din Muhammad al-khatīb. Al-ʾIqnaʿ fi ḥal alfadh ʾabī shujaʿ. Beirut: Dār al-kutub 
al-ʿilmyyah. Vol, 2, P, 289. 
He states, “if he [the husband] changed the letter (طط) into the letter (تت) it is then a kināya, as said some of 
the Shafiʿī late jurists, whether or not it [the changed letter] is form his own language” 
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Dār al-Iftāʾ. This attitude of muftis casts light on the power of the ‘institutionalization’ of 
iftāʾ as discussed earlier in the first chapter of this thesis. 
Dār al-Iftāʾ defends their legal argument in defining the kināya divorce of the way 
they define it by two main factors: the first is that there are considerable Fiqhī resources 
that define the kināya divorce in the same way, and given the established rules of dealing 
with jurisprudential differences,69 it is permitted that they choose the opinions that most 
respond to their society’s needs and interests. The second is that Dār al-Iftāʾ, recalling 
Sheikh Jomʿa’s story and the complexity of the iftāʾ structure in practice, deals with a 
society where ṭalāq is pervasive70 among people who suffer from social, economic, and 
political pressures. Therefore, they take the task of finding the most suitable legal 
opinions to maintain their pro-marriage position, and to provide the community with 
answers that preserve their social relations. This sounds as a reasonable task achieved by 
reasonable means, which is partially true, but taking this approach also creates 
problematic issues.  
The first is the use of two scholarly dishonorable doctrines, the first is talfīq, 
eclecticism—where a part of a doctrine of one school is combined with a part from 
another71 to form a desired opinion— and the second is ḥiyāl (sing. ḥīla), legal 
stratagems—quoted by Wael Hallaq, according to Imam Shāṭibī (d.1388) ḥiyāl constitute 
“legal means by which one can arrive at juridical results otherwise prohibited by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 One of which as-suyuti stresses, he states “Whenever one is inflicted with a differed-upon issue, s/he 
shall follow the opinion which sets this issue as permissible” 
70 In a general fiqhi rule, it is stated that cases by which “ma ‘ammat bihi albalwa, cases that was spread to 
the extent that it is not avoidable anymore”, it is permitted to use weak legal opinions and legal stratagems. 
71 Hallaq, History of Legal Theories, p, 210. 
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law72.” If resorting to these two doctrines by individual jurists has already been criticized 
by their colleague jurists73 because of these doctrines’ potential negative impact on the 
Islamic legal scholarships, resorting to such doctrines in an authoritative legal institution, 
such as Dār al-Iftāʾ, may in fact result in the normalization (and legalization) of such 
doctrines that override the preponderant legal doctrines for less authoritative ones for the 
sake of achieving desired legal results. 
The permissibility of using a marjūḥ, less dominant legal opinion, over a 
preponderant one, however, has been discussed in the Adab Al-Fatwa treatises. While 
most of these texts insist on the obligation that muftis give fatwas based on al-rājiḥ, the 
preponderant opinion, of their respected madhhab, school of law, they also insist on the 
importance of putting into consideration the public interests of the community in which 
they are giving the fatwas. These two points may seem at first glance to be contradictory 
since looking after the society’s public interest may result in the non-application of the 
first point, which is to follow preponderant opinion. Hence, fatwa-giving seems to be 
governed by two contradictory principles, but in fact, they are not; rather, they deal with 
different spheres/cases, which is to say muftis are obligated to follow the preponderant 
opinions in the madhhab unless it conflicts the interests of the people and their needs, 
then they are permitted, even encouraged, to follow the most suitable marjūḥ opinions. A 
prominent text that discusses this issue is “ʿUqūd rasm al-muftī” by the Hanafi jurist Ibn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Hallaq, History of Legal Theories, p, 173. 
73 One example of such critiques is found in Imam Shāṭibī’s description of the jurists in his time as “far too 
lenient in the application of the law” for their excessive use of ḥīyāl while issuing fatwas to their 
communities. For more on Imam Shāṭibī’s critiques, please view: Hallaq, History of Legal Theories, p, 
164-175. 
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ʿĀbdīn (1198-1252). Ibn ʿĀbdīn begins his commentary, on his own iftāʾ manual, by 
stating that it is an obligation on both Mujtahid muftis and Muqallid muftis to follow the 
preponderant opinion on the Madhhab, and cites a consensus on this issue. Shortly after 
and while discussing the ʿUrf as a principle factor in fatwa-giving, Ibn ʿĀbidīn states that 
it is forbidden to perform iftāʾ in a society without a proper knowledge of its customs and 
traditions.74  Another major writing in Adab al-Mufti is “Adab al-Fatwā wa-l-Muftī wa-l-
Mustaftī” manual for Imam Al-Nawawī specifies, from among the knowledge of the 
society’s customs and traditions, the knowledge of the linguistic differences, especially if 
it differs from the mufti’s own. This notion might explain the particular method taken by 
Dār al-Iftāʾ to determine the exact pronunciation of the divorce formulas in order to 
determine whether it is to be considered a ṣarīḥ or kināya divorce.   
Hence, the first problematic issue evolved from Dār al-Iftāʾ’s approach to kināya 
definition has its legal justification in the iftāʾ tradition. Although, muftis of Dār al-Iftāʾ’s 
approach might seem to depart from the preponderant rulings of the classical scholarships 
of divorce, but as seen, it has a legal background to rely on.  
The second problematic issue that evolves from Dār al-Iftāʾ’s discourse is related to 
their role as an institution that is deeply involved in the Egyptian society. As mentioned 
earlier, muftis at Dār al-Iftāʾ offer a particular role in the Egyptian society that is not 
merely limited to legal consultation, but also a mediation arena for solving marital 
disputes emerged from, or related to, legal doctrines and social practices. In this role, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Assayyed Muhammad Amīn. Sharh Manzūmat ʿUqūd rasm al-muftī. Manuscript- unknown 
publisher. P, 3. 
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muftis attempt to use their legal expertise and their respected religious authority to 
preserve the social relations in the society through creating solutions to its marital 
disputes. In so doing, Dār al-Iftāʾ also preserves social practices that are intensely 
embedded in hierarchical practices toward women participating in these societies. These 
practices are part of a larger culture that promotes presumed roles and expectations to 
each of the married partners. Instead of attempting to use their authority to change these 
practices, muftis rather attempt to adjust their methods of giving-fatwas to respond to and 
even harmonize such practices. This does not deny that muftis were also able to refine 
some of the unjust practices toward women by providing them some sort of engagement 
and leverage in their authoritative religious institution. Women’s response to muftis’ 
attempts to engage them in the iftāʾ process and their use of theses available engagement 
spaces were also remarkable; their insistence in accompanying their husbands to Dār al-
Iftāʾ to investigate their divorce cases—although it is only the husband who is heard in 
his own pronouncements—to the extend that few women came alone; their insistence in 
receiving their marital rights through religious authoritative channels; as well as their 
insistence to fulfilling their religious requirements through making sure their existent 
marriages are valid. More examples to women’ agencies in istiftāʾ will be shown below 
in the analysis of the actual fatwa cases. 
ii. Presenting a Divorce Case at Dār al-Iftāʾ: The Fatwa Sessions 
As I mentioned in my introduction, I attended one hundred and forty fatwa 
sessions over the course of six full days. One hundred and fifteen out of the total were 
divorce cases. Among the divorce cases, there were thirty cases presented by husbands, 
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five presented by wives (all of which were refused to be seen initially until they brought 
their husbands with them with the exception of a young woman who’s marriage had not 
been consummated yet), and the rest presented by both the wife and the husband either 
alone or with some other family member such as their parents or kids. 
 As discussed earlier, the fatwa corresponds to the Istiftāʾ question; petitioners are 
the ones responsible of helping the mufti to conceptualize the fatwa case by means of the 
facts stated in their question. With this in mind, the chances given to husbands to speak of 
the case are notably much higher than the chances given to their wives in marital 
disputes, particularly in divorce cases. The reason behind this is that the divorce is 
conceived as a man’s divorce due to the fact that the legal capacity of initiating a divorce 
statement is limited to men, as clarified earlier, other than the fact that the kināya divorce 
depends on the husband’s intention for its efficacy, and not merely the statement 
pronounced, all of which places the presentation of the divorce case in front of muftis 
totally in the husband’s hand.  
Whilst women’s statements and intentions are not relevant in divorce, as I have 
encountered, however, a sort of engagement from the wives’ side in the divorce fatwa 
sessions was present, but not in terms of declaring a statement or an intention, but rather 
in terms of attempting to convince the mufti that their husbands were out of their minds, 
in cases where women wanted to keep the marriage bonds, or attempting to convince the 
muftis not to believe the husband’s denial of a divorce in cases when women were clearly 
attempting to depart from their marriages and obtain a divorce. The other cases of which 
women participated in the divorce fatwa sessions were in cases of the conditioned 
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divorce; they were, surprisingly, asked if they remembered the conditioned divorce at the 
time they fulfilled its “condition, i.e. the actions or events the divorce was suspended to.” 
Marital dispute cases, other than divorce, witnessed a greater engagement by women and 
larger negotiations as well. In the next section, I will closely analyze the attended divorce 
fatwa sessions to practically show how the Dār al-Iftāʾ’s social-legal mediation position 
is keen to preserving the social relations in the Egyptian society through the preservation 
of marriage by means of their legal expertise and their granted religious authority. 
a. Intention Determination Process 
Since Dār al-Iftāʾ classified most of the pronounced divorce formulas by Egyptian 
husbands as kināya, the question of intention became an essential part of all the divorce 
cases. Muftis attempted, through conversation between them and the petitioning 
husbands, to determine the exact intention behind their pronouncements, and accordingly 
determine the establishment of the divorce. The typical question asked by muftis to 
husbands was: “What was your intention while pronouncing what you pronounced.” This 
question was usually followed by a set of other revised questions to help the husband 
understand what it means to declare a divorce intention, and to help the mufti investigate 
the declared intention by the husband. Some petitioners, however, were not able to 
understand what exactly did the muftis mean by the type of questions they asked. 
Petitioners were mostly confused between what is considered to be “intended” and 
“wanted.” In other words, the muftis were looking for the existence of the jurisprudential 
intention that accompanies the legal action, while husbands understood intention to mean 
what they want at the time of saying something.  
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Many of the petitioners, therefore, asked for clarification or a restatement of the 
question. In one particular case, case number (59), the husband asked the mufti: “When 
you say ‘intention’ what exactly do you mean?” The mufti responded: “By intention I 
mean that your heart is, at the moment you pronounced the divorce formula75, determined 
to divorce, and that you are aware of what this divorce would result in: the separation 
between you and your wife.” The husband’s response to the mufti’s previous modified 
version of the intention question was simply, “Then, the answer is NO, I did not.” I could 
not tell whether the petitioner realized that what the mufti described as an intention is not 
applicable to what he experienced, or that he found the jurisprudential intention, as 
defined by the mufti, seem to be very complicated so he just decided that he was not 
aware of this particular notion and level of determination when he pronounced the 
divorce.  
I found the petitioners’ confusion of what “intention” means to be a normal result of 
the repeated and revised question posed to them by muftis who seemed to be so eager for 
a “no” answer so that they could preserve the marriage under question. In a number of 
cases, husbands’ first answer was “yes, I intended for the divorce,” but they ended up, 
after a back and forth modified set of questions, saying no. In case number (119) for 
example, the intention question proceeded as the following: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The mufti here is following the traditional Shafiʿī definition of “ nīyah sharʿīyah, jurisprudential 
intention” which is, as mentioned in Bājūrī’s, “qaṣd yuṣaḥibūhu ʿamal, an intent accompanying an action”. 
Accordingly, intention declared after or before any action is not jurisprudentially considered as valid. For 
instance, in rituals, the intention has to be declared in the first obligatory action. Examples are: in ablution, 
intention accompanies the washing of the face; in prayer, it has to accompany the takbīr as the first 
obligatory action, etc. 
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Husband: I said to my wife ‘entī ṭaliʾ, y divorca’ 
Amin al-Fatwa: What was your intention?” 
Husband: I intended the divorce 
Amin al-Fatwa: Or was it a reaction to what she said? 
Husband: Yes, it was a reaction 
Amin al-Fatwa: A reaction to end the situation, or to end 
the marriage life? 
Husband: Indeed, it was to end the situation not the 
marriage, I want her 
In a significant number of cases, women engaged in the intention conversation not 
as determiners, but as a secondary back-up sources to help the husband recall the 
situation in which he pronounced the divorce statement. These cases put the women in a 
position of anxiety and concern in order to maintain their marital relationships, in 
addition to being frustrated from their husband’s behavior.  
In case number (110), for example, after the second repeated intention question, the 
wife, a middle-aged woman who complained about her husband’s repeated divorce, and 
was trying to reach a solution that would preserve the marriage, asked the mufti to further 
clarify to her husband the difference between intending to divorce while pronouncing the 
statement and intending to end the situation. She commented, “When he is really angry, 
he is no longer aware of what he is saying to the extent that I’m the one who later tells or 
reminds him that he pronounced the divorce.”  
Furthermore, women would sometimes show the same interest of keeping their 
marriage by trying to indirectly convince the mufti that the husband did not intend the 
divorce. For example, in case number (35), a married couple who had come to question 
three separate divorce incidents, one of which was multiple (the husband said he repeated 
the divorce 30 times), the wife interrupted her husband’s positive answer to the intention 
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question and spoke for five minutes about the situation that accompanied their first 
divorce incident three years ago, and how it could not possibly be the case that the 
husband meant to divorce her. Her exact words were, “We were a new couple and there 
was nothing to make him hate my companionship (ʿishrah); it was just that I irritated him 
in front of his relatives by saying “if you are a man, divorce me” so he pronounced the 
divorce to save his face. Indeed, I’m not intervening his intention, but that is so it seemed 
to me.” The woman’s eagerness to help her husband remember his intention was 
followed by the mufti’s affirmation of the idea. Actually both, the wife and the mufti, 
failed to change the husband’s mind who, in turn, reaffirmed his divorce intention in this 
incident as well as their second divorce incident. The third thirty-times repeated divorce, 
though, was declared as invalid on the basis of extreme anger as well as the husband’s 
testimony he did not want to end the marriage. 
With this in mind, it was not absent from the muftis’ minds that husbands may lie or 
at least play around their actual intention in order to salvage their marriages, and 
therefore, some of the muftis used methods, other than the question and answer dialogue, 
to help determine the validity of the divorce intention. The most interesting method I 
encountered was the mufti asking the husband to testify by God they did not intend to 
divorce their wives. The way this method was done is by either asking the husband to 
testify in his own words or to repeat a complete testimony formula the mufti provides 
him with. The formula provided states, “I testify, and God is my witness, that I did not 
intend to divorce my wife by saying what I have said.” Muftis here seem to be relaying 
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on the religious consciousness that brought the petitioner to the Dār al-Iftāʾ to consult 
religious authorities, and choosing not to continue in a legally invalid marriage. 
In this regard, it is also worth noting that sometimes husbands did answer positively 
to the intention-repeated questions in a confident manner that they intended to divorce 
their wives, and accordingly, muftis validated their divorces. In more than three cases I 
attended, husbands admitted that they intended to divorce their wives. One out of the 
three cases was a third divorce incident, and therefore, the mufti declared it to be an 
irrevocable divorce, although his pronouncement in this third divorce was “ʾanti ʿaliy 
ḥarām, you are forbidden for me,” which is with no dispute a kināya formula, and since 
the husband admitted that he intended to divorce her, the divorce was established. The 
other case was transferred into a group-iftāʾ session to investigate the husband’s other 
previous two divorces in hopes of invalidating one of them. It is important to note here 
that since Dār al-Iftāʾ does not issue written fatwas to divorce cases, these husbands of 
whom their divorces were declared effective still need to document these divorce at the 
state official notary in order for them to be officially divorced and start the process of the 
post-divorce settlements. 
 Sometimes the basis of the muftis’ kināya argument falls apart when facing a case 
from people who are from places where the pronunciation of the correct explicit ṭalāq 
formula are the common ones because of their Arabic accent, such as in upper Egyptian 
cities, and they claim not to have intended the divorce. In case (50), the petitioner was 
originally from Qina, a suburban Egyptian town that speaks a slightly different Egyptian 
accent than of other cities. In this city, they pronounce the letter Q (قق) nearly as the fuṣha, 
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classical Arabic, and accordingly they pronounce ṭaliq as ṭaliq and not ṭaliʾ. The mufti 
kept questioning the husband on the exact formula he pronounced, but was not able to 
make a decision regarding this divorce case since the legal basis for considering it a 
kināya has been interrupted by the fact that the husband might have pronounced the ṣarīḥ 
formula without any changes. Ideally, and as known from their legal discourse, the fatwa 
should consider the pronounced formulas as a ṣarīḥ formula and disregard the claimed 
intention. The mufti, however, did not give a fatwa in this case and decided to transform 
it into a lajna,76 a group session that gives fatwas collectively rather than individually in 
complicated cases such as this one. The reason why the mufti did not simply establish the 
divorce was because the husband insisted that he did not intend to divorce his wife, and it 
was their third divorce; therefore, the mufti attempted to reconcile between what he 
believes is the basis of the legal ruling of divorce, the declaration of the intention, and the 
preservation of an established marriage as well as the fact that since the petitioner’s 
accent removed the legal grounds for considering his pronouncement as kināya, his 
pronouncement of an explicit divorce formula did not need efficacy or a declaration of an 
intention. Altogether these three factors complicated the fatwa session, which is why the 
mufti transferred the case to a group fatwa session where more experienced muftis can 
issue the fatwa. This case shows the complexity of the muftis’ structured paradigm where 
his social role intervenes their legal scholarship, and thus, they go out of their ways in 
attempt for reconciliation. I was not present in the lajna fatwa session so I do not know 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 In some complicated cases, muftis had to set up another appointment for the petitioners but not with a 
single mufti but rather a group of three to four muftis by which they give the fatwa collectively. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to attend any of these group fatwa sessions.  
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the final fatwa given to this case, but I searched the fatwa collections of the grand Mufti, 
Sheikh Jomʿa, and found that he clearly stated that since some upper Egyptian cities 
pronounce the letter “Q,” their pronouncement of “ṭaliq” is explicit. This case further 
shows the particularity of the fatwa-giving structure to its context and the willing of 
muftis to further challenge their legal discourses for the purpose of preserving the family 
unit such as this. 
Another example to foster the claim of muftis’ willingness to further challenge their 
legal scholarships for the interest of preserving social stability as they perceive is found 
in two cases of conditioned divorce, case number (118) and (127). In these two cases, 
wives’ intention of performing the actions or engaging in the events that the conditioned 
divorce is suspended to was brought up into the conversation; they were asked whether or 
not they remembered the conditioned divorce, and intentionally fulfilled its conditional 
actions in order to transform the conditioned divorce into a divorce. Muftis resorted to 
this type of exceptional consideration, wives’ intention to fulfill the divorce conditioned 
actions, after the husbands in these cases admitted that they intentioned the divorce, and 
muftis attempted to find another reason to invalidate the divorce through bringing up the 
second actor in the incident, namely, the wife.  
Although I was not able to find textual sources for the invalidation of conditioned 
divorce, if the actor of the conditioned case has fulfilled it while forgetting the 
conditioned divorce, given Dār al-Iftāʾ’s emphasis on the intention in their legal 
discourse, they were able to use the second actor’s intention as a legal subterfuge in order 
to salvage the marriage. The women in the two cases responded positively to the question 
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that yes they were remembering that their husbands conditioned a divorce on these 
specific actions, but I asked the mufti what would have he done had they said they were 
forgetful—would the divorce be invalid then? The mufti responded by “yes, I would have 
put her intention into consideration” to my question, and clarified that the women’s 
forgetfulness of the conditioned divorce while performing the condition would act as a 
subterfuge to invalidate the marriage. 
It was interesting to learn that Ron Shaham in his study on family courts in modern 
Egypt encountered court cases where women went to the court to report the fulfillment of 
the conditional events/actions in conditioned divorces declared by their husbands so that 
they would obtain a divorce. He further explained that women needed to bring evidences 
to prove such fulfillment even if the conditional actions were suspended to a third party 
and not to the wife herself. Some wives succeeded to prove such fulfillment while others 
failed to convince the court that the action was fulfilled or that a conditioned divorce was 
pronounced in the first place.77 I did not encounter any cases of which wives reported a 
conditioned divorce in order to obtain a fatwa divorce, but as can be clearly indicated 
from Dār al-Iftāʾ’s account that these wives’ reports would not help them obtain a divorce 
unless their husbands admit to both the pronouncement of a conditioned divorce as well 
as the declaration of a divorce intention. 
Thus, these two cases show, in addition to showing muftis’ challenge of the legal 
discourse, an exceptional type of engagement for women in divorce fatwa sessions. Here, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Shaham, Ron. Family and the Courts in Modern Egypt: A Study Based on Decisions by the Sharīʿa 
courts 1900- 1955. Leiden: Brill, 1991.P, 106. 
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we find, not only that muftis are able to provide answers using their legal expertise and 
social norms, but also that they are able to challenge both of them. 
The question of intention as such brings together a strong interconnection of three 
integral spheres: first, the petitioners’ consciousness and religious responsibility 
represented in their share of the iftāʾ process; second, the challenge of the legal doctrines 
in the iftāʾ process; and third, the muftis’ faithfulness toward maintaining their societal 
relations. 
iii. Women, Divorce, and Social Enforcements 
Besides the challenges and limitations women face in both institutions, Egyptian 
courts and Dār al-Iftāʾ, there is the social stigma placed on wives who request divorces, 
as well as divorced women. These three issues curb women’s chances to obtain divorce 
in Muslim societies in general, and in the Egyptian society in particular. Despite the 
accessible spaces women were granted in both institutions, and are made in the utmost 
use of them in solving their marital disputes and negotiating their rights, there are still 
arenas their accessibility are limited to the use and benefit of men, such as in Divorce 
because of the unilateral nature of its practices. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
wives, unlike husbands, do not have unconditioned power of ending the marriage if she 
wishes to. Henceforth, the cases of which women have the right to divorce are both 
limited and conditioned legally and socially. 
 The Egyptian society places so much pressure on divorced women to the extent 
that women would rather keep the tie of marriage so that they will not suffer the 
psychological or social humiliation. As an illustration of the power of this social stigma 
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against women requesting divorce, case number (36) in a conditioned divorce fatwa 
session was of a wife who, explicitly eager to obtain a divorce based on a conditioned 
divorce that her husband claimed not to have intended, stated that she raised a khulʿ case 
to the court twice and had to withdraw it both times because of the family and friends’ 
reaction of her doing so, them arguing that her action of obtaining a khulʿ shall negatively 
affects her kids’ reputation. This reasoning, of course, is purely cultural and not legal. 
However, it is put into consideration in religious institutions that are strongly involved in 
the social lives of its clients such as Dār al-Iftāʾ. For this reason, the mufti, although 
suggested that she raise the court case if she needs a divorce, encouraged the wife to 
listen to her friends and family, and keep the bond of her marriage for the interests of her 
kids as well. 
 In addition, if women were able to pass the social challenges or were able to deal 
with it, either due to their personal capacities or social classes that significantly matter in 
this regard, another challenge would appear in front of them: the economic challenge; 
most lower and middle class women are unemployed and therefore they depend on their 
husband’s financial maintenance. The latter factor is also one of the reasons, beside the 
inaccessibility of the court to women, why they would usually attempt to get their 
husband to divorce them instead of obtaining a judicial or khulʿ divorce. Ron Shaham 
further explains women’s tendency to rather find suitable strategies to get their husbands 
to divorce them instead of resorting to the court by saying, “As a rule, women preferred 
this type of divorce [ṭalāq without involving the courts] because of its economic 
advantages (entitlement to deferred dower, maintenance for the waiting period, and the 
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maintenance for minor children in the mother’s custody). Women wished to be separated 
from their husbands found sophisticated ways to bring their husbands to divorce them by 
a ṭalāq.”78 
  While women do not favor the juridical divorces because of the economic factor, 
men, on the other hand, favor the juridical divorces for this very reason. Therefore, the 
husbands curb their uses of the absolute unilateral divorce right so that their wives would 
have to waive their post-divorce financial rights to obtain juridical divorce instead. Thus, 
the socioeconomic considerations in the Egyptian society play an impetus role in the 
divorce practices. Both married parties have a preferred type of marriage dissolution that 
would make them lose the least as possible. In a helpful summary, Ron Shaham tackles 
the socioeconomic underpinnings for the idea of the “preferred divorce” that leads the 
wife and husband to not opt for a certain type of divorce: 
The strength of the extended family, which reduces the 
number of divorces in endogamous marriages; the efficacy 
of customary arbitration mechanism in reconciling spouses; 
the objections of the wife’s father to her divorce, stemming 
from his reluctance to support her subsequent to her 
divorce and his wish to prevent future quarrels between her 
and her brothers’ wives; the considerable economic burden 
that the divorcing husband has to endure; the fact that the 
divorced wife is entitled to her jihaz [household furniture] 
with her; and the wish of the divorcing husband to marry 
again, which obliges him to pay his new wife her dower.79 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Shaham, p, 104. 
79 Shaham, p, 100. 
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As shown, some of these factors are social while other are economic, and they do not, in 
all times, only lead to a preferred divorce method, but also, and in most cases, lead to 
keeping an undesirable marriage to eschew dealing with them.  
 A good example that shows how women in the Egyptian society may as well be 
socially forced to keep their marriages instead of opting for a divorce, is evident in one of 
the five cases out of the one hundred and forty fatwa cases I attended, of a woman who 
came to Dār al-Iftāʾ alone without her husband to present her divorce case. As I 
mentioned, muftis refuse to give divorce fatwas in the absence of the husband, but in case 
number (46), a woman who may be in her 50s, insisted that the mufti hear her case even 
if he will not give a fatwa, but, as she said, would help to convince her husband, who 
refused to go to Dār al-Iftāʾ claiming they no longer had a chance to reconcile the 
marriage after he pronounced the divorce three times, to come and present the case. After 
she was done and the mufti requested that she brings her husband, she asked the mufti to 
talk on the phone with her husband to ask him to come, and he did.  
It is evident then that because of all the above complex socioeconomic factors, 
husbands, on the one hand, have become reluctant to divorce, and on the other hand, have 
suppressed their wives’ chances to both ending the marriage and receiving their full 
marital rights. Besides this result, the socioeconomic problems in the society created 
great tensions between married couples and families in the Egyptian society. As a result 
of these tensions, each of the partners attempt to use all of the available means to put 
pressure on the other partner in terms of fulfilling their rights and duties, or to control the 
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ongoing conversations/disputes about the entitlement of such rights and duties that 
belong to each of them.  
In this tension process, divorce and divorce practices play a central role; husbands 
found in their unilateral right to divorce a means to control women’s actions, particularly, 
in the conditioned and the oath divorces, which have been widely used for this purpose of 
obtaining social control through the use of a threat, and not as a dissolution of a marriage. 
A significant percentage of the divorce cases presented by petitioners in front of 
muftis at Dār al-Iftāʾ are either oath or conditioned divorce. Approximately, seven out of 
every ten husbands in the cases I observed so far stated that they did not “intend” to 
separate from or divorce their wives; they rather intended to “threaten” them so that they 
would obey or agree with the husband in his preferred solution of their conversation. As a 
results, these husbands’ claim saved their marriages because of the absent of the intention 
requirement of their kināya divorces. Here we can evidently encounter the interference of 
the institution of Dār al-Iftāʾ in the social conversation as mentioned earlier—Dār al-Iftāʾ, 
with its pro-marriage position that led to their maverick discourse in dealing with 
Egyptian divorces, playing a role in also indirectly preserving social practices that 
suppress women’s chances to obtain divorce as well as maintaining the gendered nature 
of marriage, and the presumed roles and responsibilities in the Egyptian society. 
Although I encountered some cases where women were eager to prove the 
establishment of divorce in the attended fatwa sessions, it was almost impossible for them 
to do so since the intention condition for either the conditioned or the oath divorces, is 
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merely in their husbands’ hands to determine, and thus accordingly, women were left 
with no means to practice the expanding male obligation method in this way. In case 
number (6), a wife showed a great deal of frustration after the mufti declared the 
invalidity of her husbands’ divorce pronouncements, the mufti commenting: “You should 
then raise a case to the court in order to get a divorce, but the divorce formulas your 
husband pronounced are not valid divorces since they were combined with no intention to 
divorce.” Of course, given the complex and overburdened structure of the court system in 
Egypt, it is clear that the suggestion given to this woman by the mufti is not going to help 
her end her unbearable marriage. 
A single exception from the insistence on the preservation of the marriage in all the 
fatwa sessions I attended was found in case number (117). The fatwa trustee was a 
trained Azhari graduate in his late 20s. He received six years of training at Dār al-Iftāʾ 
after his graduation from al-Azhar University, Department of Islamic and Arabic studies. 
The petitioner was a young girl—I estimated her age as 18-20 years old—who mentioned 
she was engaged, but with a marriage contract, to a man who is 24. She came to Dār al-
Iftāʾ to question the repeated divorce from her husband in an unconsummated marriage80. 
At first, and because of what I noted earlier that muftis do not hear divorce cases 
presented by the wife alone, the fatwa trustee asked her to bring her husband, or fiancé, to 
Dār al-Iftāʾ so that he can ask him about his intention. The girl insisted that he listens to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 In Egypt, there is a tradition that some families require a marriage contract in the engagement for varies 
reasons, some of which: showing serious commitment to the marriage, securing the woman’s right in cases 
of separation, securing the paternity of any unintentional pregnancy before the announcement of the 
marriage consummation, and for some conservative families, it is a perquisite for allowing the groom to 
talk and/or spend time with the bride to get to know her.  
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her explaining that she is in trouble. He then allowed her to talk, and thus she told her 
story complaining about her fiancé’s repeated conditioned divorce pronouncements that 
aim to stop her from basically doing anything in life: visiting her friends, talking to 
people, dressing the way she wants, and even going to work after mentioning she works 
as a saleswoman. At that point, the fatwa trustee asked her if they have ever had sex, even 
without the knowledge of their families, but she ensured him that they had not and were 
waiting for the official wedding. The fatwa trustee explicitly told her that these 
conditioned divorces do not count as divorce because the goal was for control over her 
and not for divorce; the fatwa trustee also encouraged her to go to work and ignore his 
threats. He then confidentially asked the girl why would she want to be with a man who 
is as oppressed and trifle as this man, and the girl expressed that she is seriously thinking 
of leaving him, but for family considerations she wants to work it out. It is worth noting 
that the fact that the marriage was not consummated, and thus did not yet render a social 
family unit, it was indeed a major factor of such bravery of the fatwa trustee in breaking 
the policy of giving fatwa to divorce cases to wives in the absence of their husbands. So, 
it was not precisely a departure of the preservation of the marriage position because the 
marriage did not yet carry its social weight as a family unit. 
This case, even if it is an exceptional one, is strongly significant to my argument; 
it shows that the young Azhari fatwa trustee was able to connect to the girl’s relationship 
crisis, and even exceed the Dār al-Iftāʾ policy of not giving a fatwa in divorce to wives in 
the absence of their husbands in order to help her get out of a relationship that he 
believed was unjust to her. It also shows that the young girl, who is unsatisfied with her 
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unconsummated marriage, is still attempting to preserve it for the sake of her social 
situation. 
As shown in this chapter, the fatwa sessions regarding divorce cases at Dār al- 
Iftāʾ of Egypt practically shows the interconnection between the legal and the social 
dimensions in the practice of iftāʾ.  Through the combination of legal expertise, shared 
contexts, and mediation skills, muftis developed a distinct strategy to harmonize social 
practices. This strategy consisted of preserving marriages as means to maintaining stable 
families—that are considered the building blocks of the society—in hopes of maintaining 
a stable society. To maintain their stance of pro-marriage, muftis needed to further 
develop a discourse to deal with the frequency of divorce in the Egyptian society, which 
threatens the preservation of marriages. In their attempts to create such discourse, muftis 
were not only willing to use the diversity of the legal opinions in the four major Sunni 
schools, but also to challenge these legal opinions. A prominent example of muftis’ 
challenge to the legal doctrines was perfectly seen in their account of the kināya divorce, 
where they used a creative reading of the legal doctrines that offered a solution to the 
non-establishment of the Egyptian divorce pronouncements.  
Petitioners, as seen, are the starting point in the fatwa-giving; they played an 
active role in the legal interpretive process through posing their questions and concerns to 
muftis, and also, as shown, through the dialogical dilemma of the intention determination 
in divorce. Petitioners also used a variety of strategies to manipulate, or at least influence, 
muftis to their advantage, and to negotiate their desired fatwas. Petitioners, both women 
and men, use Dār al- Iftāʾ, as an alternative (to the court) accessible religious authority to 
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negotiate their rights and obligations. Interestingly, although the divorce fatwa sessions 
depended on the husbands as the major actors in ṭalāq—being the one who pronounced it 
and intended/not intended it— the engagement of the wives in the sessions were present, 
for example, in cases where the couple and the mufti all reached a consensual decision to 
preserving the marriage, all collaborating in finding the possible way to do so. The wife 
was also, in some exceptional cases, the agency of the divorce case, as seen in the 
exceptional conditioned divorce cases. Thus, although women were “over-looked” in the 
fatwa sessions, but they are still important agencies in the istiftāʾ, this point will be 
further explained in the next chapter. The opportunities women have to obtain divorce are 
restricted because of the social, economic, and bureaucratic limitations. Muftis’ 
preserving marriages stance resulted in, for some cases, circumscribing the wife’s right to 
obtain a divorce. One may conclude, based on the majority of cases, that women wanting 
to preserve their marriages and/or obtain property rights have had full access to the Dār 
al- Iftāʾ’s authoritative support. However, women that do wish to terminate their 
marriages were not granted such access due to Dār al- Iftāʾ’s strong stance toward 
preserving marriages and by extension social and gender relations.
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Chapter Three: Power, Authority, and Negotiation 
 
1.Power-negotiation correlation  
The question of power and authority is essential to understanding the religious and 
social dynamics interplay in the practice of iftāʾ within its institutionalized form at Dār 
al-Iftāʾ of Egypt. As discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis, the authority and 
legitimacy Dār al-Iftāʾ enjoys is grounded in a combination between their legal 
authority—their ability to perform Ijtihād and produce fatwas—and their social 
position—their perception as authoritative mediators by the members of their society 
coupled with their correspondence to these members’ demands and needs. The 
petitioners’ role and impact in the process of legal interpretation and the issuing of fatwas 
is another issue tackled throughout the previous chapters, and is important to bring up 
here; these petitioners’ involvement in such processes is possible because of the available 
negotiation spaces in both the process of fatwa-seeking and the process of fatwa-giving. 
The power and structure of these negotiation spaces is the main topic of this chapter. 
Negotiation, the discussions between two or more parties with the purpose of 
resolving their differences or coming to mutual decisions, is an essential element in the 
practice of iftāʾ as encountered in the fatwa sessions at Dār al-Iftāʾ. Similar to the fact 
that iftāʾ is constituted through the interconnection of legal and social norms in specific 
societies, negotiation between muftis and petitioners and among petitioners themselves is 
also based on this complex interconnection. By means of negotiation, both muftis and 
petitioners bestow support and authority upon each other. In other words, petitioners in 
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marital disputes coming with their underpinning social relations in the Egyptian society 
use these negotiation spaces as a powerful tool to confer authority upon their social 
practices. Muftis, coming with their various legal scholarships, use the exact same spaces 
to confer legitimacy upon their religious and legal authority. Negotiation then, is an 
essential feature of iftāʾ and istiftāʾ. In this authorization and legitimization process, 
compromise from both parties is also made possible. In fact, the compromise plays an 
essential role in the marital disputes negotiation at Dār al-Iftāʾ as seen in previous 
chapters and will be particularly articulated in this chapter. The negotiation and 
compromise structure here is similar to what Hallaq describes, while explaining the 
mediation nature of pre-modern Muslim courts, as a “social fabric that demanded a moral 
logic of social equity rather than a logic of winner-takes-all resolutions… the creation of 
a compromise that left the disputants able to resume their previous relationships in the 
community81.” 
On the basis of the above negotiation structure, it is a fact that fatwas, as 
authoritative religious norms, “reflect and direct social organization,82” and vice-versa; 
social norms, as the situated contexts of which law is practiced, reflect and direct fatwas. 
Although some may argue, as Mir-Hosseini reports, that Islamic law is “fixed and non-
negotiable,” its legal process is in fact, as she explains “highly negotiable.83” Through 
her study of the nineteenth century marital court cases in Morocco and Iran, Mir-Hosseini 
argues and demonstrates that this negotiation is one of the main sources that enable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Hallaq, Introduction to Islamic Law. p, 60. 
82 Mir-Hosseini, p, 14. 
83 Mir-Hosseini, p, 14. 
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Islamic laws to connect to different cultural contexts. She also examines the practices of 
litigants in marital disputes to show how the power relations in family issues are 
sometimes sustained and in other times modified by the legal orders.84”  
In fact, this negotiative power-authority structure is not unique to modern 
religious institutions as in modern courts, in Mir-Hosseini’s context, and Dār al-Iftāʾ of 
Egypt in this thesis’s context; rather, negotiating power and authority has been explicitly 
or implicitly present in pre-modern Muslim societies as well. For example, Khaled Abou 
El-Fadl in his book, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women, talks 
about the role and authority of the ʿulama, religious scholars, in pre-modern Islam, and 
shows that negotiation was a very important instrument in maintaining their power and 
authority in the society. He states, “…throughout the classical period, Muslim jurists 
played a rather dynamic negotiative role in society. They often acted as a medium 
between the various social structures and political structures85.” 
Another scholar who explained the social negotiation in Islamic religious 
institutions is Wael Hallaq in his Introduction to Islamic Law, in the context of discussing 
the mediation role of judges and muftis. He draw from his reading of the structure and 
development of court system in Islam that courts, judges and even witnesses were 
strongly connected to the social norms and relations; judges’ task, according to him, is to 
preserve these relations through their privilege role in the community. Hallaq states: “The 
Qadi mediated a dialectic between, in the one hand, the social and moral imperative – of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Mir-Hosseini, p, 15. 
85 Abou El Fadl, Khaled. Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law: Authority and Women. Oxford: One 
world, 2010. P,15 
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which he was an integral part – and, on the other, the demands of legal doctrine which in 
turn recognized the supremacy of the unwritten codes of morality and morally grounded 
social relations.86” According to Hallaq, all members of the courts, including judges, 
muftis, who work as judges’ consulters, witnesses, scribes, are said to be community 
inspectors87. Thus he then claims that courts system in pre-modern Muslim societies was 
the creature of society and thus is framed by the society’s moral norms and social 
relations than it is to the legal ones. In short, the legal maxims and social norms related to 
involved parties; the presumed roles and responsibilities; authorities and privileges; 
communal and gender structures; as well as compromises and mediations, all interplay in 
the negotiation of marital disputes, both in Shariʿah courts and fatwa councils. 
Employing negotiation spaces is a means for the married couple to resolve their 
disagreements, and to steer their ongoing conversations about their marital-related issues. 
How then does negotiation function between these marital parties that resort to a third 
religious authoritative party as the muftis of Dār al-Iftāʾ? In order respond to this 
question, we need to understand that power and authority—be their source social, 
religious, economic etc.— are the basic ground for negotiation; for each party to 
negotiate, they need to possess or rely on some sort of power or exchangeable benefits to 
use in their bargaining. The more power and authority each partner possesses, the more 
they may dominate the negotiation process.  
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Provided that the social and legal privileges granted to each married partner vary 
based on each partner’s presumed roles, power and authority in the marital disputes 
negotiation do not necessarily take an absolute form, i.e. it is not that one partner is in an 
absolutely powerful and authoritative position over the other, and thus, s/he dominates 
the negotiation process. Nevertheless, it is, as I have encountered in my fieldwork, a 
proportional power and authority. In other words, a partner may be more powerful than 
the other in a certain issue, and less powerful in another. In most of the Istiftāʾ cases, each 
aspect of the fatwa question is dominated by one partner. An example to this proportional 
power is, and as will be discussed in detail in this chapter, that wives were always the 
dominate partner in all marital support cases because they posses a legal and social claim 
over it, while husbands were the dominate partner in divorce cases because they posses 
the legal utilitarian claim over it.  
There are three major factors of this proportional power and authority, which steer 
the marital disputes negotiation, and emerge from: a) the established legal rights and 
duties for both the husband and the wife; b) the social status for both the male partner and 
the female partner, i.e. the perceived roles and responsibilities for each; and c) equally 
central to the first two factors in steering the marital disputes negotiation is the third 
authoritative party involvement, which in our context is represented in the religious 
authority muftis provide to petitioners; muftis’ involvement in petitioners’ marital 
disputes also functions according to the first two factors: legal rights/duties, and 
presumed social relations. 
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With these three factors steering the negotiation spaces in mind, this chapter offers 
a more nuanced understanding of power and authority in the negotiation process in the 
iftāʾ and istiftāʾ at Dār al-Iftāʾ. In this chapter, I further analyze this negotiation-power 
correlation and its basic structure—the three factors I raised above—to show that, similar 
to the socio-legal compound structure of the making of fatwas regarding marital issues 
discussed in the previous chapters, the socio-authority compound structure of negotiating 
marital rights and duties exists. The perceived legal norms, and presumed social roles are 
equally interplayed in this type of negotiation. Muftis and petitioners use all these 
elements combined in their negotiation: the husband uses his social position as the male-
dominant married partner in the negotiation of his marital disputes in the fatwa sessions 
as the wife also uses her legal and social rights preserved to her to negotiate in the same 
disputes. 
A clear example to show the negotiation structure between petitioners themselves is 
one that Mir-Hosseini discusses in her book Marriage on Trial about the amount of 
mahr, dower, that is the main financial obligation the groom pays to his bride. She shows 
how mahr is negotiated between the two families by means of social and moral norms to 
support each family’s position. She explains: 
The bride's family argues, ‘we won't give away a girl like 
this,’ without a guarantee, a pledge; while the groom's side 
reminds them, ‘A high mahr cannot bring marital 
happiness.’ What prolongs the process of negotiation is the 
awareness on both sides that, despite all the maxims and 
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assurances, mahr is not a legal fiction; a woman can and 
will claim it when she needs to 88 
 
The bride’s family, relying on their daughter’s conceived legal right of the dower, is 
negotiating a high amount of dower, whereas the groom’s family, not supported by any 
legal claims, resorted to a commonly recognized moral fact that money is not happiness. 
Although both families never explicitly said that the potential dispute in the case of non-
fulfillment of marital responsibilities from any of the married couple along with its 
impact on the entitlement of dower payment, is their main concern while negotiating its 
amount, this scenario is clearly their motive.  
Another example to illustrate this negotiation in the legal discourse between 
petitioners and muftis, besides the kināya cases discussed in the chapter on divorce, is 
particularly the two cases on conditioned divorce, case (118) and (127). In these two 
cases, husbands declared a conditioned divorce suspended on actions by their wives, i.e. 
“if you leave the house, you are divorced.” Wives in the two cases fulfilled the condition, 
but did not mention whether they had intended to perform these conditioned actions to 
seek divorce or not. Muftis were willing to consider the absence of wives’ intention to 
fulfill the condition of divorce, which is not legally relevant to the ruling, as a subterfuge 
to invalidate the conditioned divorce and preserve the marriage. Muftis were able to 
negotiate the legal discourses in order to preserve their stated goal of preserving their 
society’s social relations. In doing so, muftis are able to also preserve their legitimate 
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authority in the society by providing this sort of suitable solutions to the petitioners who 
were, in these particular examples, eager to preserve their marriage as well.  
2. Fatwa’s Legal and Social Authority 
1. Negotiating the Legal Discourses 
A close reading to the attended fatwa sessions strongly points out to the 
interconnection between the social and the legal authorities in the practice of negotiation, 
both between muftis and petitioners, and between petitioners with each other. Petitioners 
use variety of strategies to negotiate the fatwas they are seeking so that it can become as 
close to what they desire it to be. Muftis also participate in this bargaining process not 
only as a third party that takes a petitioner’s side, but also as law interpreters who attempt 
to raise the possibility of the accepting the major/preferred fatwas, which in turn elevates 
their legal authority, and preserve their scholarships. They attempt to achieve this end by 
means of, for example, stating that a specific fatwa is the “the major opinion,” “the most 
agreed upon among jurists,” or “the preponderant one.”  
In these negotiation attempts, there is an explicit claiming of presumed social 
privileges and perceived legal rights, and an implicit authority claiming agenda for each 
of the parties. It is important for muftis to be able to satisfy the petitioners’ agendas in 
order to make a successful claim toward the muftis’ own negotiation agenda. Therefore, 
both attempt to come to an agreement that would suit the petitioners’ goal in their marital 
negotiation as well as the muftis’ legal scholarships. Of course, a compromise in both 
claims is a must in such process. However, it is not always successful, as will be shown. 
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In cases where petitioners show frustration or discomfort from the given fatwa, muftis 
make necessary efforts to find other possible ones that comfort the petitioners’ needs, and 
correspond to their own capacities, but that are within the available legal rulings and 
possible interpretations of the law. Khalid Masʿud best described this notion of 
negotiation in istiftāʾ and its crucial role in the muftis’ discourse to iftāʾ: “istiftāʾ ensured 
the discursive development of Fiqh… The mustaftī had a choice to go to another mufti if 
he is not satisfied with the fatwa. This choice placed the mustaftī in a bargaining position 
and forced the mufti to respond to the specific points raised in the Istiftāʾ.89” 
Masʿud here is paying attention to the fact that fatwas are neither binding nor 
obligatory to follow, and as a consequence, petitioners have the option to seek another 
fatwa from a different mufti if they are not satisfied with the first one. Accordingly, if 
muftis at Dār al-Iftāʾ failed to meet the petitioners expectations, they will look for other 
sources in which they may find their desired answers. Although this sort of pick-and-
choose method of dealing with fatwas is religiously disliked90, it is still practiced by 
some, and of course has the potential to affect the muftis’ authority in their society. 
Therefore, muftis make their utmost efforts to be as connected to the petitioners’ needs 
and desires as possible using the negotiable spaces in the law. This tendency of being 
connected to the members of the society helps muftis to achieve their goal of preserving 
the social relations of their petitioners, which are of great importance for them as was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Masʿud, Muhammad Khalid. The Significance of Istiftā' in the Fatwā Discourse, Islamic Research 
Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Vol. 48, No. 3  (Autumn 2009), pp. 341-366. 
90 For a discussion on the critique of using of talfīq in the legal reasoning, please see: Hallaq, Wael. A 
History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-fiqh. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. P, 207-215. 
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repeatedly shown in the first chapter. In his article “Transcendence and Social Practice: 
Muftīs and Qāḍīs as Religious Interpreters,” Kevin Reihnert elaborates on the authority 
muftis obtain through the members of their societies by means of providing suitable 
fatwas by saying, “Muftis are the ones to whom the community delegates the task of 
finding and understanding the law and then passing that knowledge on in a form 
appropriate to the problems at hand.91”  
Reihnert is pointing out to one of the most important aspect of the relationship 
between muftis and petitioners, which relies on expecting social and legal responsibilities 
from muftis. To further explain the negotiation and authority relationship between both 
muftis and petitioners, muftis provide petitioners with religious authority to strengthen 
their position in their marital negotiation. In the same manner, petitioners provide muftis 
with the social legitimacy for muftis’ religious authority by maintaining their conception 
of these muftis as authoritative. In an interesting elucidation of the relationship between 
authoritative religious leaders, such as muftis in our context, and the members of their 
communities, Hilary Kalmbach explains that although the authoritative religious figure 
may choose to compel their communities to follow these leaders’ orders—by using their 
religious authority—in fact, it is the communities that choose to follow the leaders they 
perceive as legitimate, which points out that these leaders’ authority is sourced in the 
“choice” of their communities to follow them. She states, “Holders of authority are seen 
as legitimate leaders of their communities, and these communities recognize this 
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legitimacy by choosing to comply with their demands… an authoritative relationship 
involves followers recognizing the leader as legitimate.92” Thus, the authoritative 
relationship between muftis and petitioners is a shared reciprocal authority. This authority 
plays an essential role in steering the negotiation process in the iftāʾ and Istiftāʾ 
negotiation spaces. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that negotiating legal discourses is in fact limited; 
there are cases that practically meet all the criteria that muftis challenge their scholarships 
for, but because of other factors that come into play, muftis are not able to accommodate 
these cases in their legal negotiation process. For instance, in case (24), a married couple 
came to question three court-documented divorces in hopes that they may be able to 
invalidate one of them so they may return to their marital bond. The husband claimed that 
the third divorce was under coercion by members of the wife’s family, and therefore, it 
should not be counted. The mufti explained to the husband that the type of coercion that 
might legally invalidate one’s action is only one that threatens one’s life, i.e. the choice 
would be either to document your wife’s divorce or be killed. The mufti proceeded, 
“since this is not the case in your divorce, and since you have already documented three 
divorces in the court, all of them are valid explicit-divorces, and we cannot do anything 
about them.” Thus, although the married couple are keen to preserving their marriage, 
which is a prime concern to muftis as well, the subordination to the official state system 
and the loyalty to their discourse regarding ṣarīh, explicit, divorce, which they count all 
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documented divorces as explicit and thus unavoidable, prevented the mufti from granting 
petitioners any legal negotiation spaces. 
In case number (36), a woman, in the presence of her fiancé, told a story about her 
ʿurfī marriage—unofficial and undocumented type of marriage where a man and a wife 
decide to marry with all the marriage conditions without registering their marriage at the 
state marriage registration office—that lasted for few years until she conceived a child at 
which point her husband left with the unofficial marriage contract; she gave a birth to this 
child two and a half years ago. In order to document her child, she raised a paternity case 
at the Egyptian court, but the husband appealed to the court, and refused to claim the this 
child as his own. The case was still in process for over two years, and the child does not 
have any official documents, and accordingly will not be able to go to school, etc. The 
Istiftāʾ question the woman posed to the mufti was the following: “Is it permissible for 
my fiancé, whom will soon be my husband, to officially register my child as his own so 
that we can issue a birth certificate for school and other purposes?” At that point, the 
fiancé showed his interest and his acceptance of officially registering the child under his 
own name. The mufti, however, was very firm and clear: “This is impermissible because 
it leads to ikhtilāṭ an-nasab, lineage confusion, which is forbidden in Islamic law. You 
should follow up with your court case and insist that your previous husband claims your 
child.” The two petitioners spent about fifteen minutes trying to explain to the mufti of 
the difficulties the child will face, and their hopeless court case in order to negotiate the 
fatwa they received, but the mufti, although showing sympathy to the case, was not able 
to provide them with their desired fatwa.  
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The mufti settled for giving advice that directed the petitioners back to the court 
while definitely knowing its near impossibility. The laws and judicial codes for paternity 
are in fact the most complicated ones in the Egyptian Personal Law for the fact that 
paternity is discussed in the Law under one specific case, which is the case of divorce or 
separation, and the wife and children’s entitlement of alimony to be paid by the husband. 
There does not exist a paternity Law that “governs the issue of paternity as a separate 
legal dilemma.93” As observed by Hind Ahmad Zaki in her case study of paternity 
lawsuits in Egypt, wives are always the ones who file these paternity cases and “since 
there is no specific law governing paternity in Egypt, women are often left to the mercy 
of the individual judge.” There is also no such law that compels husbands to undergo 
DNA testing either94. As complicated as paternity cases for wives seems, it is even more 
complicated for the petitioner in the previous case because she doesn’t even have proof of 
a marriage, and therefore, is why her case has been on-going for more than two years. 
This example particularly shows, besides muftis’ negotiation limits, the competed 
authority of courts and fatwa councils; the mother’s request to register her child with 	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94 Hind Zaki reports that she did not find a single judge in her study that ordered the husband to undergo the 
DNA testing in a paternity case. She also critically discusses the new draft of paternity law suggested by 
Muhammad Khalil Quoita that obliges husbands to undergo this test and discuss the steps and 
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certainty of non-adultery is not to be removed by the doubt of adultery.  
For a detail fatwa, please review, Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣryyah, the Egyptian Fatwa Council. “The 
Establishment of Dār al-Iftāʾ: History and Development.” Web. http://www.dar-
alifta.org/ViewFatwa.aspx?ID=4636&text=DNA. 
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someone else’s name is not only forbidden for its lineage confusion, but also illegal based 
on the Egyptian law codes. If the court found out that Dār al-Iftāʾ provided religious 
authoritative fatwas that conflict with its law codes in matters such as paternity or as the 
previous example of the court documenting divorce as explicit, it would certainly create 
conflicts in both the institutional relationships of both courts and Dār al-Iftāʾ, as well as 
chaos in the society’s legal system. 
In addition to the fact that the jurisprudential schools followed by muftis, and the 
scope of their legal rulings is the major factor of such negotiation limits, it is also true 
that by preserving these legal limits, muftis are also preserving their religious legitimacy; 
failing to safeguard the legal system of which they are responsible for its interpretation 
would in fact negatively affect the perceived authority of muftis by the members of their 
society.  
2. Negotiating the Social Practices 
After explaining the authority relationship between muftis and petitioners and 
how it influences the negotiation process in the legal solutions of marital disputes, I will 
explain here that this negotiation process did not only take place in choosing between the 
possible legal opinions, but also in the particular application of the chosen fatwa, this 
application negotiating incorporates the social positioning of petitioners.  
The economic status of petitioners also played a role in negotiating the application 
of the fatwas. For instance, in regard to the sufficiency of money in an atonement 
penalty—feeding ten poor for a broken oath fatwa—the mufti and the petitioner discuss 
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the estimation of the money required for that penalty based on the petitioner’s income 
and class status, as well as the current prices/expenses in the city. It is neither required 
that the petitioner asks about the exact amount s/he should pays, nor was the mufti 
required to provide such estimation95. Here, the mufti and the petitioner engage in a 
negotiation to agree on an amount that fulfills the already issued fatwa. In this process, 
the mufti relies on: a) his knowledge of the social contexts of the petitioners since he is a 
member of the same society; and b) his legitimate allowed interference in the petitioners’ 
affairs since he is perceived in the society as a legitimate religious and social mediator.  
Thus, negotiating the application of the given fatwa through contextualized social 
discussion is also essential in the practice of fatwa-giving in this sense. It also points out 
to the expected involvement of the mufti in petitioners’ practices and relations. In case 
number (80), an adult married man and a young teenager presented the following Istiftāʾ 
case: the girl is the man’s niece, whom was kicked out of her parent’s household because 
of her ‘inappropriate behaviors,’ as reported by the uncle, who wants to host her in his 
own place. This uncle’s wife, aware of the girl’s parent’s claim about her behavior, 
however, refuses to accept hosting the girl, and threatened the husband to leave the house 
if he insisted in bringing her to their place. The man’s question—presenting this in the 
presence of his niece—was not whether the wife has the right to make such claim, but 
rather, as he puts it: “So now the girl is homeless and I’m afraid if I do not provide her a 
household she may deviate from the right path [meaning her behavior will get bad], so 
what should I do? Should I ignore my wife, who already left the house insisting the girl 	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cannot stay, or leave the girl, who would then turn to a homeless, and maybe 
wrongdoer?” The mufti asked the young girl to wait outside until she is called back in, 
and when she left, he turned to the man and asked, “Be honest—is there any type of 
relationship between you and the girl that your wife is suspecting?96” The man assured 
that the girl is merely his niece and he treats her like a daughter. The mufti then asked the 
man to bring his wife to Dār al-Iftāʾ, and volunteered to talk to the wife to convince her 
to accept the young girl in her place until she finds another one.  
As shown in this case, the istiftāʾ question was in fact a social situation rather than a 
religious legal one—although some legal-related issues, such as the permissibility of 
living with the girl alone, in a khulwah, was brought up by the petitioner in the 
conversation. The man, aware of the muftis’ power and legitimacy among the people of 
Egypt, attempts to use such authority to negotiate his dispute with his wife; brining a 
third authoritative party, who agrees with the man, to the conversation will indeed 
strengthen his argument with his wife. The mufti, in turn, did not hesitate to engage in a 
social affair that would solve the social situation of his petitioner. Driven by both the 
concern about preserving the petitioner’s marriage and the concern about the moral and 
religious development of the girl, the mufti showed willingness to join this social 
negotiation of the case presented. 
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that is already wrong. 
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The following is another example from a fatwa session that also compromised a 
great deal of this type of negotiation. Case number six regarding a nafaqa, marital 
support fatwa, the mufti, as a response to the wife’s complaint about the insufficiency of 
the money the husband provides to the family, discussed the amount of money that is 
sufficient for a good living for a family of petitioners’ size until they agreed on an exact 
amount: 
Mufti: “What do you do for living?” 
Husband: “I’m an accountant and my salary is (…).” 
Wife: “He barely pays for whatever we need, although he is 
in a well-off position.”  
Mufti: “So, how much money would satisfy you?”  
Husband: “I’m saving money for any circumstances.” 
Mufti: “please raise the amount of money you give your 
wife.” 
Husband: “OK, I will add (…).” 
Mufti: “Let them be (…) for that the living expenses is 
higher now and the kids’ needs are much.” 
 
The fatwa session could have ended at obliging the husband to provide sufficient 
marital support to his family, but it continued to negotiate the sufficiency in order to 
avoid potential social disputes on what would be acceptable to fulfill this sufficiency, 
such as the wife claiming excessive amount of money to only be sufficient, or men 
claiming a deficient amount of money as sufficient. Petitioners in the session expected, 
and appreciated, the mufti’s involvement in their social negotiation. Hence, the legal and 
social involvement anticipated altogether from muftis in the Egyptian fatwa council 
suggest that muftis need not only to have a strong knowledge of the law, but also to be 
strongly situated within the specific context in which they perform iftāʾ in order to be 
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able to successfully manage these negotiation processes. Meeting the petitioners’ 
expectation is crucial to muftis for the maintenance of their legitimate authority as 
religious mediators, which is based on both their qualified legal scholarships as well as 
the support and appreciation the people of their society grant them. 
3. The Obedient Wife and the Financially Supportive Husband in Egyptian 
Courts and Society 
The basic structure of the legal and social position of the female partner and the male 
partner of the institution of marriage in the Egyptian society is based on a reciprocal 
image of their rights and responsibilities. While the female partner owns the right to 
nafaqa, financial support, and owes the duty of ṭāʿa, obedience, to her husband, the male 
partner owns the right to obedience, and owes financial support to his wife. The Egyptian 
Personal Law codes, as stated on Law 25 in 1920, amended in 1929, 1979, and 1985, 
holds that “The wife’s ṭāʿa is a husband’s right while the nafaqa is a wife’s right.97” In 
fact, as a supportive evidence for this reciprocal nature of the obedience-financial support 
marriage structure, pre-modern and modern jurists disputed the entitlement of the 
disobedient wife to her owed financial support. In the same manner, but less affirmation 
and significance, they disputed the entitlement of the non-supportive husband to his owed 
wife obedience98. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Sonbol, Amira El Azhari.  Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History. New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1996. P, 282. 
98 Sonbol, p, 282. 
112 
 
The juridical and jurisprudential recognition and establishment of these reciprocal 
rights for both of the marital couple gives them an equal right to demand such rights, and 
accordingly gain the mufti’s or the judge’s support in obtaining and negotiating them. 
Egyptian families, as Hanan Kholoussy shows in her book, For Better, For Worse: 
The Marriage Crisis That Made Modern Egypt, subscribed to the notion that the 
“husband alone was responsible for his wife’s financial support as long as she was 
obedient… a Muslim husband was required to provide regular maintenance (nafaqa) to 
cover her food and clothing expenses. For a woman of the highest class, he was also 
mandated to provide a servant or two.99” In the same manner, as Kholoussy puts it, “A 
proper Muslim wife was instructed to obey her husband fully.100” Clearly, in the 
obligation of nafaqa, the social class plays a big role on the expected application of the 
already established notion of nafaqa, which will also be encountered in muftis’ nafaqa 
fatwa sessions where they use the available social class information they have about the 
petitioners seeking fatwas in order to estimate the sufficient requirement for nafaqa. In 
the same manner, the definition of obedience also takes on different forms, but basically, 
refusing sex and abandoning the marital home are the most typical examples that will be 
discussed. 
 But did these very clear rights and duties of both marital partners effectively 
practiced in modern Egyptian society? Kholoussy points out to the fact that the husband’s 
duty to provide nafaqa was not necessarily applied properly in the society; men 	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sometimes were not always the “dutiful provider” to their families, and hence the 
Egyptian Legal system, in 1910, established an institution to further enforce this duty. In 
the 1875 Egyptian Islamic Code of Personal Law, it gave the wife the right to request a 
judge to imprison her husband up to thirty days if he refused to support her101. 
As for the notion of women’ obligation to obey her husband, it was also not always 
the case, and therefore, similar to the developed institutionalization of nafaqa, ṭāʿa was 
also further developed in the Egyptian society by the state’s interference in the institution 
of marriage; the state courts have invented a legal institutionalized form of the obligation 
of obedience, which is, bayt aṭṭāʿa, the house of obedience, to compel disobedient 
women to obey. In fact, the only form of disobedience that the Islamic courts were able to 
implement was that of a wife moving out of her husband’s house without his permission 
since, practically, it was the easiest for husbands to prove to the judges102. 
In her book, Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History, Amira El 
Azhary Sonbol argues that the nation-state contributed and reinforced the patriarchal 
order in the Egyptian society by their institutionalization of these marital rights in order 
to preserve the social structure. The system, as developed by the state-nation, has 
categorized the addressees of the law by their social units such as their gender or class, 
which is dangerous in many levels, one of which is the enforcement of hegemonic 
structure of social relations. Sonbol states, “By conceptualizing the law on the basis of 
sexual differences that are then justified by human nature arguments, the rest of the 
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patriarchal order falls into place.103” Sonbol supports her argument by the fact that 
“codification,” which is a main feature of the State Law system, was not a main concern 
to Muslim jurists in their production of legal rulings; rather, their production of rulings 
was on the basis of debating the laws while dealing with case by case104, with this fact 
even clearer in muftis’ issuing of fatwas in our contexts. In order to reinforce this 
patriarchal order in their codification of the law, state-nation, as Sonbol argues, uses 
talfiq in its formation of the codes of the Personal Law in the first place. She states, “The 
Law was going to be essentially Hanafi law, except when it suited hegemonic order, then 
Maliki law was used.105” An example to illustrate this talfiq practices is shown in the case 
of sex and rape crimes, which should be placed under family and gender relations under 
the Personal Law, but it is rather placed under criminal law, and was given modern laws 
because they are “more lenient toward rapist.106” 
This discourse taken by the Egyptian Personal Law and Shariʿah court system in 
structuring the image of the marital partners’ rights and duties, and the attempts to 
institutionalize them as means of preserving the social practices is both problematic and 
hegemonic. It led to the legitimatization of social patriarchal practices as well as the 
limiting of negotiation spaces to its codes and articles, although judges as muftis may 
also find their ways to challenge these juridical codes as will be shown. Understanding 
this state-nation discourse is vital in understanding Dār al-Iftāʾ’s discourse in dealing 
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with the same image of marital partners and their presumed roles and responsibilities for 
two main reasons: first, it will explain the competed and negotiated authority between 
courts and fatwa councils in providing suitable answers to the members of the society, as 
was discussed earlier in the introductory chapter, and when and why muftis of Dār al-
Iftāʾ attempt to avoid conflicts with state laws or attempt to grant their petitioners 
alternative solutions from the courts. Second, it explains the petitioners’ resorting to Dār 
al-Iftāʾ instead of the court to avoid the complexity of Egyptian courts structure. These 
two factors will be further clarified in the next section when discussing the fatwa sessions 
in regards to the obedient wife and the financially supportive husband. 
4. The Obedient Wife and the Financially Supportive Husband at Dār al-Iftāʾ 
The principle established in muftis’ fatwas at Dār al-Iftāʾ regarding the reciprocal 
marital rights to each of the marital partner is similar to that of the judges’ previously 
discussed judicial laws; the husband is obligated to support his wife, and is entitled to her 
obedience, and the wife is obliged to obeying her husband, and is entitled to his financial 
support. The only sort of differences between both the court and Dār al-Iftāʾ lies in their 
perception of the application of each right, which depends heavily on the nature and 
structure of each of them. For instance, Dār al-Iftāʾ as a non-binding legitimate religious 
authority, takes a negotiated and preached approach in employing this principle in their 
fatwa sessions. Courts, on the other hand, use a negotiated compelled approach—and as 
seen, institutionalized—in employing those rights in the society.  
In her book, In the House of the Law, Judith Tucker practically shows this positional 
negotiation power interplay through her analysis of the Ottoman court records of family 
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issues such as marriage, divorce, and khulʿ. She casts light on the alertness of judges, as 
well as muftis who work in the courts, in their ensuring of the fulfillment of the legal and 
social positions to each marital partner. Identifying the social and legal situations for each 
marital partner enables judges to decide which side they should take in the negotiation 
process, when necessary. Throughout Tucker’s chapters on divorce and marriage, we can 
see the emphasis on the following two main conceived themes in negotiating marital 
disputes: the first is the husband as the financial supporter of the family, and the second is 
the wife as the obedient partner. 
i. Muftis Responding to Women’s Demands of Financial Support 
 The principle of the husbands’ obligation to support their wives was a major 
element of what Judith Tucker shows with regards to women’s claims or cases on marital 
support, post-ṭalāq allowances, etc., which received a great deal of support by muftis and 
judges in her study. Despite this fact, Tucker points out that “women often ran up against 
the difficulty of proving their claims,” as was pointed out in the second chapter that dealt 
with divorce in Egyptian courts. For instance, wives have the right to obtain a divorce on 
the ground of harm, but proving the existence of harm is a challenge. Another example 
Tucker discusses, which support the principle of male’s financial obligations and in turn 
the female’s financial rights, is related to khulʿ cases. In the khulʿ cases Tucker 
encountered, she found that muftis, taking the wife’s side, insisted on ensuring the wife’s 
explicit consent in khulʿ for the fact that khulʿ terminates some/or all of the wife’s 
financial rights. Because the husband may attempt to “persuade his wife to agree to khulʿ, 
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or at most claim that a khulʿ had taken place,107” muftis were extra careful about receiving 
such explicit consent from the wife in question. Moreover, with the present of the father, 
an example given by Tucker, the mufti will still request an explicit consent by the wife. 
Tucker states, “The muftis were careful to note that a ṭalāq divorce could not be taken for 
a khulʿ and used as a way to abridge a woman’s rights.108” This adherence to women’s 
financial rights within or after a marriage is emerged from a strong tendency and 
agreement toward her positional power in negotiating in this particular subject, namely 
her financial and property rights. This power is obtained through her perceived legal 
rights that muftis are keen to preserve as part of their bigger scale of preserving social 
relations through legal discourses. 
Muftis at the Dār al-Iftāʾ never failed to support this agreement. Examples 
encountered on my fieldwork varied from demanding the fulfillment of basic needs and 
living expenses to negotiating specific post-ṭalāq allowances, and up to demanding 
gratuitous financial gifts responding to equal giving to multiple wives. For instance, in 
case number (61), a niqabi wife—the wife wearing a veil—who was accompanied by her 
husband, presented a case against him on the grounds that when he married another 
woman (with her knowledge) and granted the new bride a house to own, he did not grant 
her, the petitioner, a similar house. The question was framed as the following: “Isn’t it 
my right to demand a similar one?” The mufti’s response affirmation what she expressed: 
“Yes, it is your right.” The husband attempted to explain that his new wife needed the 
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new house, but quickly failed in his attempt because the mufti was clear in stating that 
starting from the moment the man remarried, both wives should be treated equally. As 
established in the Islamic Fiqh, jurisprudence, texts, it is an obligation upon husbands to 
give equal financial duties to their wives to the extent that it was made a condition of 
polygamy (Q 04:03- 4:129). Particularly this case shows the extent of which muftis are 
willing to support women’s claims of any financial rights even if it is not merely nafaqa, 
but also property rights over their husbands. Women then were able to use the accessible 
religious authority provided by Dār al-Iftāʾ to negotiate their financial rights to the extent 
of demanding equal distribution of gifts in a polygamous marriage, which the wife, in the 
previous case, accepted in the first place. Had this wife restored to the court instead of 
Dār al-Iftāʾ for her request, she wouldn’t have been granted any sort of judicial support 
because the principle of financial equality for multiple wives has not been coded in the 
Personal Law. The Personal Law merely necessitates that the husband provides a suitable 
household for his wife/wives, but it does not mention that these houses or any other 
property rights should be equally provided to multiple wives.  
This last point shows how Personal Law courts, although supposedly based on 
Shariʿah laws, fail to provide specific religious rulings because of their interest in 
applying Shariʿah laws is judicial and not necessarily religious. On the other hand, Dār 
al-Iftāʾ—also based on Shariʿah laws, but more connect to the social practices of the 
religious laws—are more responsive to these sort of laws because their interest in 
providing solutions to their petitioners is not only legally based, but also religiously 
based. Thus, the husbands’ financial legal duties, which  muftis take for granted, help 
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them to decide to take the women’s side in cases where wives request such rights over 
their husbands. 
These financial rights settled to women by muftis, despite the owed obedience in 
return to receiving them, provided women with enhanced position in regard to protecting 
their independent economy status. As explained by Maya Shatzmiller in her book, Her 
Day In Court, —which study the payments to women involved in marriages in medieval 
Grenada—because of the fact that Islamic legal system has provided women with a full 
legal competency over properties and established financial rights, such as nafaqa, dower, 
alimony, etc., women’s position in the society were improved as a result of the 
interaction between social practices and economic status in Muslim societies. 
Importantly, Shatzmiller also showed, through examining the archival records of 
Grenada courts, that women in this era did enjoy legal and financial rights that provided 
them an integral role in the society as well as a protected economic status, specially by 
means of the separation of property within marriages that did not allow husbands to have 
access to their wives’ properties109. Hence, the legalization of women’s financial rights in 
Shatzmiller’s context has helped women to guarantee obtaining them through Granada 
courts. Similar to Shatzmiller’s context, the legalization of these financial rights in 
Egyptian courts, besides the religious ratification bestowed upon them in the institution 
of Dār al-Iftāʾ, as well as the social affirmation to the same notion, have altogether 
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provided an avenue to Egyptian women to obtain their legally, religiously, and socially 
established financial rights.  
ii. Muftis Responding to Husbands’ Request of Wives’ Obedience 
Muftis are no exception in their position regarding the principle of women’s 
obligatory obedience. Obedience is an essential element of how women are conceived in 
the society and the religious institutions. Moreover, it is not only obedience to the 
husband by the wives, but also to the closest male relative, the father in the first place. 
Despite the fact that father’s obedience in the Islamic jurisprudence is not limited to 
daughters, but indeed sons as well, in the Muslim societies such as Egypt, the emphasis is 
always on the daughters’ obedience. Since this chapter is dedicated to the marital 
negotiation, my focus in this section is specific to the wife’s obligatory obedience to her 
husband. I would also like to bring to attention to what was discussed in the second 
chapter that the wife, according to jurists, is not legally competent to divorce, and 
therefore, she has no reciprocal right to divorce her husband. This position places 
wives—as the object of the divorce not its actor—in a weaker position in the negotiation 
process that was mostly limited to muftis and husbands regarding the latter’s divorce. 
Wives had no space to participate in this negotiation except as an indirect device to 
backing up the husband with necessary information about the divorce incident. Even this 
role is restricted to wives who wished to preserve their marriages, and not to those who 
wished to obtain a marriage dissolution; if the backing up information the wife 
voluntarily offers is not helping in this regard or rather may result in the establishment of 
the divorce, they were not put into consideration.  
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The case number (35), which has been discussed in the previous chapter, was a 
good example to this limited engagement of a wife in the divorce negotiation. The wife in 
this fatwa session wished to save her marriage while the husband seemed reluctant about 
accepting the mufti’s fatwa of invalidating his pronouncement. The mufti supported the 
wife’s narrative of the divorce incident—she claimed the husband was very angry and 
irritated by her behavior, and that his pronouncement was a response to that, while the 
husband insisted he was aware and intended to divorce her—in this case because it would 
lead to the preservation of the marriage. Calling attention to this incident again is to 
emphasize that there are two major cases where muftis, as a third party in the marital 
negotiation, took the husband’s side in such negotiation: first, in the divorce cases where 
husbands declared large number of divorce pronouncements, including oaths, and 
claimed not to have intended them, and muftis supported their side to preserve their 
marital bonds disregarding whether this choice was also supported by the wife or not; and 
second, in the cases of disobedience-claims by the husband against his wife. 
In fact, although there was not a single case in the attended sessions that was 
primarily set for the purpose of presenting an obedience case by the husbands, in the 
majority of marital cases husbands took the opportunity to complain about their wives’ 
disobedience while at the fatwa session. Muftis were clear that it is an obligation over the 
wife toward her husband to obey him unless what he asks for is forbidden. For example, 
in case number four, an unaccompanied wife in her fifties asked the muftis if she has to 
obey her husband who forbids her from going to perform pilgrimage claiming that he 
does not want her to travel. The mufti’s response was that she does not have to obey him 
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at all, and that it is even forbidden on him to prevent her from such a thing. You should 
explain why she doesn’t have to obey him in this scenario. 
In case number five, however, a young couple with two members of their 
family—the wife’s brother and another unidentified—came to question a conditioned 
divorce, and after receiving the fatwa, the husband began to present an obedience dispute 
case; he complained about his wife’s disobedience in general, and her dress code in 
particular—in the session the wife was wearing a headscarf, jeans pants, and a long-
sleeved top all in black. The mufti, after listening to the husband’s complaints and the 
wife’s objections to his complaints along with her own complaints—she had complained 
about her husband’s drinking and her dislike of sexual behaviors—decided to take the 
husband’s side in this negotiation, and began to talk to the wife about the importance of 
fulfilling the obligation of obedience to her husband, and to listen to his orders in all their 
affairs including her dress code if it bothers him if she wishes to preserve her household.  
An interesting example given by Sonbol in the breaking of ṭāʿa as a means to 
obtain juridical divorce in an Ottoman court was fascinating in its significance of 
portraying the strong relationship of obedience to the institution of marriage in the first 
place. In her example, she illustrates a court case of a husband who was ordered to pay 
his wife’s nafaqa and in return, he demanded his wife’s ṭāʿa, and forbid her from going 
to the supermarket without his permission. The wife, who clearly was not interested in 
continuing her marriage, went to the supermarket, brought neighbors as witnesses of her 
action, and presented her case to the Ottoman court that granted her a divorce on the basis 
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of “breaking her ṭāʿa to him [the husband], that is, breaking the marriage contract.110” 
This example is difficult to imagine its possibility in Dār al-Iftāʾ’s fatwa sessions since 
Dār al-Iftāʾ neither holds the compulsory authority courts enjoy, nor it is responsible of 
investigating the facts presented in its cases, such as bringing witnesses. This example is 
significant in its indications about the strong linkage between obedience and the 
institution of marriage to the extent that breaking obedience may result, with the 
interference of a juridical authority, to breaking the marriage as a whole. Another 
significant point of this example is the fact that wives, both in courts and fatwa councils, 
are able to use these religious institutions’ negotiated feature to obtain their desired 
solutions despite the fact that both enforce and reinforce patriarchal nature upon the 
marital relations in the society. 
Based on the presented cases from the fatwa sessions as well as those through the 
court, in regards to both the obedient wife and the financial supportive husband, it is now 
easier to understand the important interference of the religious and state authorities in the 
formation and application of marital relations in Muslim societies. Equally important is 
the understanding of the impact of the different nature of each of these institutions—
shariʿah courts and Dār al-Iftāʾ—on the different nature of their interference in the 
marital relations among Egyptians. In other words, although both authorities hold the 
same conjugal image of what is owned and owed to each partner in the marriage, they 
vary in their ways of implementing this image. On the one hand, shariʿah court, as a 
binding and legalized institution, pays attention only to what has been codified in its legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Sonbol, Amira El Azhari.  Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History. [Syracuse 
University Press. 1996], p. 281 
124 
 
system as solutions to cases of disputes; what constitutes disobedience and what 
constitutes non-payment of nafaqa, and the criteria of deciding on both constituted laws, 
will be further modified by the possibility to prove it in a considerable methods of 
evidentially accepted by the Egyptian courts admissions that shariʿah courts are also 
subject to, as mentioned in previous chapters. Dār al-Iftāʾ on the other hand, as a highly 
negotiated and accessible religious institution, is able to offer a different and wider sort of 
interference both in terms of providing religious solutions that respond to the 
community’s religious needs as well as negotiating the particular application of these 
solutions without having to be restricted to specific fatwas or a legal system. 
iii. Women: Agencies of the Family and the Law 
Women resorting to Dār al-Iftāʾ were able to claim financial and moral rights over 
their husbands in the fatwa sessions. They were also able to negotiate these claims in 
favor of their own desired solutions. Yet, negotiating rights was not the only type of 
engagement women were able to dominate in the Iftāʾ process; women were also able to 
pursue greater negotiation spaces outside their “legal and social rights zone,” i.e. they 
aimed to steer the fatwa session that is not solely related to their perceived roles and 
responsibilities as mentioned earlier in this chapter, but in the direction they desired—be 
it the interest of their families, the interest of their husbands, or, most significantly, the 
interest of their religious piety through the correct practice of the law.  
Women had the chance to participate in the details of the Istiftāʾ case as well as 
negotiating the given fatwa, such as the particular atonement payment in the following 
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case where in a very interesting and funny session; a middle-aged couple presented a case 
about a conditioned divorce. The husband had said, “If she [his wife] have done so and 
so, she is forbidden upon me” and then discovered she has already done that thing. As 
routine, the mufti asked the husband about his intention, and after the husband’s 
affirmation not to have intended the divorce, the mufti invalidated the pronouncement, 
and the session was about to close until the wife requested to speak about past divorce 
incidents that the husband did not mention.  
The following is the summarized dialogue: 
Wife: There were also other incidents where he pronounced 
different divorce oaths. 
Husband interrupting her: You know I repented and I won’t 
do it again. 
Mufti: What were they? Do you [the husband] remember 
any of them? 
Wife: I do remember everything he said. 
Husband: [to his wife] The mufti is busy and we should go. 
Wife: I need to talk to him about all of the other oaths as 
well.  
 
She proceeded to tell of five oaths for divorce, and the mufti addressed them all. He 
declared them all invalid, but since they are broken oaths, the mufti requested that the 
husband pays a kaffārā for each, and he specified the amount of money for each one. 
Wife: Isn’t it possible that we can reduce this amount? We 
cannot really afford that money. 
Mufti: You may fast if you can’t pay the kaffārā. 
Wife: Do I have to fast as well or only him [the husband]? 
Mufti: Only the husband has to fast. 
 
The woman, as far as I could tell, was not eager to prove or validate a divorce. On 
the contrary, she was trying to make sure that her marriage was not affected by the 
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husband’s repeated divorce oaths. Therefore, she made necessary efforts to help the mufti 
understand the exact incidents, and to decide on the cases. She also helped her husband, 
who seemed very scared of the oaths he had taken for fear that they might end his 
marriage to the extent that he did not want to present them in the session, to get a suitable 
response to his oaths and the required atonements. 
In case number (51), a married couple presented a case of zihār, oath of continence, 
taken by the husband, which renders marital intercourse illicit until an atonement is paid 
by the husband. After the mufti gave the fatwa of an estimated amount of money the 
husband should pay as atonement before he engages in intercourse with his wife, the wife 
began to negotiate the estimated amount of money suggested by the mufti claiming that 
her husband is poor, and the family cannot afford paying the entire amount in a short 
period of time. It is clear that the woman did wish for the atonement to be paid soon 
enough so that she and her husband would be able to go back to their normal marital 
relation. 
In case number (31), a young married couple were unofficially separated on the basis 
that the husband declared three divorce statements of which they thought, without asking, 
were irrevocable divorces. The husband came to Dār al-Iftāʾ alone, in a previous session 
that I did not attend, and asked about the statement he had pronounced, and the mufti 
invalidated them. In the session I attended, however, the husband brought his wife to the 
mufti because she did not believe him, although was very hopeful it was true, to verify 
that the divorce was not established. Actually, cases of separation between married 
couples who do not obtain official divorce exist in a surprisingly large number in 
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Egyptian societies due to many factors such as not wanting to deal with divorce 
settlements, the social stigma of being “divorced”, which is significantly more distrustful 
for women than men, etc. 
 These cases show that Dār al-Iftāʾ was able to provide women access to religious-
authoritative spaces to obtain their rights and to negotiate their martial disputes as well as 
engage in other negotiation spaces whenever they desire to acquire other specific 
religious or family related goals. 
Other cases showed mutual desired fatwas between the married couples or decisions 
that were made prior to their visit to Dār al-Iftāʾ where their visit was for the purpose of 
seeking consultations with regards to the validity of their mutual solutions, and the 
method to acquire and apply it. The following is an example of a husband and his wife 
who came to Dār al-Iftāʾ asking about the process of cancelling an oath divorce, i.e. the 
husband declared a divorce oath on something, and he is willing to withdraw his oath.  
In case number (98), the fatwa question raised by the wife in the presence of the 
husband was as following: 
The wife: my husband said to me, “if you go to search for a 
job, then you are divorced” and I did not, what then should 
we do to cancel this condition? 
Mufti: [to the husban] This is not a divorce and you can 
take back your oath and pay the atonement. 
 
As shown through this example, although it is the husband who plays the larger role 
in the marital disputes in general—divorce cases in particular—women are able to find 
places in which they could engage in the Iftāʾ process, and use the accessible religious 
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authority of Dār al-Iftāʾ to obtain desired results or to use it as a pressure tool to 
negotiating these desired results, again, only when they are aligned with the Dār al-Iftāʾ’s 
methods and aims. 
In this respect, Mir Hosseini raises some fundamental questions about the use of 
courts as means to achieve an end even outside the courts, drawing from this premise that 
courts are not only used to seek juridical judgments, but also used as a bargaining method 
of which people attempt to negotiate rights and duties, and that may result in the ending 
of the dispute outside the court order:  
The court system is used in different ways and for different 
purposes by men and women. The larger number of cases 
brought by women is a reflection of the unequal nature of 
martial rights and obligations. Women resort to court to 
improve their bargaining position vis-á-vis their husbands. 
Men come to court to offset – or preempt—their wives’ 
actions… 30 per cent of nafaqa and 42 per cent of rujuʿ 
cases ended in tanazul, withdrawal of the case, indicating 
that an agreement was reached outside the court111  
 
Courts, and similarly fatwa councils, thus, are primarily used as arenas for negotiating 
marriage and other marital relations especially by women.112 
It is crucial that we understand, based on what is explained throughout this chapter, 
that both the interpretive and bargaining features of iftāʾ depend primarily in the 
following aspects: first, a shared social and cultural ground between muftis and the 
petitioners allows both to push and pull in a dialogue and negotiated manner over 
mediated solutions in order to satisfy each of the parties involved. It is worth noting that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Mir-Hosseini, p. 50 
112 Mir-Hosseini, p. 53 
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despite the choice granted to petitioners to seek different fatwas had the fatwa they 
received is not desirable, petitioners at Dār al-Iftāʾ’s fatwa sessions seemed to be willing 
to accept advices given to them by muftis almost all the time. This is indicated in some 
phrases said by petitioners such as: “I married him on the basis that he is religious, and 
that the Islamic law is our judge,” said a wife in one session; “We came here so you 
would be our final judge,” said a couple in another session; and “We are going to do just 
as you say,” said several wives/husbands. Sometimes at the end of the fatwa sessions, 
petitioners would declare a promise that none of them will reject or reconsider what the 
mufti says. As Hussien ʿAli ʿAgrama observed, despite the fact that fatwas are non-
binding, petitioners voluntarily do follow the given fatwa. He states, “People do not have 
to obey the fatwas they receive. There are no institutionalized enforcement mechanisms 
for them… [yet] those who received a fatwa tended to follow it even if this caused them 
difficulty or some unhappiness.113” This tendency by the petitioners gives much 
significance to the negotiation process at the fatwa sessions since it makes them more 
eager to succeed in their negotiation with the muftis as well as making the muftis keen to 
meet the legitimacy devoted to them by the petitioners’ commitment to their fatwas. 
Second, there are strong set of shared presumptions of prescribed roles and 
responsibilities for each marriage partner between muftis and mustaftīs. For this reason, 
as seen, muftis in many sessions advised wives to obey to their husbands, and advised 
and husbands to satisfy the financial needs of their wives in order to maintain their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 ʿAgrama. ʿAli Hussein. Ethics, Tradition, Authority: Toward an anthropology of the Fatwa. (The 
American Anthropological Association: Vol. 37, No.1, pp. 2-18) p. 4 
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marriages. That is to say, there is a continued attempt to preserve a deeply rooted social 
structure and legitimate authority in both the relationship between muftis and petitioners, 
as well as between the married partners. 
Third, the religious piety that motives petitioners to resort to religiously 
authoritative figures to solve their disputes and to ensures their practices are in line with 
their religious belief and commitments. The recognition of people’s religious needs is 
significant to the understanding of the reasons behind using Dār al-Iftāʾ as a means to 
negotiating their disputes, and to the understanding of their willingness to negotiate and 
compromise between their desired fatwas as well as the applications of such fatwas. In 
this regard, Hilary Kalmbach points out that “the increasing popular demand for religious 
instructions has led to the expansion of religious preaching114” and thus, the issuing of 
fatwas became essential to the society. 
iv. Religious Preaching Based on Social Expectations  
It is worth noting that all husbands who presented divorce cases in the sessions I 
attended, including those that were conditioned and oaths, received a great deal of rebuke 
and preaching advice because of their unacceptable behavior in their impetuous use of 
divorce. The head of the oral fatwa department particularly pointed out to me that this 
preaching is an essential part of the Iftāʾ at Dār al-Iftāʾ for that they also hope to be able 
to refine such behaviors. The percentage of the cases that mentioned they have come 
before to Dār al-Iftāʾ in previous similar divorce incidents (about 40%) indicates that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Kalmbach, p,  
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such rebuke is not necessary effective or successful. The reason for its unsuccessfulness, 
as it seems to me, is that the ground that allows them to use their unilateral divorce right 
as a social control is not removed by such rebuke. This ground is mainly presented in two 
things: the privilege male-authority that the society is granting to husbands as the male 
partners in marriages, and the reconciling legal solutions to Dār al-Iftāʾ provide that grant 
husbands domination over their marital bonds. Provided that Dār al-Iftāʾ discourse, also 
indirectly, reinforces the patriarchal and male dominant structure in the society by putting 
the divorce and all its relevant practices on the hands of husbands leaving no room for 
women to safeguard their space of power in divorce while granting her a space of 
negotiation and power over marital issues than divorce, such as maintenance, and other 
property rights. 
Women also had their share of such rebuke and religious preaching, but it was 
different as their social roles and expectations are also different. Women were always 
advised to be obedient to their husbands, and to tolerate the disliked behaviors, which 
may include verbal and physical violence or shortcomings in the family’s needs that their 
husbands may cause to them because of these husbands’ greater responsibilities to work 
and support the family. The fatwa session number (98) witnessed these two types of 
preaching to the husband and the wife. In the session, the fatwa trustee, who is in his 
thirties, and the petitioners, also in their thirties, engaged in a long discussion—one of the 
longest ones I have attended—after they were already given the fatwa about 
understanding the piety conditions of being a good husband and a good wife. The fatwa 
trustee’s advice to the husband, after having already rebuked him for his five divorce 
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pronouncements, was the following: “Husbands should be responsible, serious, and fulfill 
their household’s financial needs aside from treating their wives with Iḥsān, perfected 
goodness.” The fatwa trustee supported his advice with hadiths such as, “The best of you 
is the one who is best to his wife,”115 and, “Treat them [women] with goodness.”116 The 
husband affirmed his agreement to the fatwa trustee’s advice by nodding his head, and 
directly said, “And please, Sheikh, tell her she should also stop annoying and disobeying 
me because that is why I get maddened and pronounce the divorce.” The fatwa trustee 
turned to the wife and acknowledged what the husband just said. Then, the mufti used 
hadiths as well as the socioeconomic situation in Egypt to support his advice that the wife 
should be obedient to her husband, and pardon his behavior—at this point, and from other 
similar sessions, I assumed that even if the husband did not request that his wife be 
advised as such, the fatwa trustee would have done so anyway because as I said, this was 
pretty much a typical end of each session: giving a religious advice to the mustaftī, again 
and as clarified, based on their social roles as well as their legal duties.  
I particularly chose this case as an example of the preaching part of the Dār al-
Iftāʾ’s fatwa sessions because its fatwa trustee, whom I only attended few cases with 
because of his cases’ unusual length compared to other cases, is also an Imam at a local 
mosque in Cairo. Being an Imam whose first job is giving the Friday prayer ceremony, 
which is mainly based on preaching, is significant in this fatwa trustee’s fatwa sessions as 
they were longer than other sessions, included prepared preaching speeches, and, equally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Sunan Ibn Majah. Book 9, Hadith 2053. USC-MSA web English reference: Vol.3, Book9, Hadith 1977 
116  Sahih al-Bukhari 3331, book 60, Hadith 6. USC-MSA web (English) reference: Vol. 4, Book 55, Hadith 
548. 
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important, requested an oath by Allah on the truthfulness of the facts presented to him by 
the petitioners in their cases. 
The preaching part of the fatwa-giving is not unique to Dār al-Iftāʾ under 
consideration. Rather, it is deeply rooted in the etiquette of fatwa giving, adab al-futīā, 
manuals117 that emphasize the essentiality of giving religious piety advice to the mustaftī, 
as well as emphasizing the importance of the polite receiving of this preaching advice by 
the mustaftī. Some of these manuals dedicate an entire chapter to discuss the piety 
conditions that both muftis and mustaftīs should adhere to. Dār al-Iftāʾ includes this 
essential point in their paper work and in their brochures, which they also give to 
mustaftīs. This notion ensures the religious authoritative element embedded in the Dār al-
Iftāʾ’s relation to the mustaftīs. 
To conclude, the nature of negotiation spaces in istiftāʾ is similar to the nature of 
iftāʾ; it consists of threefold structure of social, legal, and religious aspects. Muftis 
provide petitioners with these negotiation spaces in an attempt to connect fatwas to these 
petitioners’ needs and expectations. Muftis, who enjoy a triple-dimensional authority, 
interfere in the Egyptian marital disputes at three levels, a legal level, a social mediation 
at a very personal level, as well as a religious preaching where they tackle the piety 
criteria petitioners, who are Muslims, should meet. 
The nature of marriage within its legal form, in courts, its social form, in Egyptian 
families, and its religious form at Dār al-Iftāʾ consists of a reciprocal structure that give 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 For a detailed discussion on the role of religious preaching in the fatwa giving, please refer to, Al-
Shawkānī, Al-Nawawī, and Ibn ʿĀbidīn. 
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the husband the obedience right over his wife and demand his financial support, while 
giving the wife the right of financial support over her husband and demands her a full 
obedience to his orders. This marriage structure is a manifestation to the social 
dimension impact on the legal dimension and vice versa. As members of the Egyptian 
society, muftis hold a consistent adapted image of gender relations, and hence, they 
directed their efforts to enforce this image. Negotiating marital disputes, as encountered 
at the fatwa sessions at Dār al-Iftāʾ was in large a reflection of the above marriage and 
gender relations’ structures. Due to the legal codification of socially accepted religion-
based roles and responsibilities, the marital partners’ chances of receiving an 
authoritative legal fatwa from the mufti are increased. 
Despites the fact that muftis are not willing to question the social relations 
structures, muftis went out of their ways to reconcile between the married couples for 
the sake of preserving marriages and ending disputes before having to resort to courts 
and its bureaucratic channels. It was worth noting that because of the competitive 
authority relations between courts and fatwa council—two official state institutions—
muftis avoided any potential conflicts with the courts’ codes and orders. In turn, 
petitioners resorting to Dār al-Iftāʾ were in fact hopeful to end their disputes or obtain a 
desired solution without having to go through courts’ bureaucratic channels. Besides 
attempting to solve their disputes, petitioners also appeal to Dār al-Iftāʾ to fulfill their 
religious desires to seek guidance from legitimate religious authorities, such as muftis. 
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Conclusion 
To recapitulate, fatwas are constructed through the interconnection between 
textual and contextual interpretations; while muftis bring the textual knowledge to the 
iftāʾ process, mustaftīs bring the contextual situations of the istiftāʾ. Both, muftis and 
mustaftīs, bring their societal commonalities, interpersonal commitments, and respective 
powers to the iftāʾ process. During this iftāʾ-istiftāʾ compound, the process of negotiation 
is intertwined to improve the claims over disputed rights and duties for the parties 
involved. The interpretive method of iftāʾ then is grounded in the shared components 
between muftis and mustaftīs. These components can only be fully understood through 
the interactive dialogues in fatwa sessions, which bring a vivid aspect that is usually 
overlooked in studies dedicated to fatwas and iftāʾ, namely, the involvement of 
individuals in the iftāʾ process. 
An example that illustrated the above iftāʾ structure was presented in the 
interference of Dār al-Iftāʾ, as an authoritative religious institution, in marital relations in 
the Egyptian society. Through their fatwa counseling services, muftis aimed to maintain 
social stabilities and gender relations. During the society preservation attempts, muftis 
adapted to the social patriarchal assumptions that give each married partner privileges in 
correspondence to their gender position in the society; female obedience in return to male 
financial obligations. Similar to the fact that these reciprocal privileges are translating the 
social and gender structures, they are also a translation of the legal and religious stances 
in both the Egyptian Personal Law codes and the legal religious fatwas. 
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Through a synthesis of theoretical research and data from interactive iftāʾ-istiftāʾ 
sessions at Dār al-Iftāʾ, this thesis demonstrates that not only that fatwa sessions, similar 
to court cases, combine the synthase of negotiated legal-social structures in a society, but 
also add a vital element to such synthase, which is the religiosity element; since fatwas 
are non-binding legally, as Muslims, petitioners still aim to follow the leads of muftis in 
hopes of fulfilling their religious demands. Hence, the role of muftis as highlighted 
throughout this thesis is of a three-dimensional nature: legal, social, and religious. 
The research in Islamic legal interpretation mostly focuses, in its theoretical form, 
on the Islamic jurisprudential methods and principles, and, in its practical form, on court 
cases. The research on fatwas, however, is not justly studied in the legal interpretation. 
Limiting the focus to the study of court cases and jurisprudence texts overlooks important 
aspects that should enhance our understanding of the structure of legal interpretation—
such as the consideration of the interactive dialogues as essential to the legal interpretive 
methods—, Muslim societies—such as the role of the individuals’ interpersonal aims in 
the formation of the law—, and gender studies—given the immense number of women 
who face marital issues but cannot afford to access courts for legal advice, or can, but, 
chose to resort to fatwas for religious considerations.  
For this reason, I suggest that the research in Islamic legal interpretation shifts its 
attention to the study of iftāʾ as an institution that bring textual and interpersonal 
dimensions. The model of studying iftāʾ as presented in this thesis shall not overlook the 
interactive role and impact of ordinary Muslims, particularly women, in influencing the 
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development of the law, the role of muftis as social mediators, as well as the influence of 
the society on muftis and mustaftīs.  
This model of studying fatwas can benefit not only the research in Islamic legal 
interpretation, but also the research in social and gender studies in Muslim societies. The 
findings of this thesis, then, are useful to the study of iftāʾ and fatwas as to identify the 
lacunae in the scholarship of studying iftāʾ and suggest a modified model to study fatwas 
that can potentially be developed in extended academic research, such model shall fill the 
lacunae in the scholarly research in iftāʾ and fatwas. This model operates under 
developing a reconstructed discourse to the study of fatwas to include all the previous 
elements; petitioners, particularly women, as agencies of the law; muftis as social and 
religious interpreters. The ultimate purpose of this discourse is to demonstrate that the 
powers and authorities of texts and contexts are equally embedded in the Islamic legal 
interpretation. 
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